



ELECTION PROGRAMME
for the
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1999 - 2004

GROENLINKS


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GroenLinks,
the Dutch Green Left

member of the European Federation of Green Parties

April 1999



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Introduction

GroenLinks pursues the same values both in the Netherlands and in Europe: *ecological sustainability, social justice, international solidarity and cultural openness*. GroenLinks' goals have to be partly achieved in the European arena. Issues that cross borders, from environmental pollution to tax evasion, ask for an approach that crosses borders. In view of that, the European Union, the most far-reaching form of cooperation between states worldwide, cannot be disregarded. Without the EU, there would not be European works councils, driftnets would not have been banned, cartels would flourish, and the equal treatment of men and women would be less advanced.

However, the EU with its lopsided economic character is also responsible for negative developments. It is far more successful in the advancement of competition than in organising solidarity, sustainability and legal protection. Politics in Brussels and in member states is too much dictated by the market. Throwing rotten eggs from behind the Dutch dykes cannot reverse this tendency. Just like the business community, that has been organised internationally for a long time and heavily influences the present Union, green and left forces have to make themselves felt within the European institutions.

A show of teeth

The values that GroenLinks devotes itself to can only be realised if the European Union gains in democracy, decisiveness and credibility. An assertive European people's representation has to be the driving force behind these changes. The empowerment that should give citizens a grip on the unleashed forces of market and money starts in the European Parliament. In certain areas, like environmental policy, this parliament already has considerable competences.

The European Parliament as envisioned by GroenLinks uses these competences optimally, and does not recoil from using, if necessary, the most forceful instruments of power: rejecting the budget or dismissing European Commissioners. The present majority in the Parliament has unfortunately recoiled from that time after time. In January 1999 for instance, a majority of social-democrats and christian-democrats protected the European Commission, when it was already seriously discredited by allegations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism. It took a Committee of Independent Experts to get Jacques Santer and his Commissioners to resign. The European Parliament could gain credibility if it showed its teeth more often.

Cooperation

GroenLinks is not alone in its opinion. We are part of the most active group in the European Parliament, the *Green Group*, which consists of representatives of green parties from nine member states. The Green Group took the lead in denouncing financial irregularities within the European Commission. The Green Group regularly succeeds in convincing a majority of the Europarlament, for example in exacting regulations for cleaner cars and fuel. The group cooperates closely with the European environmental movement and other non-governmental organisations, with the green representatives in the national parliaments, and with the European Federation of Green Parties, which encompasses thirty parties from Western and Eastern Europe.

Since green parties in several European countries have gained governmental power, the Green Group can also count a few members of the Council of Ministers, the most

powerful institution of the EU, among its allies. Green Members of Parliament and Ministers are jointly trying to steer the decisions in Brussels in the right direction. Unfortunately, there is not yet a television programme, '*Brussels Today*', that can provide insight for Dutch citizens into the complicated political battles in and between the European institutions.

Scandals

The European people's representation too often lets itself be dismissed as a joke. In the past years, scandals have been piling up: double pensions, generous expense allowances, expensive parliament buildings, family members on the payroll, mass absence at voting. A lot of Members of the European Parliament have done everything to invoke a voters' boycott.

GroenLinks has publicly addressed a number of abuses. We would rather wash the dirty linen in public than sweep the dirt under the carpet. Some results have come from that, such as the announced anti-cumulation law that will cut the double pensions of some Dutch Members of the European Parliament, which is the result of a motion by GroenLinks group leader Paul Rosenmöller that was passed in the national Parliament. Also, the European Parliament has decided to withhold half of the presence fees of representatives who fail to appear at votes too often. Because of that, the presence at votes has increased. That in turn increases the influence of the European Parliament, since amending a European bill requires the votes of at least half of all MEPs, which is not possible when many members play truant.

Another step in the right direction is the draft-Statute for Members of the European Parliament that the MEPs have adopted in December 1998. If this Statute is approved by the Council of Ministers, double pensions for MEPs will disappear and travel allowances will be based on costs actually incurred.

Still, there is a lot left to be improved in terms of parliamentary morals in Brussels and Strasbourg. This election programme therefore includes a reform plan for the European Parliament. If we want to drastically increase the democratic quality of the EU, the European people's representation has to function better.

Critical and constructive

In the next five years also, GroenLinks wants to make itself heard in the European Parliament, for a democratic, green and social Europe. Sabotaging further European unification is not a wise move. That would be playing into the hands of neo-liberal forces, for which the EU is about finished now that the big common market and the Euro are a fact. If European cooperation grinds to a halt, multinational corporations will continue to play national governments off against one another, at the expense of social services and the environment. The arrival of the Euro sharpens competition between EU countries for investments and jobs. To prevent this race from leading to the bottom of civilisation, a strong European social and environmental policy is necessary.

GroenLinks, as opposed to the other large parties in the Netherlands, is not inclined to put up with all the compromises from Brussels. GroenLinks has voted against the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, the founding of the WTO and Europol, both in the European Parliament and in the Dutch parliament and senate. Not out of aversion against relinquishing national sovereignty, but because also for international organisations balanced and democratic rules must apply. The Europe of market and money (Maastricht) cannot do without strict agreements on the protection of people and the environment. A common European asylum policy (Amsterdam) has no added

value if it is concocted in secret meetings, without democratic checks and balances. Social and environmental standards must not be sacrificed to free trade (WTO). The foundation of a European police information service (Europol) with insufficient parliamentary and judicial control is an announced derailment of justice. GroenLinks wants to submit a constructive and critical contribution to a better Europe. We pursue a democratic Union with a decisive social and environmental policy and a common approach to global issues. Such a full political union has long been frustrated by the bickering about the Euro. In the take-off for the Amsterdam Summit (June 1997), the member states were too busy trying to economise themselves into the monetary union and keep others out of it. Partly because of that, the Amsterdam Treaty was a failure. The call for a better Treaty has meanwhile found a broad response in Europe. A new European Treaty will be an important issue in the European elections if it's up to GroenLinks.

At the same time, GroenLinks wants to move the enlargement of the EU rapidly ahead. There lies a historical chance to overcome the division of Europe definitively. The accession of the former Warsaw Pact countries and the arrival of the Euro demand greater European solidarity. It follows that the stronger shoulders should carry the heaviest load. GroenLinks wishes to remain immune to the virus of the populist *we-want-our-money-back* calls that has contaminated the Dutch government. More stability and security in a greater and tighter Union is a European as well as a Dutch interest. That cannot be gotten at a bargain price.

On June 10th, you can vote for a European Union that makes up its social and ecological deficit, closes the democratic gap, and shortens the distance to its citizens. A Union that tackles the problems that we as Europeans have to solve together, but does not interfere in matters that can as well or better be dealt with nationally. You can be sure that with your support, GroenLinks will be making every effort for such a Union in the next five years, if necessary against the tide.

Chapter 1

Democratic Europe

From the stock market to marriage, from the menu to television, the borders between states are fading. The world economy and decision-making in international organisations have an ever greater impact on our daily life. It is time that democracy, constitutionality and citizenship are also given an international dimension. This challenge is most acute in the European Union, where customs at internal borders have vanished and where a powerful supranational level of administration has been created.

The EU is an experiment. Economic cooperation commenced after World War II to prevent new mass slaughter. Nowadays, the countries of Western Europe no longer prepare for war against each other. In that respect, the European experiment has succeeded.

Economic cooperation has its own dynamic. Each agreement creates new problems that demand a common solution. This has led to a process of voluntary integration that has no equal. An ever closer union of more and more countries with diverse cultures and traditions. The EU has 15 member states today, with 380 million inhabitants. One out of every three national laws originates in Brussels.

Democratic deficit

Is the loss of democracy the sacrifice for this expansion? Not if European cooperation increases the freedom of democratic choice. When countries cooperate, political choices can be made that are increasingly difficult to make for individual countries. National politics after all sees its possibilities for independent policy making dwindle because of the increasingly global market. The anonymous forces of the market are not accountable, in contrast with elected politicians. This argues for democratic decision-making on a level where politics can regain its primacy. Trade within and between its member states still accounts for the larger share of the EU's wealth. The EU can therefore set limits to the market.

The input of citizens in supranational decision-making depends on the manner in which that is organised. In this, the European experiment needs urgent improvement if it wants to avoid reaching deadlock in a crisis of legitimacy. The EU is not just an international organisation; it is becoming more and more like a state. However, the separation of powers – a guarantee against abuse of power – that defines a democratic constitutional state, remains absent. The governments of the member states retain an important part of the legislative *and* executive power, in the Council of Ministers. National parliaments, that can each instruct only one of the fifteen ministers, often miss out, especially when the Council votes by qualified majority. The European Parliament is far away from having sufficient legislative and supervisory powers in all fields of policy. Today, no MEP or MP has any grip anymore on expansive and sensitive areas of policy like agriculture or asylum. The national governments seem to find this 'democratic deficit' quite convenient.

In its demand for more power, the European Parliament is hindered by a chronic lack of authority. Parliamentary misconduct places European democracy at risk.

Therefore thorough revisions are urgent. A lot of measures can be taken by the parliament itself. Sometimes the cooperation of the member states is necessary. For instance, they should not condemn the parliament to the life of a 'travelling circus' between Brussels and Strasbourg. Also, the national governments have to establish

a real European electoral system. GroenLinks could then form one cross-border list with *Die Grünen*, *Les Verts* and other allies, on the basis of a common programme. Having European delegates who are only accountable to a national electorate creates difficulties. Because of that, crude national interest often gains the upper hand over a balanced European vision.

Civil society

For GroenLinks, more parliamentary influence is a strict precondition for more European policy. Democracy, of course, is more than the formal power of MEPs. Of great importance is also the influence that active citizens can exert on decision-making. Fortunately, more and more non-governmental organisations (NGOs) organise themselves on a European level. They form international alliances and, in doing so, overcome the *Kafka-in-Brussels*-experience. Their representatives have access to the European Parliament and find ways into the European Commission. Some NGOs face their opponents head on, like the environmental movement and the European employers' clubs. So, slowly but surely, a European *civil society* comes into being.

