

# perspectieven

## As far as the world extends

AMBITIONS FOR THE DUTCH  
ARMED FORCES IN A CHANGING  
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

**CDAW**  
*Wetenschappelijk  
Instituut*

RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
FOR THE CDA

A publication of the Research Institute for the CDA. The institute's goal is to conduct scientific research for the CDA based on the foundations of the CDA and its programme of principles. The institute provides documented advice on policy outlines, both on its own initiative and at the request of the CDA and/or its members in representative bodies.



P.O. Box 30453, 2500 GL The Hague  
The Netherlands  
Tel. 0031(0)70 3424870  
Fax 0031(0)70 3926004  
E-mail [wi@cda.nl](mailto:wi@cda.nl)  
Internet [www.wi.cda.nl](http://www.wi.cda.nl)

ISBN-EAN 978-90-74493-52-9  
2007 Wetenschappelijk Instituut voor het CDA

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronically, mechanically, including photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

This book is the English language version of 'Zover de wereld strekt', published by the research institute for the CDA in 2007.

## CONTENTS

<b>Foreword</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Summary</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1 Christian democratic principles</b>	<b>15</b>
1.1 Main duties of the armed forces	16
1.2 National legitimacy	16
1.3 International legitimacy	19
<b>2 Developments regarding the security situation</b>	<b>23</b>
2.1 Globalisation and increased interdependence	24
2.2 Information technology	25
2.3 Elimination of bipolar power balance	25
2.4 Civil war, human rights violations and failed states	26
2.5 Terrorism	27
2.6 Relations between states	30
2.7 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery	31
2.8 Rising (regional) superpowers	33
2.9 The 'instability belt'	36
2.10 Demographic changes	37
<b>3 International action</b>	<b>40</b>
3.1 General	41
3.2 NATO	42
3.3 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)	46
3.4 United Nations (UN)	50
3.5 In conclusion: international action	51
<b>4 Dutch defence policy</b>	<b>53</b>
4.1 Prinsjesdag Letter, Operation 'New Equilibrium'	54
4.2 The Dutch level of ambition	55
4.3 Defence and Development Cooperation	56
4.4 Operational insights and developments	59
4.5 Societal developments	65
4.6 Technological developments	67
4.7 The armed forces	69

<b>5</b>	<b>Positions and conclusions</b>	<b>73</b>
5.1	Level of ambition	74
5.2	Organisation	75
5.3	Personnel	76
5.4	Compulsory social service	78
5.5	Investments and operations	80
5.6	Defence budget	81
Appendix 1	The level of ambition of Defence	84
Appendix 2:	Trends in the Dutch defence budget	87
Appendix 3	Activities that could be included in ODA definitions	89

## FOREWORD

Few organisations have experienced as much change in recent years as the defence organisation. In 1990, no one would have thought that the Netherlands would be militarily active in Yugoslavia, then still intact. The Balkans were still far beyond our own borders and those of the EU. But even when perspectives began to broaden, no one thought it possible that the Netherlands would have some 1900 troops on active duty in Afghanistan in early 2007.

At the start of a new cabinet, it is important to draw up a balance sheet of the past few years and to contribute to a vision of the future for the defence organisation. This report goes into detail on the security situation and on international trends and developments occurring at a rapid pace, and analyses defence policy more closely. The question in this context is how the level of ambition set by the government relates to the available resources and to the role that the Netherlands wishes to fulfil on the world stage in cooperation with other countries and within international contexts. After all, the armed forces are the ultimate foreign policy instrument. Defence policy is therefore closely linked to foreign policy and increasingly to development cooperation. This report, however, focuses especially on the role of defence and is written from a defence perspective. It therefore explicitly addresses the organisation of the armed forces and the place of the Netherlands in the international community.

The directorate of the CDA Research Institute is very grateful to the committee led by J.S.J. Hillen for its work in creating this report. The committee members were D.J. Barth, M.G. Fraanje-van Diepen, R.W.F. Kortenhorst (adviser), E. Kronenburg, J.J.M. Penders, Gen-Maj. D. van Putten, P.W.L. Russell (adviser) and Lt-Gen. M.L.M. Urlings (ret.). Special thanks to S.R. Wiegmans, the secretary of the committee.

Mr. R.J. Hoekstra  
*(Chairman)*

Drs. E.J. van Asselt  
*(Deputy Director)*

# Summary

## 1. Christian democratic principles

The main tasks of the armed forces can be described as: protecting the integrity of our own territory and that of our allies, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; promoting international law and order and stability; supporting civilian authorities in law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.

### *National legitimacy*

The government holds a monopoly on deployment of the armed forces. This is inextricably linked to democratic accountability. This does not mean that every military action requires the prior consent of the States General. Military considerations may weigh so heavily that political power may decide to suspend democratic review, for example, because the openness inextricably linked to a democratic review of the issue may obstruct the result to be achieved.

Aside from public accountability, firm democratic support is also important. The legitimacy of deployment of the armed forces is well served by broadly supported principles, carefully formulated in more peaceful times. A structural budgetary guarantee can be provided on this basis. Those who are deployed must also be certain that the entire Dutch home front is in solidarity with them. This requires that the specific context in which deployed Dutch troops operate is considered in an opinion, in legal, as well in political, public-relations and societal terms.

### *International legitimacy*

Where human dignity is at stake, the international community cannot remain a bystander. As part of the international community, the Netherlands must take responsibility in proportion to its relevance and abilities for promoting international law and order. The Netherlands will not undertake any independent military action outside its own territory.