If true Europeans exist at all, they are the citizens of various countries – all with their national peculiarities – who formulate common interests and want to convince others of them. Even if they unite under the slogan *EU-rot-in-hell*, they gain a European identity, willy-nilly. An identity that stems from a shared vision of Europe's future and from common efforts to make this vision a reality by engaging with the European institutions. European citizenship, defined this way, does not exclude anyone. Those without Union passports or a Christian heritage can be Europeans as well.

Transparency

Dealing with the EU is often hampered by secrecy. Access to official documents is limited. The Council of Ministers makes laws behind closed doors. Back room politics increase the information gap. A law that prescribes open government to the European institutions is urgently needed. Transparency is the best guarantee against dominant lobbies and mismanagement. Politicians and public servants have to feel they are being watched. Moreover, open decision-making, accessible to press and public, increases the legitimacy of European administration. Nothing creates more eurosceptics than politics that surprises citizens with *faits accomplis*.

Constitutional community

While the legislative and executive powers run amok in the EU, the judicial power is underdeveloped. The member states limit the access of individuals to the European Court of Justice in areas where judicial control is of major importance, sometimes a matter of life and death. That goes for asylum policy and for the cooperation in justice and police affairs. On top of that, European citizens still cannot invoke a European constitution. The Union-citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty remains an empty shell as long as it offers hardly any more and sometimes even less rights than those laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights fifty years ago.

Not only citizens have a stake in being able to invoke rights against the European institutions. Member states, especially the smaller ones like the Netherlands, also stand to gain from a European legal community in which conflicts are decided by democratic rules, not by sheer power.

Subsidiarity

One of those rules is the *subsidiarity principle*: the EU does not interfere in issues that can be dealt with as well or better on a lower level. Cultural policy is a good example of such an issue. Still, it appears that to preserve even this particularly national competence, agreements on a European level are necessary. For example to prevent commercial broadcasters from settling in neighbouring countries to get around Dutch advertisement rules. Or should we lay down those advertisement rules on the European level? The example shows that the interpretation of 'subsidiarity' is seldom clear-cut and will often fuel political battles.

GroenLinks opts for a division of competences that strengthens the body politic's ability to act on all levels, from local to European. To that end, European agreements are often necessary. Those rules should define a common basis of civilisation and protection. An approach that is already being used in European social legislation. Minimum standards, not maximums. Not too many escape clauses, no superfluous details. Such rules should be made democratically. It should be possible to reject them by referendum. This way, European citizens will have a choice again.

Fortress Europe

The freedom to travel to another country, and to live and work there, has almost become a fundamental right in the EU. A European crossing borders is a model Union citizen. However, those who try to do the same without a Union passport are treated almost like criminals. In concert, the member states are constructing a Fortress Europe. For people that is, because the EU does strive for worldwide circulation of goods, services and capital with enthusiasm.

These contradictions will eventually prove to be untenable. The increased possibilities of transport and communication put people in motion all over the world. Some leave their place of birth out of necessity, as a consequence of poverty, human rights violations, wars and ecological disasters. Abuses that Europe – to put it kindly – does too little about. Prosperous Europe has therefore long been an immigration region. The restrictive admission policy does not alter that fact significantly. It does however create an underclass of illegal immigrants and crowded asylum shelters, by closing off other ways of entrance. Legal migrants are being withheld from returning to their countries of origin, because once outside means always outside. This policy creates its own untenability.

Ostrich policy should be replaced with an immigration policy that faces the facts. In that policy, political refugees ought to retain priority. The Geneva Refugee Treaty of 1951 gives those who fear persecution a strong claim to protection. Unfortunately, European cooperation has up until now mostly served as a legitimization for attempts by member states to avoid complying with the duty to carefully examine each asylum application. Central and Eastern Europe and even Turkey are used as a buffer against refugees. In contrast with the rapid construction of Fortress Europe, proposals for common minimum standards, partly because of the required unanimity in the Council of Ministers, are dismantled until no member state is affected by them in any way. Governments still are restricting their policy in turn, so as not to be more hospitable than their neighbours are.

The Treaty of Amsterdam gives European asylum and migration policy a binding character. But the usual checks and balances have been left out. There is still the threat that in the secret ministerial meetings the least humane member state sets the European standard.

The members of the European Parliament should not accept a role on the sidelines. They can use their grip on the EU budget to exact a European Fund for Refugees, as a first step towards European solidarity.

A second group of migrants who deserve priority are the (future) partners and children of migrants who already reside here legally. The member states are after all bound by human rights treaties to respect family life.

In conclusion, there are the labour migrants. Even in times of great unemployment, it is not wise to shut the front door to everyone who is not a manager or a professional football player. It is an illusion to think that they won't find the back door to rich Europe. Moreover, it will take a long time yet before there is one European labour market. A surplus of labour in one country can coincide with a shortage elsewhere. It would therefore be logical to allow entrance to a certain number of immigrants from outside the EU. They should, for the same period of time as citizens from other EU countries, have the chance to start providing for themselves. To reach an entrance volume that makes legal labour migration an interesting option, such an immigration policy has to start on a European level.

Treaty stop

Is Europe without inner borders an ideal feeding ground for organised crime? The nature and scale of international crime have seldom been researched, but that has not kept the EU member states from fanatical judicial treaty-making. Every government during its half year presidency of the Union puts new initiatives on the table to prove it is *tough on crime*. Because of that, in the third pillar of the EU a forest of overlapping treaties has grown. No one knows to what extent they really improve justice and police cooperation. Most treaties have not even come into effect yet. The member states are so busy making more new treaties that there is no time left for parliamentary approval of those already signed.

Criminals seem to be the only ones to profit from the drafting of even more treaties. The authorities that are in charge of tracing and prosecuting criminals have long since lost track of the legal situation. The best thing the EU can do for police officers, public prosecutors and judges is to give them the chance to familiarise themselves with the existing possibilities for international cooperation.

It is therefore time for a *treaty stop* in the field of criminal justice. GroenLinks makes an exception for treaties that guarantee the rights of suspects. When it comes to that, the Council of Ministers has had a blind spot up until now. At the European Court for Human Rights, suspects can only file complaints against individual member states, not against cooperating states and European organs like Europol. Such a treaty should also lay down when foreign police and justice officials have to give testimony in criminal court cases. As long as they are not obliged to do so, European cooperation can be abused to launder illegally obtained evidence.

The cooperation as described above stays intergovernmental, a responsibility of national governments that decide which agreements they want to make. Judicial control by the Court is necessary for an unequivocal observance of the agreements and for the legal security of individuals. Democratic supervision in this EU pillar is for the most part a matter for national parliaments. Where possibilities for supervision by national parliaments really fall short, the European Parliament should be given a role. That goes for Europol, the European police information service that now operates in a democratic vacuum, but still gets assigned ever more tasks.

No new dividing lines

In the negotiations with applicant states, the EU puts a heavy emphasis on the battle against crime. Constitutional progress in Central and Eastern Europe should however not only be judged by the fight against crime. The ultimate accession criterion for new member states is human rights. Also the equal treatment of men and women belongs to the basic rights of the EU from which the newcomers may not diverge. In the case of the internal market, the Euro or even environmental laws, transitional periods are negotiable. There can be no compromising on the constitutional qualities of the applicant states, however. The many adaptations that the EU requires of its new members will take a formidable investment in building institutions, from competent courts to national health services. If the EU does not support the adaptation process with money and personpower, a lot of rights and rules will remain dead in the water. The constitutional and democratic deficits in its own organisation provide the EU with a credibility problem in the negotiations with applicant states. It gets worse if the EU starts to withhold fundamental rights from new Union-citizens. More and more voices argue for a postponement of the free movement of workers, out of fear of an invasion of job seekers from the East.

The EU cannot make the applicant states face the burdens of membership, in the form of many, sometimes painful adaptations, while withholding the pleasures. Without sufficient reciprocity and support, the risk that the enlargement process will fail grows. The Union-citizens-to-be could get so fed up with the EU dictates that by the referendum they could reject accession at the *moment suprême*.

That would be a sad ending. Security, environment and prosperity, in West and East, stand to gain from erasing the dividing line that was drawn through Europe by the Cold War. It is therefore regrettable that the EU has opened negotiations with only five of the ten Central and Eastern European applicants. Between the front runners (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) and the trailers (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia) a new dividing line is threatening to arise. With the latter group of countries clear agreements have to be reached as to their path towards accession. They have to be equally entitled to EU support, if only because their vague perspective of accession makes it more difficult to attract private investment.

GroenLinks wants to invest generously in EU enlargement, both politically and financially. But even then we must recognise that the EU cannot take in an unlimited number of new members in the near future. It would nullify its own merits and be reduced to a free trade zone. With countries like Russia and Ukraine, the EU should devise other forms of cooperation. Agreements on access to the internal market, economic support and facilitating the movement of people should prevent the Wall from being put up again elsewhere.

The EU's ability to take in new members increases to the extent that its member states agree on more democratic and prompt decision-making procedures. That has not been accomplished in the Amsterdam Treaty. The risk of paralysis and lack of credibility increases when, after 2002, the EU enlarges. But the EU cannot go back on its promise of accession either. The enlargement has to put pressure on to rapidly revise the Amsterdam Treaty.