According to the internationally accepted idea of a ‘responsibility to protect’, the international community has a responsibility to intervene and override the sovereignty of a country if a population is seriously suffering as a result of a civil war, uprising, repression or lawlessness, and the government in question cannot or will not end it or avert it. The responsibility to protect consists of three elements: attempting to prevent the population being at risk; responding – militarily as a last resort – if the civilian population is in serious trouble; contribution to reconstruction and reconciliation. Prevention and intervention are therefore not enough; by definition, involvement also implies contributing to reconstruction and reconciliation. The

importance of human rights is thus placed in the perspective of international law and order, for which Christian democracy wishes to bear responsibility.

The United Nations Security Council is the designated forum for approving military intervention, especially interventions against the will of sovereign power. Nonetheless, there may be situations in which a different deliberation may be made, for example, if decision-making stagnates or does not do justice to an emergency situation. In that case, the Netherlands must engage in its own deliberations and may then decide to participate in a coalition of available countries, particularly in the case of reciprocal solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and the European Union. Although the responsibility to protect is very important in that case, the utmost restraint is required. The Security Council is a very important source of legitimacy for deploying force, the ultimate measure.

In the case of an immediate threat, the question arises of whether it is justified to take military action without a prior mandate from the Security Council, before the threat manifests itself. Article 51 of the UN charter allows for anticipatory action out of self-defence. There is no consensus, however, in a UN context on the criteria for pre-emptive action. The Caroline criteria ('a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation') may be considered the beginnings of a suitable reference point for potentially invoking article 51, but they need to be refined, as application is complex. In any event, the deployment of military resources, as the last resort, must be in proportion to the nature, gravity and size of the threat.

## 2. Developments regarding the security situation

Various developments greatly affect the security situation.

1. Globalisation, together with economic interdependence, is interweaving the interests of more and more countries, thus reducing the likelihood of war. On the other hand, conflicts that took place at a safe distance in earlier times now are also more likely to have local repercussions. Migration, economic dependencies and reciprocal alliances result in interconnectedness but also vulnerability. Security has thereby acquired a broader meaning than just the classic defence against a military attack on one's territory and that of allies.
2. Because of the revolution in information technology, no political system can now close itself off (completely) from the outside world or from outsiders. This is further reinforced by large-scale mobility of people and



goods. It has also opened the way to completely new production processes and economic insights. There has been impressive product innovation in the area of defence. This involves not only weapons systems but also intelligence, on Earth and from space. New technology is not increasing strike power alone. Electronic viruses, hackers and other significant disruptions of communication and production systems can greatly reduce our own effectiveness and even defensiveness.

3. The communist power bloc has collapsed. Many former communist countries are now even members of NATO. The old bipolar power balance has thereby disappeared.
4. The international community is increasingly faced with the task of separating conflicting parties in relatively small-scale nationalist conflicts to offer civilians relative security. Crisis management has become a new branch of the military. Failed states pose another challenge. These states often have no democratic or constitutional experience or tradition, have a government that barely functions and are at risk to reverting to chaos even after years of relative calm. These countries are often characterised by complex internal relations and tensions, with the loyalty of various groups in the population lying not automatically with the nation-state but with tribes or ethnic or religious groups.
5. International terrorism has made the security system in the world more diffuse, more complex and less predictable. This requires a pro-active foreign policy, aimed at addressing problems before they reach us. We must fear the worst if terrorist organisations obtain chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear resources. As necessary as it may be to deploy the armed forces, the struggle against terrorism is ultimately one of values.
6. Partly due to the strength of NATO, a conventional attack on the territory of the alliance is not considered likely. Ninety per cent of armed conflicts occur within states, not between states. Rogue states in particular, which seriously violate human rights, do not comply with international obligations and agreements and often have aspirations to regional power, nonetheless pose a threat to international security.
7. With the rapid spread of ballistic missile technology and systems, the increasing range and the growing number of countries with ballistic missile capacity, the threat to NATO territory has grown. NATO territory requires appropriate protection against ballistic missiles. The Netherlands must therefore actively advocate a missile shield for Europe and make a concrete contribution to missile defence.
8. The rise of China and India as global powers means that the focus of the world economy is shifting to Asia. These countries are growing in importance in military terms as well.

9. The world's most important trade routes and many reserves of vital resources lie in the 'belt of instability', running from North Korea to the Caribbean. Transport capacity is limited at some crucial but narrow passages. The supply routes for oil and gas therefore are a vulnerable element in our energy supply. Where physical protection of transport routes by military means is required, and there is an express international mandate to do so, the Netherlands should also be prepared to contribute.
10. Finally, demographic changes mean that Europeans are expected to make up just 6% of the world's population in 2025. At the same time, the cost of a greying population is rising. This puts pressure on other spending, including defence. Other parts of the world are experiencing strong population growth. Europe will be older in 2025, less powerful economically and surrounded by unstable regions.

### 3. International action

#### NATO

Christian democracy strongly values the NATO alliance. Our security interests are embedded in the North Atlantic treaty, of which one of the fundamental principles is article 5: the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance in the event of an armed attack on one or more allies. This principle gained a broader significance when it was invoked after the 9/11 attacks. NATO offers a continually available military command structure – the world's strongest. It also links the defence efforts of major democracies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This enables Europe to arrive at the same insights as the United States and Canada, together in an alliance context, or to exert influence on each other to that end. The stubbornness the US can allow itself within the international community is counterbalanced by the weak and divided nature of Europe. An international division of duties, with the upper range of the spectrum of violence reserved for larger countries and smaller countries dedicated particularly to low-risk peacekeeping operations, must be explicitly rejected. This results in gratuitous moralising: one becomes the moral critic of a world history that one lets others create. It is preferable for international operations in which our country participates to be carried out by or under the leadership of NATO, mandated by the Security Council where possible.

The creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) must be lauded. Dutch participation in this rapidly deployable force must not be seen as optional; general assent of the States General to participation in the NRF comprises implicit approval of immediate deployment of Dutch troops that are part of the NRF if required, according to NATO. A constitutional amendment comp-

rising a right of assent for the House for *all* forms of deployment of Dutch troops provided to the NRF is contrary to this and must be rejected. It is currently still the case that if a country provides troops to the NRF, it can subsequently also pay the cost when it comes to deployment. A fairer distribution of burdens adds to NATO's credibility and effectiveness. Initiatives to finance certain activities such as in infrastructure are steps in the right direction towards more common funding. Serious efforts must be made in this direction.

#### *The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*

Common funding is also desirable in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

For Christian democracy, the European Union is more than a common market with the Euro as its currency. It is also a community of values and therefore a political union as well. A security policy is logically part of such a union. The need for more cooperation in a European context is urgent. European countries spend an average of 1.8% of GNP on Defence, the US 3.4%. The technological gap between the US and Europe is thereby at risk of becoming wider, with every risk that carries for interoperability within NATO. Europe is therefore committed to a considerable intensification of policy and resources. The EU's ambitions must not be increased, as it is difficult enough to achieve the current ambitions. The ESDP must complement NATO; the committee therefore sees the EU's role for the time being as lying more in small-scale missions with a lower risk profile than Afghanistan, for example. A separate headquarters for the EU is not required because the EU can use NATO capacities under the Berlin Plus agreement. A reverse Berlin Plus plan is also desirable: NATO using EU capabilities, such as the Gendarmerie Force. The European Defence Agency must be expanded further and enabled, with a bigger budget, to manage equipment projects. The Netherlands must continue to endeavour to promote fair competition on the European defence market. The elimination of article 296 of the EU treaty is therefore desirable.

#### *United Nations (UN)*

The UN is the world community's central forum and the Security Council is the world's most authoritative body in terms of sanctioning the use of military force, but it is less obviously the entity to carry out crisis management operations the more violence is involved. This is primarily the result of a limited ability to issue a good political mandate and the restrictions in carrying out operations, especially where command is concerned. The security and defence policy of the Netherlands is primarily shaped within international institutions and organisations. The approach should there-

fore be aimed at strengthening them and being a reliable ally. Participation in ad hoc coalitions, however, such as Enduring Freedom, may sometime be the only practical alternative to take action.

#### 4. Dutch defence policy

The Netherlands' foreign policy ambitions must correspond to our economic power and with a view to a safer, better world: noblesse oblige. The current level of ambition of the Dutch government (see appendix 1) is realistic and must be maintained. The downward trend in the defence budget, however, is cause for concern in that regard.

##### Cooperation between the ministries of Defence and Development

Cooperation as part of an integrated foreign and security policy has intensified in recent years. For example, the Stability Fund was created to finance activities related to peace, security and development and has been successful in part because the fund provides both ODA and non-ODA resources. Intensification of cooperation is desirable. The government must continue to allow discussion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) financing for activities relevant to development, carried out by troops. Appendix 3 summarises activities that are not currently covered by ODA definitions as set by the OECD but which are relevant to development.

The demands placed on troops change with geographical, societal, political and technological trends. The reality of Afghanistan indicates that troops in an operation area must be able to engage in reconstruction, assure security and carry out targeted combat actions, known as a 'three-block war'. The reality of the three-block war knows no fronts or safe hinterland and a peaceful situation can suddenly turn into combat contact. This is why every member of the military must be first and foremost a fighter, and then a specialist. The great diversity of deployment areas and the often extreme and risky circumstances place great demands on the physical and mental toughness of our soldiers. They are expected to be able to operate in virtually all climate zones and regions. Realistic training using the train-as-you-fight principle is therefore required.

Military disciplinary law need not be reintroduced. For less serious offences, the ministry of defence applies its own legal system, while the Public Prosecutor is brought in for more serious offences. Generally, an excellent pattern of standards and values – the military ethos – among Dutch troops is very important. Although levels are generally good, lasting attention is called for and an additional impetus as well.

The importance of combat support and combat service support has increased further. Without these critical capacities, combat units have little or no deployability.

The demands placed on equipment are also increasing. The budget to immediately replace equipment lost in operations or wearing out sooner is not enough to deal with the problem in its entirety.

NCW (Network-Centric Warfare) is at the core of the transformation of modern armed forces and is required to ensure interoperability with allies.

The financial resources to increase interoperability more rapidly and to improve the network and information infrastructure are lacking.

Technological developments will require more from personnel in the future.

This will include more stringent requirements for instructors, and personnel spending more time in training. The further expansion of the role of brigades as part of national tasks is a favourable development.

The air transport capacity of defence is essential to the expeditionary capability of the entire armed forces. Despite additional measures, however, the need is greater than the capacity. Expansion of strategic air transport capacity is therefore desired. Among other things, personal and material helicopter capacity must be reinforced, partly through more helicopters and partly by adjusting the crew ratio, for example, and expanding support personnel. In terms of the Joint Strike Fighter, the discussion should not be about *whether* to purchase the JSF but in what quantity to purchase it.

The military constabulary is able to meet national and international demand, because its personnel can be deployed flexibly and has a military background. To be able to continue to guarantee this flexibility and military background and because of the relationship between internal and external security, it is essential for the military constabulary to continue to be part of Defence.