PROGRAMME POINTS

A. Democracy and the rule of law

1. Before 2002, the member states revise the Amsterdam Treaty, to prepare the Union better for the enlargement. The new EU Treaty increases democracy, constitutionality, transparency, effectiveness and decisiveness in the policy areas in which the EU is competent. The European Parliament, national parliaments and non-governmental organisations will have a part in the treaty revision. The outcome of a Europe-wide referendum on the new treaty determines whether national ratification procedures will be put in motion.
2. The European Parliament gets:
 - a) the right of codecision in all legislature on which the Council of Ministers decides by qualified majority;
 - b) greater control over other decisions of Council and Commission and over the EU organs, among which the European Investment bank and Europol;
 - c) the right of amendment on the whole EU budget;
 - d) the right of initiative and a strengthened right of inquiry;
 - e) the right to appoint and dismiss Commissioners individually.
3. Transparent decision-making with qualified majority votes becomes the general rule in the Council.
4. The executive powers of the Council shift gradually to the European Commission.
5. The European Court of Justice gets full judicial power over the interpretation of all laws, decisions and treaties of the EU.
6. The European Court of Auditors gets more supervision powers, among which the right to inspect the accountancy and archives of all those who pay or receive EU subsidies and the right to cooperation from national audit-offices in the battle against fraud and waste.
7. The existing preconditions for forming a hardcore of member states, integrating faster than the rest, are supplemented by an obligation to assist member states that want to but cannot take part. Introduction of a right for the EP to approve and set the budget for the forming of such a hard core contributes to limiting the use of multi-speed integration to cases in which the greatest effort has been made to reach consensus in the Council.
8. The EU respects the subsidiarity principle. EU legislation is given a minimum character as much as possible, and does not contain details that are better filled in on a national or lower level.

B. European citizenship

1. The EU Treaty will be reformed into a European constitution by a directly chosen constituent assembly. This constitution has to be ratified by an EU-wide referendum and by the member states. The European constitution gives more substance to the rights of residents and to Union-citizenship. To accomplish that, the Treaty will contain:
 - a) the protection of basic rights, based on and at least equivalent to the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the Social Charter;
 - b) an anti-discrimination article with direct effect that explicitly forbids discrimination on the grounds of sex, sexual orientation, marital status, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, belonging to a national minority, birth, age, disability or health condition, but

leaves member states ample room to use affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.

- c) the right of NGOs to sue the European institutions in the European Court of Justice for illegal actions or failure to act;
 - d) the possibility of EU-wide referenda;
 - e) the right of third country nationals to obtain Union citizenship after five years of legal residency in the EU and, for their children, at birth in the EU;
 - f) the active and passive right to vote on all levels for EU citizens and for third country nationals in the member state where they legally reside;
 - g) the promotion of equal participation of men and women on all levels of decision-making;
2. The EU checks more critically than up until now whether member states fully apply all articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for all inhabitants. An independent institution therefore tests yearly to what extent civil as well as social and economic rights are really effected and which obstacles still exist. The best standard for verification is the realisation of the rights of the most disadvantaged.
 3. The free movement of persons and workers will also apply to third country nationals legally residing in the EU.
 4. The right of access to information materialises in a European transparency law. It will put an active information obligation on all EU institutions and organs, among others through the Internet, and sets strict, well-defined conditions for secrecy.
 5. Before taking policy initiatives, the Commission consults all relevant NGOs that are organised on a European scale. It publicises which organisations were consulted. If necessary, the Commission subsidises its critics.
 6. All interested parties, regardless of citizenship or place of residence, are given the right to take part in public consultation and appeal procedures.
 7. A European offensive against racism based on the anti-discrimination article of the Amsterdam Treaty will be launched. This article will also be used to delete articles in the EU legislation which discriminate against for instance the elderly, homosexual men and lesbian women.
 8. The EU promotes the recognition of marriage and registration of same sex couples by all member states.

C. Reforming the European Parliament

1. The EP is going to work on a recovery of its credibility by:
 - a) strictly supervising whether Members use their expense allowances for the intended purposes, basing travel allowances on the real costs made and strictly matching *per diems* to participation in roll-call votes and meetings;
 - b) publicising statistics that give insight into the presence and voting participation of each Member;
 - c) no longer subsidising the private supplementary pension fund for Members;
 - d) reneging on upward harmonisation of income and pension and banning double mandates in its proposal to the Council for a Common Statute for all MEPs;
 - e) only waiving prosecutors' requests for lifting the immunity of Members when those are obviously politically motivated;
 - f) making its president, vice-presidents and quaestors dismissable;
 - g) lifting limitations on access of the media to the parliament;

- h) limiting the number of spokespersons per group and allowing interruptions, so that the debates become more lively;
 - i) introducing the instrument of a motion of censure against an individual Commissioner in its Rules of Procedure;
 - j) giving national MPs the right to speak at committee meetings, and asking national parliaments for the same right for MEPs.
 - k) not only barking, but also biting.
2. The Council and the member states cooperate in reforming the EP, among other things by:
- a) pressing for a more sober expenses regime during budget negotiations;
 - b) setting a uniform procedure for the European elections, with European lists of candidates and based on proportional representation, without electoral thresholds;
 - c) amending the Amsterdam Treaty so that the EP gets the right to choose its own seat.

D. Asylum and immigration

1. The Geneva Refugee Treaty is the standard for European asylum policy. Common minimum standards and mutual support put the brakes on policy competition between the member states.
2. In a new EU treaty, the Refugee Treaty will be added to the basic principles of the Union. The European Court of Justice can test asylum measures against it. The *Aznar-protocol*, which limits access to the asylum procedure for EU citizens, will be deleted.
3. In the earliest revision of the decision-making procedures concerning asylum and immigration policy, the Council will switch to voting by qualified majority, the EP will be given the right of codecision and the Court will get full judicial powers. The capacity of the Court will be strengthened to speed up the judicial process.
4. The Council retracts the resolutions on *safe countries and safe third countries*. The guarantee laid down in the Dublin Convention that at least one member state has to test an asylum application in substance will be fulfilled. The right to appeal to a higher court is ensured. Only in case of valid suspicions that an asylumseeker has already filed an asylum request in another member state can his or her fingerprints be taken and registered in the *Eurodac* system. Family members and those who lived together enduringly in the country of origin will have the right to reunite and go through the asylum procedure in the same country.
5. A European Fund for Refugees will be established, which partly compensates the costs that member states have for shelter of asylumseekers from the EU budget. Central and Eastern European countries are given support to improve their asylum procedures and shelter facilities. Also Third World countries are eligible for EU support, to foster a reasonable shelter for refugees in their own region.
6. The EU instigates binding minimum standards for the quality of asylum shelters. Asylum seekers will be given the right to study and to work.
7. EU standards for the recognition of refugees are solely additional to the Geneva Refugee Treaty and the Handbook of the UN refugee organisation (UN-HCR). For example, they will lay down specifically that also sexual preference, overstepping sex-specific standards or the threat of sexual violence can lead to a well-founded fear of persecution.

8. Displaced persons whose asylum requests are refused but who cannot be sent back because of an unsafe situation in their home countries will have the right to study and work; after three years they become eligible for a permanent residence permit.
9. An independent European information centre for asylum policy will be set up. This centre will publish reports on the countries of origin of asylumseekers, based on verifiable data from as many sources as possible.
10. The EU instigates minimum standards to guarantee the right of legally residing third country nationals to family reunion and to form a family.
11. The EU stimulates remigration measures with an option of return for those who regret the decision to remigrate.
12. Europe is an immigration region. The EU formulates basic principles for a more liberal admission of workers, self-employed and job-seekers from outside the Union.

E. Fighting crime

1. Police and justice cooperation in the EU remains intergovernmental as long as the need for federalisation has not been proven and the constitutional structure of the EU is inadequate.
2. Before the EU draws up new criminal justice treaties, governments and parliaments of member states will make a definite decision on the approval and execution of the treaties already agreed upon in this area in the framework of the EU and the Council of Europe. As an exception to this treaty stop, the position of suspects in criminal court cases will be improved by treaty.
3. National police and prosecution officers will be thoroughly educated in working with the existing treaties on criminal justice cooperation, preferably in an international framework, so that member states gain at least ten years of practical experience with them.
4. The cross-border battle against crime is aimed mainly at trafficking in humans, especially trafficking in women; at the smuggling of weapons, radioactive and other heavily polluting substances, large quantities of narcotics and protected or endangered plant and animal species; at laundering money and at large scale international fraud at the expense of the EU budget.
5. Europol will not be given executive competences. It will be submitted to full judicial supervision by the Court and democratic control by the EP. The protection of privacy will be improved, the immunity of Europol staff abolished.
6. The EU definition of 'participation in a criminal organisation' is limited to groups that, with criminal means, pursue financial gain.
7. Also on a European level, the prevention of crime should take precedence. European measures will be tested on their sensitivity to fraud. The EU recommends to member states that they legalise the use of soft drugs and decriminalise the use of hard drugs.
8. The anti-fraud-unit of the European Commission gets greater room for executing control in member states. Suspicions of fraud within the European institutions are immediately reported to justice.
9. Encryption will not be limited.
10. The EU strives for a dismantling of the worldwide telecommunication-tapping network *Echelon* and refuses to cooperate in other initiatives for undirected interception of telecommunication. A treaty will be drawn up that binds cross-border targeted tapping to the approval of all member states concerned, sets

rules for cooperation between secret services, and forbids economic espionage and spying on EU partners.

F. Enlargement

1. Admission of the Central and Eastern European applicant-states into the EU increases security of all Europeans. No other state in or around Europe may be excluded from EU membership in advance. New member states have to:
 - a) respect human rights, the rights of minorities and the equal treatment of men and women, abolish the death penalty;
 - b) be stable democracies and constitutional states;
 - c) have settled all serious mutual and internal conflicts;
 - d) simultaneously with the internal market legislation, also execute the social and environmental legislation of the EU.
2. The EU offers the applicant states substantial economic support, ample access to its market and assistance in the building of institutions and the civil society.
3. The EU abolishes the visa requirements for subjects of all Central and Eastern European candidate member states. The European agreements on external border controls may not turn the borders between new member states and non-EU countries into impenetrable barriers. Free movement of persons and workers will be effected immediately upon accession for inhabitants of acceding countries.
4. The EU emphatically distances itself from the notion that Turkey as a 'Muslim country' could never be an EU member, but holds on unequivocally to democratisation, respect for human rights and a peaceful solution for the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as preconditions for the start of accession negotiations.
5. The EU dedicates itself to strengthening political and economic ties with and between the European countries that are not applicant states. That also goes for the Mediterranean.