## Positions and conclusions

The current structure of the armed forces can be considered complete: a navy with an increased focus on supporting operations on land, an army with flexibly deployable brigades and supporting units and an air force with a balanced combination of fighter aircraft, transporters and helicopters. The interests of collectivity across the armed forces can be combined with maintaining the identity of individual components of the armed forces. Without wishing to detract from the important and visible role of the Commander of the Armed Forces, operational commanders should continue to play a significant role in being directly responsible for operational readiness and their 'figurehead' function for the organisation should be maintained. The new role of the armed forces as a structural security partner in this country is deserving of support.

Given an attractive job market, it is particularly important to retain high-quality personnel in which significant investments have already been made.

Both the special position of military personnel and the recruiting power of the armed forces must be reflected in the employment terms for this group. Future negotiations on employment terms must accommodate these issues. Veterans' care requires continual attention. It is on the right track but must be expanded and reinforced.

A serious social and parliamentary debate must be held on the introduction of compulsory social service, paying particular attention to different models in use among our allies. All young people would then have to be available for one year of their lives to perform tasks for society, with involvement in the military as one of the options.

To be able to have a useable yardstick for the required defence budget, the Dutch contribution to crisis management operations in recent years is a sensible starting point, given the Netherlands' position and capability. Given the present shortages, a growth trend for Dutch defence spending that exceeds the growth of the gross domestic product is therefore desirable, with the aim of meeting the NATO standard of 2% of GDP over time.

# 1 Christian democratic principles

## 1.1 Main duties of the armed forces

Our government engages in appropriate armament, rightfully and with reason. Rightfully because to bring peaceful order to society, we have given the government the sole right to use violence. As a result, we can set safeguards on the use of violence such that it is used only in an extreme situation and only if we consider it justified. With reason, because international society is unstable and violence is used that does not correspond to what we consider our justified interests, or even threatens it. Our interests comprise the security and welfare of our own citizens on our own territory, our own citizens and justified interests elsewhere, and those of our allies, but also promoting welfare and human rights in conflict areas elsewhere. Counter-acting instability far away also results in more security for our own citizens in the long term. The armed forces currently have three main tasks:<sup>1</sup>

- protecting the integrity of our own territory and that of our allies, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba;
- promoting international law and order and stability;
- supporting civilian authorities in enforcing law, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.<sup>2</sup>

## 1.2 National legitimacy

The Dutch government should govern in a way that is peace-loving and which promotes peace, but is not armed without reason. Individuals may be pacifists; the government does not have such a choice. Maintaining the monopoly on violence on our territory, protecting the territorial integrity of the Netherlands, is a classic duty of the armed forces. More generally, security in the broader sense is a basic duty of the government.

In the Netherlands, the use of violence is a monopoly held by the government. Associated with this sole right is the responsibility for using the armed forces, which is inextricably linked with democratic accountability. Actual deployment of the armed forces is thereby also subject to society's judgement. Permitting and accepting violence, after all, requires very good assurances.

1 As formulated in the 2000 Defence Policy Document and reaffirmed in the 'Prinsjesdag' Letter and its update.

2 The latest insights into combating terrorism lead to integrated security thinking, in which military resources – under the authorised command of the civilian authorities – may be necessary in addition to police and judicial resources.



The committee does not necessarily draw from that guiding principle the conclusion that every military intervention requires the prior consent of the States General. Since military force is not a consideration until all other means have been shown to fail, the use of this ultimate means must be optimal and goal-oriented. Military considerations may weigh so heavily that political power may decide to suspend democratic review, for example, because the openness inherent in a democratic review of the issue may obstruct the result to be achieved. Confidential information to the States General as a possible interim solution is not an option, because confidentiality cannot be an element of the evaluation process that is inherently public.

Aside from the question of whether the prior consent of the States General is required, every military action occurs under the political authority of the government, which can theoretically take decisive action at any time. It should be emphasised here that a military operation requires political clarity. Crossing the line from political to military intervention necessarily implies that the political options for improvisation have lost their power and may even be harmful to the course of the military action.

Aside from the fact that the government is publicly accountable for deploying the armed forces, careful attention will be required at all times to create a robust democratic basis for having and using this resource. In this modern era of communications, in which emotion can play an important part in public debate and decision-making, in-depth contemplation is required as to the interpretation of relevant conflicts and potential contributions by the Netherlands to a solution. Sensibility and contemplation are required in view of:

- a. proper, balanced decision-making on a potential conflict;
- b. a structural budget guarantee. This is created only if policy is based on a long-term strategy;
- c. a structural solidarity, emphasised by rational insights, with the Dutch military, which must do their work in an environment that differs from the Netherlands in every respect.

A brief explanation of these points is appropriate here.

Re a. The considered nature of the Dutch position in times of crisis is greater the more the emotional tension in a critical situation can be assessed in relation to broadly supported principles, carefully formulated in more peaceful times.

Re b. There is no way of being certain when the defence organisation will have to be called on. Whereas other government tasks can be valued in

terms of achievement immediately and at any time, for defence this aspect depends on the international situation. Even in times of less international tension and violence, hence less frequent deployment, the defence forces must maintain their professional standard and levels of training and equipment. This is why corresponding structurally entrenched budgetary support is required.

Re c. Those who are deployed must be certain that the entire Dutch home front is in solidarity with them. As the Second World War continues to recede into the past, the number of civilians who have consciously had to live amid violence, lawlessness and amorality is declining. The discrepancy between such conditions and the safe and prosperous situation in our welfare state is enormous. The specific context in which deployed Dutch troops operate, should be considered in an opinion in legal as well in political, public relations and social terms. Sufficient insight into Dutch society in extreme circumstances will also contribute to more empathy for refugees from areas experiencing extreme violence.

Violence and the absence of freedom are certainly not risks that are necessarily remote to us. Our free society is of course vulnerable to terrorist action. All protection of freedom in a broader sense detracts in turn from rights such as privacy. For example, the government must ensure that intelligence is very well organised. Weighing the consequences against the interests of privacy must receive plenty of attention in public debate, but the interests of collective security override the privacy of the individual.

A healthy awareness of security in society requires the population to know how to deal with disruption, blackmail and terror using defensive determination. 'A people that yields to tyrants will lose more than life and wealth; its light will die,' wrote the poet Van Randwijk, and with good reason. Fear, short-sighted self-interest or other understandable emotions can decisively hinder effective resistance and play into the hands of the opponent. Saddam Hussein provided an illustrative example when he held foreign civilians hostage after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The international community was shown to be powerless. Political celebrities were sent by each country to ask respectfully for clemency, undoubtedly also carrying the necessary secret concessions with them. It must have been the finest hour of Saddam Hussein's entire career. For a moment, the world appeared to be on its knees in front of him. Submitting to blackmail for the sake of peace is always tempting. In the television era, which is transparent in many respects, blackmailing leadership through public opinion is a favourable ploy for terrorists. Societal resistance is required.

### 1.3 International legitimacy

Where human dignity is at stake, the international community cannot stand aside, states the CDA report titled 'New roads, firm values'.<sup>3</sup> This is at the core of the responsibility that the CDA advocates in the world. This framework can be defined very broadly. For example, the manifesto of the EPP states that Christian principles and values, inspired by the Gospels and by Christian heritage, are inextricably linked to human rights, democratic ideals of freedom and equality, social justice and solidarity.<sup>4</sup> This report emphasises the government's responsibility to contribute to a secure environment. This is in keeping with the obligation included in the Dutch constitution to contribute to promoting international law and order. To do so, the government has a wide range of political, diplomatic and economic resources at its disposal, as well as the armed forces, if necessary. The Netherlands will have to take responsibility in proportion to its relevance and possibilities and as part of the international community; the Netherlands will not undertake any independent military action outside its own territory.

#### *The responsibility to protect*<sup>5</sup>

Aside from being a response to a threat to the justified interests of the Netherlands and those within the alliance, the deployment of Dutch military resources will be primarily aimed at protecting civilians elsewhere from disproportionate violence. In the case of areas where local government authority is no longer functioning and military deployment is entrenched in decisions by the Security Council, this is mostly a practical consideration. Is Dutch deployment among the options, in view of other military commitments elsewhere? Are there special historical or political circumstances involving the Netherlands and the area in which the operation is taking place? Is the Netherlands being called on to provide financial, facilitative or active military aid?

There are conceivable circumstances, however, in which the decision is more complicated, more delicate, either because military deployment is contrary to the wishes of the ruling sovereign power or because the coali-

3 CDA report, 'Nieuwe wegen, vaste waarden. Aanzet tot een strategisch beraad binnen het CDA' (New roads, firm values. Approach to strategic deliberation within the CDA), p. 15.

4 European People's Party manifesto, article 163.

5 This report makes frequent use of diplomatic terms and military jargon. These terms are explained in the text.

tion is not supported by a decision by the Security Council and is formed only by a few countries working together in it specifically (a coalition of the willing).

At the request of the Canadian government, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has investigated whether, and if so when, a state is entitled to act in a compulsory, i.e., military, manner against another state to protect people in that state. The title of the report is *The Responsibility to Protect*. The title alone provides an understanding of the results of the investigation and the considerations included in it. The compilers of the report conclude that the international community does indeed have a responsibility to intervene and override the sovereignty of a country if a population is seriously suffering as a result of a civil war, uprising, repression or lawlessness, and the government in question cannot or will not end it or avert it. The responsibility to protect consists of three elements:

- attempting to prevent the population being at risk;
- responding – militarily as a last resort – if the civilian population is in serious trouble;
- contributing to reconstruction and reconciliation.

In these guidelines, Christian democracy sees similarities to its own principles on justified war. The importance of human rights is placed in the perspective of international law and order, for which Christian democracy wishes to bear responsibility. Prevention and intervention are not enough in that case; by definition, involvement also implies contributing to reconstruction and reconciliation. The job is not finished when the failing regime is gone, nor even necessarily when order and authority have been restored. The ‘responsibility to protect’ principle is now broadly supported. The United Nations and the Dutch government as well are standing behind it and believe that the international community has a responsibility to take action regarding states that cannot or will not protect their citizens.<sup>6</sup>

The United Nations Security Council is the designated forum for approving military intervention, especially interventions against the will of sovereign power. Nonetheless, there may be situations in which a different deliberation may be made. The Security Council may be the highest global authority

<sup>6</sup> UN summit, 14-16 September 2005; see also the government’s report on the summit, including a response to the report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, titled ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, Tweede Kamer (Lower house), house document 26150, no. 34.

on peace and security, but at the same time it is a political body in which, for various reasons, decision-making stagnates or does not do justice to an emergency situation. This can be expressed through the use of the right of veto by one of the five permanent members. In that case, the Netherlands must make its own deliberation and may then decide to participate in a coalition of available countries, particularly if the reciprocal solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and the European Union is involved.<sup>7</sup> Although the responsibility to protect is very important in that case, the utmost restraint is required: the Security Council is a very important source of legitimacy for deploying force, the ultimate measure.

### *Pre-emptive action*

Although the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lies with the Security Council, there may be situations that justify acting without a prior mandate from the UN. In particular, this involves the issue of pre-emptive action, which is called for in the event of an imminent threat. Is military intervention without the consent of the Security Council before the threat manifests itself justified in such a situation, and if so, under what conditions?