G. Culture

1. European culture consists in the first place of learning how to handle and appreciate cultural diversity. Therefore the EU complements the cultural policies of its member states with a policy aimed at exchange, also with countries outside the EU. Cross-border cultural initiatives and networks are supported. All cultural and educational programmes of the EU are open to the applicant member states.
2. The linguistic richness of Europe deserves continuous protection. Especially within representative institutions like the EP, all official languages have to be on an equal footing, *coûte que coûte*. Member states agree that their students learn at least two foreign languages.
3. All young people get the right to a period of study or work in a European foreign country.
4. Cultural policy will not be subjected to the laws of the market. Systems of fixed prices for books remain allowed, also for cross-border language regions.

Chapter 2

Solidary Europe

National governments more and more often run up against the limits of their ability to set social conditions to the market. Whenever they want to go in for reducing working time or giving employees a greater say in companies, the employers' lobby cries blue murder. Realistic or not, the fear of an exodus of companies has a paralysing effect on social policy. The member states could raise their sights higher, if social standards are elevated on a European level. Why don't we have for example a guaranteed period of paid parental leave for all European workers yet? Such measures would express that the European Union is not merely a prosperity machine, but also a source of social civilisation. Europe will not become happier, and certainly not cleaner, with economic growth alone. The discipline of the market sometimes has to be put aside for the sake of the human dimension.

GroenLinks devotes itself to a Union in which solidarity is firmly anchored. Solidarity between rich and poor regions, between the employed and the unemployed, between men and women, between young and old, between natives and newcomers, between healthy and disabled citizens. To reach that goal, a major political effort is vital, because up until now, European social policy is still in its infant stage.

The right wing of the political spectrum invokes the subsidiarity principle: there is no need for strict European regulations. Europe – market and money – will generate employment and prosperity by itself. For those who cannot keep up, there is a safety net on a national level. This should not be too comfortable; a government that wants to redistribute too much will be called to order by the market. The left wing is in favour of a European social policy, but often too hesitantly. Some think that solidarity is by definition bound to national borders. Or they fear that the differences in Europe are too great for a decent social policy. Others claim that we first have to have the Euro in our pockets, and that a social Europe will then follow. It is high time that progressive forces shed their defensive attitude and join hands for an active social policy. After all, the EU is out of balance, as long as it organises competition, but not solidarity. Europe should not only offer opportunities to companies, but also perspectives and security to employees, job seekers, people on the dole, pensioners, young people and consumers. For many, the EU will only then become relevant. For the European Parliament, here is an opportunity to boost its credibility. It should not solely complain about its limited competencies. As much as a treaty revision is wanted to give social policy more momentum, MEPs do not have to wait for that. The representatives of GroenLinks therefore attach great value to extra-parliamentary alliances with trade unions, marches of the unemployed, anti-poverty protest, the women's movement, environmental groups, organisations of the disabled, platforms of the elderly, consumer unions, churches and organisations of sexual minorities. The European Parliament should be the pulsing heart of the Union, a platform where social movements meet. Thus, a European social network develops that can resist the international business lobby and the dictates of the financial markets.

Regaining sovereignty

Three developments – globalisation, the arrival of the Euro and the enlargement of the EU – more than ever challenge Europe to search for new forms of solidarity. According to some, it is already too late for that: we do not compete on the European internal market, but on the global market. However, the process of globalisation is not

that fast. There are only a few sectors that really compete worldwide. Globalisation is also an ideological project of neo-liberal cut, aimed at talking politicians into even smaller margins. Up to 90% of the trade of European companies still takes place within the EU. On the European level, as opposed to member state level, larger social efforts barely have a distorting effect on trade flows. By sharing sovereignty and setting common social standards, member states can actually increase their freedom of action in the social field. The argument that increasing minimum wages or shortening the working week undermines national competitiveness will then lose validity.

As the most powerful trading block in the world, the EU can also make a difference on the global level. The freedom to form trade unions, the ban on discrimination and lots of other social standards that were drawn up by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), are still a long way from being common practice in the world. If the EU pushes that in negotiations on free trade, globalisation can become a phenomenon that does not empty social rights of meaning, but gives them substance globally.

Stabilising the monetary union

Since January 1, 1999, monetary union is a fact. With that, exchange rate risks for companies have disappeared, and the wind has been taken out of currency speculators' sails. Travelers are freed from exchange costs when in 2002 guilders, marks and liras are replaced with euros. The EU will have a powerful political symbol. Still, this single currency is little reason for cheer. In the past years, the euro has also become the symbol of energetic cuts in public expenditure. The welfare state has partly been dismantled, social cohesion has taken a blow. That process is still ongoing in many member states. The corset of monetary union still squeezes spending and that does no good to the EU's popularity.

GroenLinks likes to see the budget deficit decrease. But cutting budgets is a never-ending story, as long as the European tax race is not tempered. While governments wrestle to control their expenditure, at the same time they feel obliged to lower the levies on capital. If not, companies will move their investments and rich citizens will send their money across the border. Often they are coaxed by tax benefits in neighbouring countries. Thus, EU member states compete each other's treasuries down to the bottom of the barrel. One is more adept at that than the other, but in the end there are only losers left. That is evident from the fact that levies on labour, the less mobile production factor, are still rising in almost all EU countries. Shifting the tax burden from capital to labour is juxtaposed to the goals of employment policy. Partly because of that, unemployment in the Union remains unacceptably high. Officially, ten percent of the professional population is without a job; that is at least twenty million Europeans.

European tax coordination for now remains limited to difficult attempts to weed out the most serious extremes – fiscal favours for companies and tax paradises for savers. If member states leave it at that, the tariff battle will get worse. The euro further stirs up competition. Member states' budgets threaten to become stuck in a downward spiral. Then, a recession will not even be necessary to test the Stability Pact. This pact, meant to guarantee the stability of the euro, threatens countries that let their deficit run up to over 3% with heavy fines. It is questionable whether governments can justify to their voters that in times of severe unemployment and a rising deficit, on top of that they transfer billions in fines to Brussels. Probably not. That will throw the Union into a crisis, and with that also the Euro.

Here, the fact that the agreements on monetary union foresee fines, but not support, avenges itself. A lack of in-built solidarity is the greatest threat to the stability of the euro. The euro countries have given up their monetary instruments. Their margin for budget and tax policy has diminished. Because of that, all economic misfortunes threaten to be passed on to the labour factor. Salary cuts, lower social benefits and further flexibilisation of the labour market will then have to turn the tide of economic cycles. The tougher monetarists among politicians, employers and central bankers dare to admit that more and more clearly, now that they have safeguarded the introduction of the Euro. This competition in working conditions and social security can herald a European race to the bottom of social civilisation. Competitiveness will then become the national idol, at the expense of people and social activities that do not help boost the gross national product. While paid labour becomes more and more like a professional sports competition, volunteer work will remain undervalued. To avoid budgetary anorexia, deregulation and a fixation on productive labour, member states have to provide themselves together, as the EU, with the instruments to stabilise economic swings and spread wealth more evenly. The EU should put the brakes on policy competition and encourage investments where they are most needed. That requires more European cooperation and solidarity.

Bridging differences

The accession of new countries, much poorer than the present member states, forms the third challenge to the social Europe. The inhabitants of all applicant states will have to be given a concrete prospect of work, prosperity and social progress if they are to remain supporters of accession. That requires more support than the EU foresees now, and a greater appeal to the solidarity of the present union citizens. But mass unemployment, poverty and political unrest in Central and Eastern Europe could cost us even more dearly.

In an enlarged Union, agreements on social standards and wages will have to take into account the large differences in labour productivity between member states. Differentiation of social standards may not come down to denying rights though. The fact that Polish citizens will be able to look for work in the whole EU is only discomforting if employers can take them on with worse working conditions than domestic employees. Viewed in that way, free movement of Polish workers should encourage the present member states to close the gaps in their system of social protection.

European social policy should not only take into account economic, but also political and cultural differences. Increasing diversity challenges politicians to distill common values from diverging national traditions. Often, this willingness is lacking, and legislative proposals meet with vetoes in the Council of Ministers. But even the most neo-liberal ministers can hardly put their foot down, if European employers and employees together develop the proposals. Therein lies the use of the European Social Dialogue. Within the EU there should be ample room for the input of the social partners, on the condition that they make good on their responsibility to improve working conditions and employment. If the negotiation results of the social dialogue are too meager, European institutions should not hesitate to reject them. The European Parliament should be granted that right as well; a parliamentary big stick. Increasing the stakes of the social dialogue forces the national employers and trade union federations to improve European coordination. Then we will perhaps see more EU-wide trade union actions.

If the social partners remain divided, politics should take the lead. But still many social measures can only come about if the Council agrees unanimously. This decision-making regime frequently leads to blockades. Ministers may not hide behind each other's unwillingness. If the issue is worth it, and unanimity out of reach, closer cooperation between those states that want to can be the lesser evil. A Europe of multiple speeds in this area is acceptable, if a long-lasting social impasse is the alternative.

Value for money

A Europe of solidarity cannot be obtained at a bargain. The one and a half percent of our Gross National Product that flows to the EU forms an acceptable contribution for a rich member state that has amply benefited from the European Funds for decades. As an import and export county, the Netherlands still gets a disproportionate advantage from the internal market. More important than the question of what the EU may cost is the question of what its money should be spent on. Not on motorways in Spain, but on a high speed train to Warsaw or touristic cycle paths between the North of the Netherlands and Ostfriesland. Not on supporting the price of boxed calves, but on improving the distribution structure for biological food. Not on patching up nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, but on European research on renewable energy sources.

Instead of such political proposals, the Dutch government, over the last years, has introduced mainly bookkeeper's arguments in the negotiations on financing the EU, unfortunately. Partly because of this attitude, the agreement that the governments of the EU countries reached in March 1999 in Berlin was cheap. However, the agreement has so many loose ends that it probably won't last for long. The member states have postponed the greater part of the reform of European agricultural policy. They devoted only 3% of the EU budget to the applicant states in Middle and Eastern Europe, too little to promote a quick accession.

Those parties who send their MEPs to Brussels as bill collectors, turn their back on the European challenges. GroenLinks' representatives in the European Parliament will launch proposals that do not simply serve Dutch financial interests, but help Europe to make progress as well. This election programme contains such ideas: a European Fund for Refugees, a more fraud-proof collection of import levies, partial decentralisation of agricultural subsidies, European ecotaxes. Support for Central and Eastern Europe also serves Dutch prosperity.

GroenLinks doesn't go for the easy buck, but for a responsible enlargement of the EU, an agricultural reform that produces an attractive, livable and sustainable countryside, and a truly stable euro. The EU should be given the means to do that. It may even levy its own taxes, on the condition that they be used to advance sustainable development. Because of a lack of European coordination, the taxes on profit and use of the environment are too low now.

Not we want our money back but *value for money* should be the guideline for further reforms of the EU finances; less fraud and waste, more democratic supervision over a socially and ecologically responsible spending of the European funds.

PROGRAMME POINTS

H. Social Europe

1. Besides sustainable prosperity, the EU should also contribute to a high level of employment, income security, combating poverty, a fair division of labour, care and income, equal opportunities and the development of free citizens who speak up for themselves.
2. In a new EU Treaty, European social policy is given a greater reach that also encompasses social security. Upward harmonisation on the basis of minimum prescriptions remains the leading principle. For all social policy applies: no vetoes in the Council of Ministers but qualified majority decision-making with equal decision power for the European Parliament.
3. Trade unions and employers' organisations are given the express task of improving working conditions within the Social Dialogue. Agreements between the social partners that lead to draft-legislation need the approval of the Council as well as the EP. The EU creates the possibility of making collective agreements on a European level generally binding, for sectors that compete across borders.
4. The EU sets minimum standards for the level of minimum wages, social security and basic pensions. These standards are related to the average income in each separate member state and guarantee all citizens the minimum living standard in their member state. Also minimum standards are set for the level and period of benefits in case of unemployment, illness and inability to work.
5. Impediments to the freedom of residence for pensioners, the early retired and those unable to work are removed by legislation that makes it easier to take benefits and pensions abroad, but simultaneously counters tax evasion.
6. The EU sets minimum standards for the access to education. Those who, in their own countries, have a right to some form of study allowance will also receive that while studying in an acknowledged institution for higher and professional education in other EU countries.
7. The European policy for equal treatment of men and women in the labour market is expanded to combat indirect discrimination, for example in function classification systems. A new EU Treaty declares equal treatment to be applicable to all forms of social security.
8. On the basis of UN standard rules concerning equal opportunities for disabled persons, the EU, in concert with the client organisations concerned, draws up directives that make full participation and free movement for disabled persons possible. The EU also sets rules to prevent social exclusion of people with HIV/AIDS.
9. The EU promotes participation and co-management of employees. Introduction of the European company statute may in no way turn workers' participation into a dead letter.
10. The legal position of consumers on the internal market will be strengthened. European consumer policy also promotes sustainability as much as possible, for example by extending the legal guarantee on products to at least three years.
11. EU prescriptions for universal service ensure the accessibility of the digital highway. In investments in knowledge infrastructure and the digital highway, the EU gives priority to public services and optimal access to information for all citizens worldwide.

I. Employment union

1. Employment becomes a touchstone for all European policy, especially for tax politics and the reform of the European funds.
2. Member states coordinate their macro-economic and employment policies. A new Treaty enables the Council and the EP to lay down binding directives.
3. Member states guarantee, if necessary with support from the Structural Funds, the right to education, internships or subsidised employment for all unemployed, starting with youths and the long-term unemployed.
4. The EU promotes the redistribution of labour and care, among other things by introducing minimum prescriptions for reduction of working time, the right of employees to part-time labour, paid parental and calamity leave, affordable childcare and sabbatical leave.
5. The EU takes measures that offer protection to employees with flexible contracts.
6. Labour mobility is increased by lifting impediments for the free movement of workers as a result of diverging fiscal, social and education systems. In amending social and fiscal legislation, member states apply a *cross-border workers test*. A European fund will be created that assures the benefits and pension claims of migrating employees. The mutual recognition of diplomas will be speeded up.
7. Unemployed persons are given the possibility to look for work in another member state during a year, while retaining their benefits.
8. The European Investment Bank will warrant the provision of more risk capital, on advantageous conditions, to starting entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized businesses.
9. The EU stimulates sustainable employment with investments in knowledge infrastructure and the digital highway.

J. Monetary Union

1. A stable Euro requires a democratic framework and greater solidarity.
2. In the new EU Treaty, besides price stability, promotion of employment becomes an important goal for the European Central Bank.
3. The legitimacy of the European Central Bank is dependent on transparency and democratic accountability. A new EU Treaty will stipulate that:
 - a) the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the ECB become public a month later;
 - b) the EP gets the right of endorsement in appointing the directors of the ECB;
 - c) the ECB directors can be asked at any time to give account by the EP, supplemented by national MPs who enjoy the right to speak;
 - d) Council and EP get the right, in the last extremity, to dismiss members of the Board of Directors of the ECB by qualified and respectively two-thirds majority.
4. The European Commission will represent Euroland in international negotiations on monetary policy, as within the International Monetary Fund and the G8 of large industrial countries.
5. The Stability Pact becomes sensitive to cyclical movements: in times of recession, the member states may let their budget deficit rise further, in times of rapid growth they should decrease the deficit.

K. Taxes

1. European tax policy is desirable in as far as it:
 - a) promotes employment and sustainable development, by lowering the burden on labour and increasing the burden on capital and use of environmental space;
 - b) restores to honour the principle of 'the strongest shoulders carry the heaviest load';
 - c) prevents downward pressure on the level of public services and social security.
2. To counter tax evasion, there will be European minimum tariffs for taxes on interest income, dividend, capital and capital gains. Passing on these levies to income taxes remains possible. Therefore member states are obliged to mutually exchange relevant information.
3. There will be a European minimum tariff and a harmonised base for corporate taxes.
4. At the next revision of the EU Treaty:
 - a) decision-making by qualified majority is introduced in the Council for all fiscal measures, with co-decision for the EP;
 - b) the EU gets the possibility to levy taxes itself, beginning with corporate profits and use of environmental space;
 - c) the EU gets the right to contract loans.
5. Anticipating the greening of the European VAT system, the member states get the right to lower the VAT on environmentally friendly and labor-intensive services, like shoemaking or bicycle mending.
6. The EU makes a point of the introduction of a *Tobin tax* by as many countries as possible: a small tax on currency transactions that discourages purely speculative transactions and limits the power of financial markets.
7. The EU devotes itself to reaching an international agreement on levying taxes in cyberspace.

L. Financial solidarity

1. With the help of the Structural funds, regions with trailing or stagnating economic development are supported in attracting or developing extra economic activity. At least two thirds of the Structural Funds for regional development goes to the regions where the wealth is less than 75% of the EU average. For other regions, the required level of co-financing from national funds is increased. Cross-border cooperation, initiatives of and for disadvantaged groups, improvement of cultural and environmental infrastructure are awarded higher priority.
2. The part of the corporate taxes and ecotaxes that is levied by the EU feeds an Employment Fund and Investment Funds for Sustainable Development.
3. The Employment Fund is used for targeted investments in regions that are troubled by rising unemployment due to cyclical adversity.
4. The Cohesion Fund for the poorest member states is dissolved. Investments in environment and infrastructure will be supported from the Investment Fund for Sustainable Development.
5. The Pre-Accession Fund will be at least doubled, even if the EU budget does not rise. All Central and Eastern European applicant states have an equal claim to support.
6. The EU carries on a dialogue with governments and non-governmental organisations in the applicant states about the social repercussions of the

accession process. The EU offers, if necessary, budget support to applicant states that want to improve their social performance.

7. A say in the matter for non-governmental organisations and regional/local governments is a precondition for awarding support from all EU funds.
8. Irregular or fraudulent use of EU subsidies leads to immediate reclamation. The institutions and companies responsible are temporarily excluded from support.
9. Member states revise the Own Resources Decision. In that revision:
 - a) the contribution to the EU will not only be based on Gross National Product, but also on its growth or decline: countries experiencing a boom contribute relatively more than counties in recession;
 - b) the proceeds from customs levies that are paid to the EU are transformed into a set amount that is decreased gradually; from the extra levies collected, the member states may keep not 10 % but 100 %, which makes the fight against fraud ten times more rewarding and spares the European Commission a lot of supervising work;
 - c) the Own Resources Ceiling is elevated if the EU needs extra contributions to fulfill its tasks;
 - d) the contribution rebate for the United Kingdom is abolished.

Chapter 3

Sustainable Europe

The environment knows no borders. Many environmental problems, like the greenhouse effect and the pollution of seas and rivers, go across borders. International cooperation is vital in order to realise a sustainable society. By that GroenLinks means a society that produces its prosperity without drawing upon the earth's resources disproportionately. The inhabitants of the rich North should, in view of the precautionary principle and distributive justice, no longer exceed the *environmental space* available to them according to present knowledge, so that room is created for the economic development of the South and future generations may find an inhabitable world.

More than any other international organisation, the EU binds its member states to environmental legislation. This is noticeable for the applicant states which face enormous investments needed to comply with all existing EU environmental laws. However, Europe is far from being sustainable. The quality of air, water, soils and biodiversity are still decreasing, if we make a net calculation. European integration still creates too few solutions and too many new problems.

Thus the removal of trade barriers encourages moving goods through Europe, even more so because the environmental cost of all that transport is not passed on to the customer. Even worse, the EU also subsidises all kinds of transport infrastructure: the *Trans-European Networks*. Member states claim money for motorways that sometimes run through nature reserves with a European status – Brussels still does little in the area of spatial planning. More and more European politicians and civil servants recognise that the growth of road and air transport forms the largest threat to European nature and environmental goals. But many others still believe that more asphalt means more work and prosperity.

As long as European environmental policy is lagging behind the development of the internal market, the risk of *eco-dumping* remains: companies that settle in the member state with the most lenient environmental regulations. When the euro is a fact and cost and price differences are visible in the blink of an eye, European competition will be used as an argument against national environmental laws even more often. With the same ambition with which the internal market and the monetary union were realised in the past decade, Europe should draw up and implement a *Green Agenda 2025*. An encompassing ecological programme to make the EU comply with the demands of sustainability within one generation.