In view of new threats and the concept of pre-emptive action under the US National Security Strategy, the government has asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) for recommendations. In principle, article 51 of the UN charter allows for self-defence in the event of an immediate threat of an armed attack. There is, however, no consensus within the UN on the question of when such a threat occurs and how it may be defended against.<sup>8</sup> Nor is rewriting article 51 called for, or expanding or limiting it through interpretation. For the AIV/CAVV, the *Caroline criteria* ('a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation') form a suitable reference point for potentially invoking article 51. In such cases of sudden, overwhelming threat, allowing no moment of deliberation and no choice of means, taking proportionality into account, the use of violence for self-defence could be permissible, provided these criteria are strictly applied, according to the AIV/CAVV.<sup>9</sup>

7 Such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without a mandate from the UN Security Council.

8 Tweede Kamer (Lower house), house document 26150, nr. 34.

9 'Pre-emptive action' recommendation, no. 36, Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, No. 15, Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, July 2004, p. 21.

The same recommendation states, however, that the state practice of ‘anticipatory self-defence’ is limited and unclear. This means it is difficult to arrive at the firm conclusion that the Caroline doctrine is still applicable to current international law.<sup>10</sup> All in all, the commission found little internationally to indicate clear, transparent criteria. The Caroline criteria, however, may be considered a starting point for a suitable reference point for potential pre-emptive action. According to the commission, the government was therefore right to ask whether these criteria did indeed provide enough to go on and whether they need to be refined further over time. An example might be the threat of a digital attack on computer networks that are essential to the security of a country. Such an attack is not a traditional ‘armed’ attack under article 51. The contemporary threat of terrorism also renders the applicability of the Caroline criteria complex. The example of the 11 September attacks given by the government in response to the recommendation effectively illustrates this complexity:

‘When would the threat of an attack on the United States have been sufficiently sudden and overwhelming that intervention would have been justified? At the point that the planes were threatening to strike buildings? At the moment the hijackers boarded the plane? At the moment they were trained for their deadly mission, somewhere in the desert? Or even at the time they were making their plans? Or at the moment al-Qa’ida declared war on the US and the West?’<sup>11</sup>

These questions are difficult to answer, and ones in which the need for reliable intelligence plays a vital role. The government supports the statement in the US security strategy that ‘we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’<sup>12</sup>. Time will tell whether the Caroline criteria leave enough room to do so. In any event, the committee believes that the deployment of military resources, as the last resort, must be in proportion to the nature, gravity and size of the threat. Taking action against terrorists certainly need not be on a large scale by definition but may, preferably, also occur over a short period with precision weapons, for example, launched from sea or air, or by special units.

10 Ibid.

11 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 29800 V, no. 56, p. 3.

12 The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, p. 15.

## 2 Developments regarding the security situation

This chapter outlines the most significant developments affecting the security situation.

## 2.1 Globalisation and increased interdependence

The liberalisation of international capital movement and the globalisation of the economy have rendered national borders more relative. Together with this, nations are more dependent on each other for prosperity and well-being than ever before. This economic bond prevents large-scale conflicts to a considerable degree. It was in fact one of the reasons for more economic cooperation in Europe through the ECSC and later the EC and EU. It was the philosophy of the founders of the European Union, which included the Netherlands. Although Europe will need to deepen considerably in political terms, the European community has probably definitively ended centuries of war on a relatively small and densely populated continent. The related spectacular economic success<sup>13</sup> has commanded international respect. The formula for economic interdependence has become groundbreaking, partly because of the European example, for a new world order based (in part) on business operating globally. Globalisation also brings countries on other continents further into the fleet of nations. The economic prosperity now being experienced by China and India may help to further strengthen and broaden economic ties. Such prosperity and intensified relations bypass other parts of the world almost entirely, such as parts of Africa and the Middle East. Violence can disrupt and damage not only a political structure but also an economic order.

The other side of globalisation, furthermore, is that virtually all threats have acquired an international dimension. Conflicts that took place at a safe distance in earlier times now are also more likely to have local repercussions. Migration, economic dependencies and reciprocal alliances result in interconnectedness but also vulnerability. Security has also acquired a broader meaning than just the classic defence against a military attack on one's territory and that of allies. The consequences of conflicts on an open state such as the Netherlands are far-reaching. Securing the oil supply is sometimes mentioned casually in this context, but this fails to take into account the fact that the elementary conditions for the existence of a country and society have broader ramifications than protecting sovereignty and territory. This of course does not mean that the oil-supply argument legiti-

13 For example, unification has provided an opportunity to standardise very different industrial systems, whereby smaller markets in conflict with each other have been able to grow into a large, internationally competitive market.



mises all means or ends, but the example does illustrate the great degree of global interconnectedness. This interconnectedness can be a source of dependence and cooperation, but also one that causes fragility and vulnerability.

## **2.2 Information technology**

Another worldwide development with major consequences for defence has been the revolution in information technology. The consequences are unprecedented. No political system can now close itself off (completely) from the outside world or from outsiders. All over the world, at any time, countries, companies, organisations and civilians can become informed of circumstances, developments, relations and figures elsewhere. This is also reinforced by the large-scale mobility of people and goods, which has also developed in unprecedented ways. IT has also opened the way to completely new production processes and economic insights. Finally, there has been impressive product innovation, including in the area of defence. This involves not only weapons systems but also intelligence, on Earth and from space. Spectacularly improved military precision is one of the products, allowing a more efficient result to be achieved in theory, with much less violence.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, new technology has not only increased effectiveness. Here again, vulnerability has increased. Electronic viruses, hackers and other significant disruptions of communication and production system can greatly reduce our own effectiveness and even defensive capabilities.