Environment policy: European *and* national

Member states may not pass the responsibility for sustainable development on to the EU. "That can only be done in a European context" is too often used as an excuse to back out of taking national environmental measures. That is irresponsible and unwise. With a progressive environment policy, countries do not only run risks, they also create opportunities. Strict environmental laws may chase some polluters over the border, but encourages most companies by far to make extra efforts to efficiently use energy and resources. In the longer run, this creates a competitive advantage. Clear environmental agreements encourage the development of innovative knowledge and technology, the export products of the future. Of course, the advantages of a *green front-runner policy* will be greater according to the number of

countries that are obliged to follow suit. National and European environmental programmes can strengthen each other.

The EU should create maximum space for member states who want to serve as boosters to a sustainable policy. Too often, the European Commission tries to ban national environmental measures, because they would hinder the free movement of goods. Placing the market above the environment is a wrong way of setting priorities, which is disastrous for public support of the EU. The European environmental laws and levies should have an unequivocal minimum character, which member states can go beyond.

Investing in enlargement

The heritage of the communist command economy in Central and Eastern Europe encompasses many ecological disaster areas. After the collapse of the Wall, governments clearly did not give priority to ecological reconstruction and modernisation. Green movements and parties in these countries see accession to the EU as a chance to put the environment higher on the political agenda.

The EU also stands to gain if the applicant states make good their environmental backlog as soon as possible. For that, the EU has to make far more means available than it is planning to at the moment. Between 100 to 150 billion euro are needed to adapt mainly energy production, water treatment and sewage in the applicant states to European standards. These countries cannot come up with that amount on their own. If sufficient support for a rapid recovery is not forthcoming, chances are that after accession the new member states will put the brakes on European environmental policy. This is not just hypothetical, now that the Amsterdam Treaty has not done away with the possibility that environmental measures are blocked by one single member state.

Extra means to support environmental investment in the applicant states are also necessary because the countries with which the EU has not yet entered into accession negotiations, like Rumania, may not get left behind the front-runners, like Poland. Those trailing behind need all the more European support.

In certain cases, it is defensible that new member states do not completely comply with the EU environment laws upon accession. Sometimes, extra time is necessary for structural solutions instead of makeshift measures. Implementing an energy conservation programme is more time-consuming, but also more sustainable and cheaper than placing filters on brown coal plants whose eventual closure is inevitable.

Sometimes, the applicant states are greener than the EU. Environmental laws concerning genetic manipulation for example are stricter than those in the EU. Their agriculture is less damaging to the environment. They still have a lot of unspoilt nature, among other things primeval forests. It is in nobody's interest if Central and Eastern Europe copy the mistakes that Western Europe made in its economic development. Especially here it should be underlined that integration in the EU may not be a one-sided process.

Farming for the future

The agreement the governments of the EU countries reached in Berlin in March 1999 postpones many of the reforms needed in European agriculture. In their zeal to freeze the agricultural budget, government leaders forgot the goals of the reform process, like greening agriculture and making enlargement possible. De need for a

more audacious reform will make itself felt more and more painfully in the coming years.

The traditional goals and instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy do not suffice any more. In many cases, they are even contradictory, in subsidising surplus production, environmental damage and animal suffering. The challenge is to develop a policy that will lead to sustainable agriculture. For that, it is necessary to break with the present trend. Market and price policy should no longer be tuned to strengthening the export position of the EU on the global market. Qualitative goals should be put at the center: protecting the environment and biodiversity in rural areas, encouraging cattle farming that puts animal welfare and the environment at the centre, preserving natural and cultural landscape.

A sustainable reform of the agriculture policy should comply with four criteria:

- Agriculture must be made more environment-, nature- and animal-friendly;
- The policy must contribute to global food security in the longer run;
- The reform must facilitate the enlargement of the EU;
- The countryside should be vital and attractive. Vital means with a solid socio-economical basis; attractive means with sufficient facilities for inhabitants and enough tranquillity and scenic variation for recreation.

The cost of agriculture and the countryside to the tax payer is less of a problem, if the money is well spent. That means it should not finance dumping surpluses on the world market, for instance. European farmers deserve support for sound foodstuffs that are produced in a clean and animal-friendly way. For such products, the consumer and taxpayer – the citizen, who likes to enjoy tranquillity and scenic beauty in his leisure time – may be asked a reasonable price. This reasonable price is at present not offered by the world market. That has the character of a *dumping market*. If global market prices will determine the agricultural revenues, that spells disaster for the European countryside. Only large-scale, industrial agriculture will then survive. A certain amount of market protection is therefore inevitable. That applies in any case as long as the WTO allows unfair competition, for lack of agreements on phasing out all (veiled) government support for export goals, and of social, environment and animal welfare standards that all agriculture should comply with.

In order to prevent surplus production and export dumping, market protection should be accompanied by production control. Limitation of agricultural production in the present EU member states is also necessary to give room to the development of agriculture in the acceding countries, without exceeding the agricultural guideline in the EU budget. For Central and Eastern European agriculture, the higher agricultural prices of the EU could be a stimulus. At the same time though, the EU should recognise the socially unacceptable effects in the new member states when the food prices rise faster than the standard of living. Already, Central and Eastern Europeans have to spend a major part of their income on food. To bring about a responsible integration of West and East in the area of agriculture, it may be necessary for the EU to strive for lower prices.

Agriculture also yields achievements that cannot be directly passed on through food prices, like natural values and scenic beauty. For this, farmers deserve support from public means. The income support given to farmers to compensate for lower guaranteed prices will also take on a more sustainable character when nature and environment criteria are attached to it. The allotment of such subsidies can partly be decentralised to the member states, providing the European Commission acts as a supervisor against unfair competition.

PROGRAMME POINTS

M. Sustainable development

1. The EU draws up a *Green Agenda 2025*, aimed at reaching sustainability within one generation.
2. The EU drastically reduces the use of natural resources and energy. Strict environmental demands are made of trade and investments, to prevent ecological dumping.
3. The tax system is greened. There will be European minimum levies on energy, fertilisers, pesticides and scarce natural resources. VAT is adapted in such a way that environment-friendly production and consumption are rewarded.
4. Environmental levies follow the principle *the polluter pays*. The profits are partly used for Investment Funds for Sustainable Development in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Third World and within the EU.
5. The Investment Fund for the EU aims mainly at environment-friendly innovation of transport of people and goods in Europe, energy conservation, sustainable energy generation, recycling, environmentally responsible agriculture and new environmental technologies.
6. Subsidies from existing European funds are tested for environmental effects and ended if necessary. The environmental criteria for spending money from these funds are sharpened and closely supervised.
7. Within the borders of the EU, experiments will be set up with tradable emission rights.
8. The Union will start a spatial planning policy aimed at sustainable development. Economy, transport and agriculture will be attuned to that.
9. The goal of sustainable development will be integrated in all policy areas of the EU. The Directorate-General for Environment of the European Commission puts the policies of other DG's to a sustainability test. Environmental organisations are involved in all relevant policy-making.
10. The existing legislation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is extended with a strategic EIA. In the EIA-directive, the obligation to assess the *zero-option* and work out the most environment-friendly alternative is introduced.
11. Projects with considerable cross-border impact have to comply with the environmental standards of all member states or regions concerned.
12. The European Commission does not hesitate to request the European Court of Justice to fine member states that do not or badly execute EU environmental legislation.
13. At the next revision of the EU Treaty, decision-making by qualified majority in the Council is introduced for all environmental measures, with the right of co-decision for the European Parliament.
14. The environmental guarantee in the EU Treaty is strengthened: member states may introduce stricter measures and higher levies, if it is plausible that these have an advantageous environmental effect.

N. Enlargement

1. The EU offers firm support to the adoption and implementation of EU environmental legislation in the applicant states. After accession, transitional periods of five years at the most are acceptable, if the extra time facilitates the choice for structural solutions instead of *end-of-pipe*-measures.

2. Companies from the EU are obliged to comply with EU environmental legislation when they invest in applicant states.
3. The EU promotes the development of environmental expertise in the applicant states. In environmental projects subsidised by the EU, local knowledge and technology is used whenever possible, and public participation is guaranteed.

O. Traffic and transport

1. The transport of inputs and products will be reduced. Transport of goods over the road and through the air will be drastically limited. In the development of Trans-European Networks, transport by rail, water, pipes and the digital highway gets absolute priority.
2. European minimum excises on petrol and diesel are rapidly pulled up to the highest national level. These minimum excises are then increased by 7 % each year.
3. There will be a ban on new passenger cars that use more than 10 litres of fuel per 100 kilometres. Car manufacturers will be obliged to reduce the average consumption of all sold cars to 5 litres in 2005 and 3 litres in 2010. Simultaneously, the standards for emissions from cars are made stricter.
4. There will be a European maximum speed of 100 km/h. Notorious speeders get speed controllers.
5. The European standards for vehicles in public transport ensure their accessibility to bicycles and wheelchairs. The European railway companies are obliged to make it possible to take along bicycles and wheelchairs in the train, also in international rail transportation.
6. There will be a network of high-speed trains in the EU. Interference with nature and new annoyances in densely populated areas is avoided by letting these tracks wherever possible run along or on existing rails and by using *pendolino* trains.
7. The EU introduces excises on kerosene and/or an emission levy for aeroplanes, as well as VAT on plane tickets. Take-off and landing fees are strongly differentiated to discourage night flights and promote more silent and clean aeroplanes. The EU dedicates itself to global aviation levies. It forbids all subsidies and exploitation subsidies to airlines and airports. Flights within Europe of less than 500 kilometres are banned on routes where a good public transport alternative is available, like a high-speed train. The number of (regional) airports will be reduced. The European Commission will play a co-ordinating role in limiting and distributing airport capacity. The EU stimulates research into alternatives for the aeroplane, like zeppelins.
8. The EU obliges ports to pass on the cleaning of ship's tanks in the dock charges, to prevent the dumping of harmful substances at sea. Ships of shipowners who are guilty of such practices are banned from European ports. That also applies to ships that can no longer be deemed safe according to EU standards.
9. The EU draws up a programme for the promotion of cycling. It stimulates especially laying out of cross-border and long distance cycle paths.

P. Energy

1. The EU obliges itself to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by at least 2 % a year.
2. There will be a regulating energy tax.

3. The European programmes aimed at energy conservation and use of renewable energy sources are expanded. There will be a special fund to realise the *1-million-roofs-programme*: in five years, a million houses in the EU will be fitted out with solar panels.
4. The Euratom Treaty will be dissolved. All research into nuclear energy is discontinued. Earliest possible closure of nuclear plants will become one of the goals of a new energy chapter in the EC Treaty. Reprocessing of nuclear waste is stopped immediately. In principle, nuclear waste will be stored in the grounds of the closed-down plants.
5. The EU gives active support to Central and Eastern European countries to phase out nuclear energy there as well and promote energy conservation and sustainable energy production. Closing down the most dangerous nuclear plants gets priority.

Q. Sustainable production and waste

1. Polluting emissions from industries are reduced with legislation aimed at integral chain management and the closing of industrial cycles. In all phases of the chain, environmental data have to be made public, among other things by means of yearly environmental reports.
2. The approximately 100,000 chemical substances that are now legally available on the EU market will be tested on health and environmental effects. The most dangerous ones, among which endocrinic disrupters, are banned.
3. There will be an unequivocal system of environmental certification of products. The cleanest products are put in the lowest VAT tariff.
4. Producers get a duty to take back as well as process their products and packaging. Waste production is prevented as much as possible. PVC, blister and aluminium packaging is banned. There will be an extended deposit system.
5. The legislation against dumping waste outside the EU will be toughened and better upheld through simplification.

R. Nature

1. The habitats of animals and plants that enjoy protection on the basis of the habitats and birds directives will be linked into a European ecological network at an increased pace. This network will not be interfered with by infrastructure or buildings.
2. Where flooding risks necessitate a cross-border approach, the EU promotes nature recovery along rivers to create enough waterbuffers and give the original flora and fauna a new chance.
3. There will be a European ban on import and trade in non-sustainably produced wood.
4. The EU bans hunting for pleasure, import of protected plant and animal species and the import of fur and other animal products obtained by hunting. In the very short term, hunting migratory birds and applying 'inhumane' catching methods like the leghold trap are banned, as well as import of products that were obtained in that way.

S. Agriculture and fisheries

1. With legislation, subsidies and levies, the EU promotes environment- and animal-friendly production methods in agriculture. Ecological agriculture, which uses no

- fertilisers and chemical pesticides, will be the model for the whole European agriculture. Retaining and strengthening (agro-)biodiversity is stimulated.
2. Subsidies on the export of agricultural products are abolished. Buying up and storage of surpluses is limited to a minimum. Guaranteed prices disappear gradually. Import levies and production-controlling measures, like quotas, nature fallow and the promotion of extensive farming, will provide farmers with a reasonable price for their produce. The EU strives for a volume of agriculture that, as a rule, does not necessitate export outside the EU to get rid of surpluses. The production capacity to feed Europe remains intact.
 3. The EU influences production and price levels in such a way that a socially unacceptable rise of food prices in new member states is avoided. If this makes lower EU prices necessary, farmers will receive income support to compensate. These direct payments are gradually linked to nature and environmental conditions and employment criteria.
 4. Giving substance to the environmental, nature and landscape conditions that are attached to direct payments and other subsidies for farmers requires European minimum standards as well as national and regional detailing. Therefore, the execution of these subsidy regulations is partly decentralised to the member states. With this shared responsibility of EU and member states goes a common financing. Member states will contribute to the direct payments to farmers following the principle of co-financing. The European Commission sees to it that there is no distortion of competition.
 5. Intensive cattle farming is phased out. On a European level the development of habitation standards is taken up energetically. These standards are based on the 'natural' needs of farm animals. The breeding of animals for fur will be banned. The transport of live livestock goes no further than to the nearest slaughterhouse.
 6. Import levies on agricultural products gradually take on the character of environmental levies, as much as possible.
 7. The EU strives within the WTO for trade agreements that give room to strengthening agriculture in developing countries and in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU also invests directly in sustainable rural development in these countries.
 8. There will be a ban on the use of medication as growth enhancers and the preventive use of antibiotics in cattle farming. The import ban on *hormone meat* is retained.
 9. The EU develops standards for a reserved approach to genetic modification of plants and animals. Food packaging will indicate if genetic interventions were used in the production. Animal testing and genetic modification of animals is only allowed if it's the only way to reach a substantial improvement of public health and if there is no unacceptable animal suffering. Patents on life are abolished. Cloning humans and animals is banned.
 10. Subsidies for cultivation, storage and export of tobacco are discontinued.
 11. Farm animals will become vegetarians again. There will be a ban on adding bone meal or fish meal to cattle foods. The indiscriminate catching of sea animals for the fish meal industry will be banned in the future.
 12. International agreements on fish quota aim for recovery of fish stocks. In the very short term, catching methods will be developed that cause less animal suffering and are more selective in size and kind of fish.
 13. The EU, in cooperation with the North Sea fishermen, fisheries biologists and the environmental movement, sets up a large-scale experiment to see whether the

prescription of fishing methods, fishing days and seasonal fishing regulations can be a sustainable and fraud-proof alternative for the distribution of fish quota among fishermen.

14. The European sea fisheries fleet is reduced in size. Fisheries agreements with developing countries may not interfere with the subsistence of the local population.
15. To put a halt to the scaling up of fisheries, a maximum is set for the number of quota that may be added up by one shipowner after the buying-out of small fisheries companies. Renting out quota will no longer be allowed.
16. The EU strives for encompassing international agreements on the management of seas and oceans. Small-scale seasonal and coastal fisheries get priority over industrial sea fisheries.

Chapter 4

Global Europe

Borders are being removed not only within the European Union. Also on a global scale, state borders and national sovereignty are gradually losing their significance. Thanks to large-scale means of transport and advanced possibilities of communication, the global traffic of information, goods and people is growing. This worldwide exchange makes cultural cross-pollination possible on a hitherto unknown scale. In this respect, the process of *globalisation* is enriching. Western music and literature, for example, have become more colourful over the last decades. However, it is not a case of exchange on an equal footing. Differences in economic power partly determine the valuation of ideas, lifestyles and traditions. That means that there is a danger of cultural uniformity too. It is unlikely that McDonalds has only the superior taste of its products to thank for its worldwide popularity. For many, the *Big Mac* is tangible evidence of prosperity and global citizenship. For others it is a luxury good that they can only dream of. Both groups are bound by the same fascination with a life of material affluence. If other cultural sources dry out as a result, diversity is lost.

For dictatorial regimes, it becomes more and more difficult to shield their citizens from 'subversive' contacts and ideas. That also is an achievement of globalisation. Ironically, the worldwide spread of democratic ideas coincides with an erosion of political room for manoeuvre. National governments are gradually losing their grip on capital and investment flows. They are under mounting pressure to pursue a policy that conforms to the dominant preferences on the financial markets, on pain of monetary and economic crises. This coercion decreases the room for democratic choices concerning the organisation of society.

Politics on a global scale

The globalisation of politics is still far behind the globalisation of the economy. Even stronger than within the EU, the emphasis in negotiations in the international arena is on removing trade barriers. These liberalisation agreements, along with technological developments, speed up the pace of the globalisation process, and strengthen the lopsided economic character of that process. Only the need for expansion of multinational corporations, it seems, is powerful enough to move governments to relinquish sovereignty. For now, the world government knows only one powerful department; the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Social, ecological and security policy on a global scale, assigned to the United Nations, develops at a snail's pace. States are not prepared to equip the UN with the necessary competencies and means. The development of post-national forms of democracy, in order to give citizens a voice in global politics, is still in its infancy as well. Thanks to the increased (digital) means of communication, a cooperation between non-governmental is developing that spans the world, but they can hardly get a foot in the door with the international institutions. Of directly elected international popular representation there is only one imperfect example: the European Parliament.

Changing course

The democratic control of EU policy offers an opportunity for a change in direction in the EU's global performance. Opening up new markets should no longer be given priority. The EU should aim to set social and ecological limits to the unleashed world

market. For a fairer division of wealth, an international approach to ecological problems, an increase in global security, greater transparency and democratic supervision of international organisations like the WTO.

With a better-attuned position within these organisations, preferably even common representation, European countries can put a greater weight in the scale. That is, if European policy is more than the greatest common denominator of national interests. Supporters of a policy that wants free trade to be also fair trade are to be found in large numbers in the public opinion of the rich North. Europe should also go into partnership with the losers of globalisation: the gap between rich and poor countries, between prosperous and impoverished population groups within developing countries, is still growing alarmingly fast. Uncontrolled economic growth as well as stagnating development can increase the strain on natural resources so much that sustainability is a long way away.

For the world south of the rock of Gibraltar, the EU is decidedly not a negligible factor. The policy areas in which European integration has progressed most are of great, sometimes even vital interest to developing countries. A change of European direction should start there. For example with the agriculture and fisheries policy. Subsidised European agricultural exports disturb the local food provision and rural development in developing countries. The EU still tries to keep a large fishing fleet afloat by buying fishing rights along African coasts. Local fishermen are left out in the cold. In spite of all the free trade rhetoric, developing countries still get only scant access to our markets.

The development policy of the EU, just like the Dutch policy, should be aimed at combating poverty, investing in basic social provisions, sustainable development and promoting human rights and democracy. The Union and the member states can complement each other, if the EU aims at the areas in which it is competent and knowledgeable. This applies to food provision, to fisheries and rural policy, to strengthening human rights and democracy, and to environmental policy, especially concerning energy and biodiversity. The Lomé Convention between the EU and 71 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean, the ACP countries, has to be strengthened precisely in these areas.

This development treaty should, besides articles on support and trade, also contain agreements on human rights and democracy, conflict management, environment and migration. That way, a more equal partnership can come about between the EU and the ACP countries.