## **2.3 Elimination of bipolar power balance**

A third development is the end of the communist power bloc led by the former Soviet Union. At best, bipolarity somewhat stabilised the world in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century after the Second World War, but at great cost. There was an impressive and very expensive arms race on both sides. Partly because of this, the population in communist regions was long unable to participate in economic progress. Furthermore, nuclear weapons were like a sword of Damocles hanging over a divided world. The price of inadequate crisis management could quickly have deteriorated into total destruction on both sides – a truly chilling scenario. The communist system eventually collapsed, particularly as a result of the determination of the West, the anti-historic nature of Marxism and internal economic weakness. All of this was also furthered by a world view constantly enlarged by information technology. The failure of the state-run economy in the face of free

14 Conflicts cannot be won using precision weapons and technology alone.

enterprise became visible to ever larger groups. The corrosion began at Europe's borders but spread to the entire system, far faster than anyone had expected. It ended in what no one had ever dared to hope for: a virtually velvet revolution. Since then, the dismantling of the enormous weapons stockpiles on both sides has been a very important, although not consistently spectacular, part of international defence policy. Non-proliferation of ABC weapons is not the least of the issues. Many former communist countries are now members of NATO. The alliance itself is therefore also faced with a new task in new global relations.

#### **2.4 Civil war, human rights violations and failed states**

The fourth development is the outbreak of relatively small-scale nationalist conflicts with immediately disastrous consequences for the local population. These conflicts have been commonplace for longer in Africa, but for a long time potential local conflicts in Europe and Asia were suppressed in the dominant political system. This restraint was eliminated with the fall of the Soviet Union and Europe was confronted with military violence, large-scale violations of human rights and large streams of refugees and displaced people. The international community was increasingly assigned the task of separating the conflicting parties and providing civilians with relative protection. Crisis management operations became a new branch of the military. By now, the requisite experience has been accumulated in this area, experience with consequences for the structure of defence for the Netherlands. In addition to the importance of standing up for human rights and contributing to reconstruction, stabilisation missions help to prevent large streams of refugees, including those bound for Europe and the Netherlands. But there is more at stake if we attempt to prevent failing or failed states. These not only pose a problem to their own population and to surrounding countries, but can also degenerate into a breeding ground for terrorism and serious crime. By providing a haven for al-Qa'ida, the failed state of Afghanistan exported terrorism and drugs,<sup>15</sup> both finding their way to Europe. Contributing to stabilisation, reconstruction and nation-building for such countries is therefore not just the responsibility of the international community but is also understood as self-interest for a country such as the Netherlands. The challenges are no less daunting. Failed states often have no democratic or constitutional experience or tradition, have a government that barely functions and are at risk to reverting to chaos even after years of relative calm. These countries are often characterised by complex internal relations and tensions, with the loyalty of various groups in

15 Afghanistan still exports an enormous quantity of drugs, especially opium.

the population lying not automatically with the nation-state but with tribes or ethnic or religious groups. A country such as Iraq, ruled for decades with an iron fist by a dictatorship with an effective government apparatus and an army, appears to be resigned to such a situation. The former Yugoslavia has fallen apart completely. With the collapse of a secular dictatorship, extremism and religious fundamentalism can emerge, posing a threat to attempts to start a democratic constitutional state. The problem of deep-seated cultural differences from the achievements of the West that we take for granted cannot be underestimated. We cannot conclude, however, that we should withdraw from areas where these achievements are being fought for – on the contrary. As difficult as it is and as extraordinarily fragile as the process of democratisation is, these countries now have a democratically elected government for the first time in their history, partly thanks to the efforts of our military. This is how values such as freedom, democracy and human rights are promoted.

## 2.5 Terrorism

The fifth important development is international terrorism. The destruction of the World Trade Center in New York is a symbol of the struggle, but attacks in other parts of the world have also claimed many victims and caused damage to the economy. The vulnerability of open societies was exposed in a painful manner. Terrorism consists of posing a major threat with comparatively few resources, whereas it is not easy to organise a defence against it. Budgets are also limited and there are privacy protection requirements. Combating terrorism hotbeds is a mission that is politically, and especially militarily, precarious. This task of ever increasing importance must be taken into account when configuring the armed forces.

The security system in the world has become more diffuse, more complex and less predictable because of the threat of terrorism. Terrorism has become globalised. It uses open borders and the Internet and asymmetrical methods. The 9-11 attacks were prepared in Hamburg, the financing came from the Arab world, while the hijackers were trained in Afghanistan and the attacks themselves occurred on American soil. Threats can occur over distances of thousands of kilometres. This requires a pro-active foreign policy, aimed at addressing problems before they reach us. The fight against terrorism, based on article 51 of the UN charter, should therefore be seen as a form of pro-active self-defence. Its relevance is still current, because the threat has increased rather than decreased, not only because of the growth of terrorist organisations but also their efforts to achieve their goals by catastrophic means. After 11 September, there is in fact just one more step up

on the escalation ladder: the use of weapons of mass destruction. If countries can still be scared off by the threat of mutual destruction in the event of a nuclear conflict, the same does not apply for catastrophic terrorism. The risk that al-Qa'ida will obtain weapons of mass destruction over time is increasing, even though an attack by such means is not considered likely in the short term. However, al-Qa'ida has repeatedly stated its ambition to obtain weapons of mass destruction and it is not the only organisation active in this area. In 2005, some 25 terrorist organisations showed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) resources. One way to obtain them is to undertake relations with countries sympathetic to them. For example, the terrorist group Hezbollah is financed and armed by Iran. To date, its support has been limited to conventional weapons. The question is whether this will continue to be the case.