More cohesion

Greater cohesion between the different forms of external policy of the EU, like development policy and trade policy, is urgently needed. Unfortunately, it is precisely the foreign policy of the EU that lacks cohesion. The European Union enters the world stage as an economic giant whose political brain is still in a pubescent stage. This lop-sidedness causes mishaps and passivity. Because the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) trails behind its economic role, the EU takes too little responsibility for the promotion of a global rule of law, international stability and sustainable development. Whether it is about investments in Burma or about arms deliveries to Turkey, the trade interests of the EU and its member states usually take precedence over efforts for human rights. In international crises the EU can often not act because of internal differences.

GroenLinks expects from the EU as an economic world power a much more active contribution to the prevention and management of conflicts. For the CFSP, a first task

would be in the direct vicinity of the EU. The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the deadlock of authoritarian development systems in Northern Africa and the Middle East have led to chaos and bloodshed in a number of areas (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Algeria, Kurdistan). These crises are often worsened by trade relations which increase the disparities in wealth. The EU shall have to contribute to the peaceful solution or rather the prevention of such conflicts. Where reconciliation and recovery is possible, the EU should offer ample support. No less important is the task of the EU in the developing legal order. At the center of that should be an active human rights policy, that dominates over economic interests. Apart from that, the EU has to support the efforts of the United Nations to lessen the tensions between countries and peoples.

A telephone number for Europe

The foreign policy of the EU is, even after the Amsterdam Treaty, still largely determined in the national capitals. The dissent that member states display in their common deliberations in Brussels is bound up with the illusions that especially the larger member states, like France and the United Kingdom, foster. These former colonial world powers have not yet accepted that they also have become a size too small to be in high favour on the world stage. They often choose a solo strategy, even if it is bound to fail. The smaller member states do see that the margins for an independent foreign policy are getting smaller. Precisely within a European framework they can regain influence. But even though these countries hardly dare use their veto right in the Council of Ministers, they also hesitate to take leave of the principle of unanimity in the CFSP and award a role to supranational institutions like the European Commission and the European Parliament.

As long as these illusions and hesitations exist, the institutional weakness of the foreign pillar of the EU, that leaves maximum space for conflict of interests and diverging national strategies, cannot be easily repaired. But especially with the enlargement of the number of member states, governments will have to dare take the step to coordinated decision-making by qualified majority voting, under democratic control. Aside from their own geopolitical lines they should take a 'common telephone number', so the EU can be reached by the rest of the world. Political will and common institutions have to start strengthening each other. Such a dynamic also led to the internal market.

Civilian power

GroenLinks does not foresee a military role for the EU. There are too many outsiders that would feel threatened by a West European defence power. That certainly applies now that the Amsterdam Treaty describes the future military tasks of the EU broadly, and fails to set the precondition of a UN mandate. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of which almost all European countries, the United States and Canada are members, is the most legitimate framework for the promotion of security in Europe. Because of the resurrection of NATO after the Cold War era, Europe unfortunately has invested too little in the OSCE. The Russian response to NATO's intervention in Kosovo shows how easily we can relapse into Cold War patterns, with all the dangers those entail. The pan-European OSCE urgently has to be strengthened and streamlined. The foreign policy of the EU could serve that purpose, if it limits its military dimension to a coordinated offer of troops to the UN and the OSCE, for peace missions, humanitarian operations and intervention in case of (pending) genocide.

Non-violent instruments, aimed at prevention, should be the force of the foreign and security policy of the EU. If it uses its economic power responsibly and builds on the still tender political cooperation, the EU could, with early warning, mediation, economic support and targeted embargoes, make an important contribution to the prevention and solution of conflicts. That is not only a case for governments. Groups from civil society have to be able to play an acknowledged role.

The Amsterdam Treaty calls for cooperation between member states in the area of armaments. Some member states strive for a European arms industry. Their present defence corporations can only survive through subsidies and a less than picky export policy. It is very much the question if a merged, concentrated European weapons industry could do any better. Keeping this sector alive creates tension with the pursuit of a stringent European arms export policy. When the second goal has to take a back seat to the first, when the EU delivers to dubious regimes, it takes away from its own pursuit of conflict prevention. When the EU then helps put the fire out, it might even happen that European blue berets come under fire from weapons marked *made in the EU*. The costs, in money and human lives, of a European weapons industry are higher than the gains.

PROGRAMME POINTS

T. International cooperation and trade

1. The EU takes the lead in imposing social and ecological conditions on world trade. The EU wrings expanded possibilities out of the WTO for trade measures in view of violations of human rights or internationally recognised labour standards, and to protect the environment, natural resources, public health and animal welfare. With that goes the right to ban the import of products of which the composition or the production method trails far behind European social or environmental standards, or tax them with *eco-duties*. The revenues from these duties is channelled back to developing countries to enable them to make their production more sustainable.
2. For products from the 48 poorest countries, all other import duties are abolished. The rules of origin, that make it more difficult for developing countries to export to the EU as products contain more semi-manufactured articles from other countries, are eased.
3. The EU designs development strategies aimed at improving the position of women living in poverty, in order to combat the international feminisation of poverty.
4. There will be a strict code of conduct for all European multinationals, which prescribes a socially and environmentally responsible investment and trade policy, everywhere in the world. Sanctions are possible.
5. The EU pursues the establishment of a balanced multilateral investment treaty, preferably in a UN framework. A worldwide public debate in which all interested parties are involved delivers the points of departure for such a treaty. The EU will in any case devote itself to clear rules concerning human rights, labour conditions, environment and safety, that have to be respected by foreign investors. *Flash capital* will be put under restraint. Also, developing countries will receive instruments to develop and support their own businesses under protected circumstances.

6. The EU pursues greater transparency and democratisation of international organisations like the UN, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank.
7. The EU puts its policy methodically to a coherence test, so that the interests of developing countries are consistently considered in every decision. The compatibility of European trade and development policy with the goals of peace building and conflict prevention is also evaluated. The European Commission reports yearly on compliance with the coherence obligation. The EP invites representatives of governments and non-governmental organisations from the South to comment on these reports.
8. Sustainable development implies the transfer of *environmental space* to the South. The EU will take a leading role in making and strengthening global agreements to counter climate change, environmental pollution, exhaustion of resources and diminution of biodiversity. It strives for supervision instruments and sanction mechanisms for these treaties. The EU itself will set an example.
9. Development cooperation in the future will increasingly be paid from a UN fund that is filled with the profits from international taxes on capital movement and environmental pollution. The EU makes the pursuit of such a fund a priority in the coming years.
10. The member states agree within the framework of the EU to make a larger effort to decrease the debt burden on developing countries. In the year 2000, a considerable part of these debts will be cancelled.
11. Within the Lomé Convention, the role of the private sector and of non-governmental organisations is strengthened. All countries in the group of 48 least-developed countries can accede to the Lomé cooperation. The support that the EU offers in the Lomé framework will mainly benefit these countries. The European Development Fund will grow as the number of Lomé participants rises.
12. The EU pursues the reinforcement of regional cooperation between countries in the South, instead of fighting for greater access to their markets. Trade agreements with ACP countries aim at trade advantages for these countries that do justice to their level of development.

U. Foreign policy and security

1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aims at strengthening the global rule of law, guaranteeing human rights and reducing tensions between states and peoples. Economic interests are subjected to that. The EU promotes the involvement of civilian organisations in preventing and solving conflicts.
2. The Council of Ministers resorts to decision-making by qualified majority on the CFSP, with the exception of military issues. A precondition is democratic supervision by the EP.
3. A European Commissioner will coordinate the execution of the CFSP. She takes the place of the High Representative of the Council and is the face of the EU to the outside. She is accountable to the EP.
4. The Unit for Policy Planning and Early Warning is transferred from the Council to the Commission. This unit becomes more transparent and will cooperate with non-governmental organisations in the field.
5. The EU pleads with the UN to make the permanent seats of France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council available to the EU. The EU develops proposals to democratise the Security Council and abolish the veto right.
6. Military block organisations are the wrong answer to the new European security issues. To prevent a new partition of the continent, NATO and the West-European

Union (WEU) will be dissolved as soon as possible. NATO and WEU means that are useful for UN or OSCE missions, like means of communication and rapidly deployable troops, are transferred to these organisations. There will be an initiative to internationally supervise military intelligence instruments like spy satellites. The data of that will be made available to the UN and the OSCE.

7. There will be a European Security Council that directs the OSCE and answers to the Parliamentary Assembly. The OSCE is given more means and a greater competency for action in crisis situations. The link between the EU and the WEU will be replaced with a treaty obligation for the EU to support the OSCE.
8. The member states of the EU make a coordinated offer for peace troops to the UN and the OSCE. In that, each member state devotes itself to a limited number of military tasks, preferably cooperating with other countries in multinational army units. These troops are permanently available and can be rapidly deployed.
9. Groups from civil society that are involved in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as their European platforms, research and training centres, get European support.
10. There will not be a European arms industry. A binding EU arms export code prevents member states from delivering weapons to countries that violate human rights, lie in areas of tension, spend insufficient funds on the basic needs of the population or refuse to cooperate with the UN arms register. All weapon transactions will be public. The Structural Funds of the EU keep offering investment support to the conversion from military to civil production.
11. The EU strives for a European nuclear arms free zone instead of a European atomic umbrella. Europe does not cooperate in a new legitimisation of the American nuclear weapons stationed here, in the framework of a strategy against Third World countries. The European partners put pressure on France and the United Kingdom to come to further nuclear disarmament.
12. The EU devotes itself to a worldwide ban on weapons of mass destruction, landmines and the use of depleted uranium.

GROENLINKS CANDIDATES FOR THE 1999 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

as designated by the GroenLinks congress on February 5th and 6th, 1999

1. Joost Lagendijk
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3. Alexander de Roo
4. Theo Bouwman
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6. Jan Juffermans
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9. Nesrin Cingöz
10. Richard Wouters
11. Ans Zwerver
12. Jan Muijtjens
13. Ben Crum
14. Wies Dulfer
15. Antoinette Fonville
16. Karien Kienhuis
17. Suse Offerhaus
18. André Bos
19. Bart Kuiper
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