Given the lack of respect for human life shown by terrorists, we must fear the worst if they obtain the worst weapons. The Islamic radicalism of al-Qa'ida and organisations inspired by Bin Laden and the like is aimed at all of Western civilisation. It combats our way of life at all costs and is not open to negotiation. The illusion that Europe could be spared this form of barbarism has been rudely shattered. Two and a half years after 9-11, Madrid was attacked, then London. A number of terrorist acts have also been prevented.<sup>16</sup> The idea, tempting for some, that countries bring calamity upon themselves by supporting the United States is misplaced. Even in countries such as France, not particularly known for following the United States, attacks have been foiled. And what are we to make of the attack on Bali, in mostly Muslim Indonesia?

28

With the attacks in Madrid and London, the threat proved not to come from Afghanistan but from within those countries themselves. Among the tens of millions of Muslims in Europe, a young generation has emerged that is radicalised and susceptible to terrorism. Parts of the second and third generations feel alienated from the society they live in and are turning against Western countries. A number of indigenous young people are also converting to Islam and then seeking connections with radical Muslim organisations. Military intervention by the West in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan may lead to further radicalisation, as the attacks in London have brought to light. The US/British invasion of Iraq and the continuing bloody fallout from it have, perhaps inevitably, incited terrorism, both in Iraq and in Europe. In various European countries, recruiting for the armed

16 For example, see 'Target Europe' ('Doelwit Europa') by R. de Wijk, Amsterdam 2006, which describes attacks and attempted attacks by Muslim extremists.

struggle in Iraq is taking place among Muslims. A wave of arrests in various European cities has exposed a network of terrorists with links to the terrorist organisation al-Qa'ida in Iraq of the terrorist al-Zarqawi, who has now been eliminated. Many of the networks discovered in Europe helped al-Zarqawi in his actions in Iraq and Jordan, the MIVD states in its annual report.<sup>17</sup> The AIVD has also expressed concern that those travelling to Iraq will bring their experiences with terrorism there back to Europe to commit attacks.<sup>18</sup>

The Netherlands is making a significant military contribution to stabilising Afghanistan, to prevent terrorists from having free rein there again. At the same time, this deployment increases the risk of attacks in the Netherlands. The threat of terrorism in the Netherlands is currently substantial as it is.<sup>19</sup> This means there is a real chance of an attack occurring in this country. The Netherlands is frequently mentioned in statements by serious terrorist networks and attacks have already been committed in other countries comparable to the Netherlands. Here, too, there is radicalisation and recruiting.<sup>20</sup> The threat of terrorism has increased the demand placed on Defence as part of national security and so its third main task is increasing in importance.

The struggle against terrorism will be a long-term matter and will have to be carried out with a wide range of resources, of which one is deployment of the armed forces, nationally and internationally. As necessary as such deployment is, the struggle against terrorism is ultimately about values.<sup>21</sup> Islamic terrorism is aimed not only at the West but also against modernity in general in the rest of the world, and with it, moderate Muslims. Most victims of Islamic terrorism are Muslims. Taliban leader Mullah Omar would probably not have received many votes if he had participated in the Afghan elections. It is therefore not without reason that the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and affiliated organisations commit attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are probably supported by Iran and Syria in doing so: they do not *want* demo-

17 MIVD 2005 annual report, p. 24.

18 AIVD 2005 annual report, p. 24.

19 As established in the last threat report by the National Anti-Terrorism Coordinator; see <http://www.minbzk.nl/onderwerpen/veiligheid/terrorisme>.

20 According to the National Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, radicalisation and recruiting are occurring on a 'considerable' scale.

See [http://www.nctb.nl/wat\\_is\\_terrorisme/actueel\\_dreigingsniveau/index.asp](http://www.nctb.nl/wat_is_terrorisme/actueel_dreigingsniveau/index.asp).

21 According to British prime minister Blair as well. See his opinion piece, 'Battle for Global Values' in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007.

cracy to succeed there. Democratisation, civil and political liberties, the growth of trade, education and science, improvements in the status of women – these are developments that terrorists are fighting with their barbaric methods, because they take away the breeding ground for their radical ideology.

## 2.6 Relations between states

Non-classic threats and security problems have therefore increased in size, and with them the demand placed on Defence. We must not, however, close our eyes to other developments. Partly due to the strength of NATO, a conventional attack on the territory of the alliance is not considered likely. In general, armed conflicts between countries appear to have been reduced to a museum relic of the Cold War: after all, about 90% of conflicts occur within states, not between them.<sup>22</sup>

The situation in the Middle East, however, proves how much conflict can still arise between countries, whether in conjunction with non-state actors such as terrorist organisations or not. The fact that there are now new problems and challenges therefore does not mean that all other risks have disappeared. The strength of armed forces matters in international relations. Military power still counts in classic relations between states. It was not without reason that Colonel Gadaffi decided to halt his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programme and have the materials programme sent to the US. This was not due to cultural dialogue or development aid but to the effectiveness, demonstrated to Saddam Hussein, of the deployment of military power by the American armed forces and the willingness to deploy them if necessary.

In interstate relations, it is primarily the rogue states that pose a threat to international security. These are countries whose governments seriously violate human rights, do not comply with international obligations and agreements and often have aspirations to regional power. They reaffirm these with threatening rhetoric, major military spending and illegal acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. This involves countries such as Iran, North Korea and Syria, which work together. Both Syria and Iran also lend support to terrorist organisations. The ultra-conservative regime of the strictly Islamic republic of Iran especially is seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism. In addition to supporting Hezbollah, the Palestinian

<sup>22</sup> Dilemmas for future national action' ('Dilemma's voor het toekomstige landoptreden'), Prof. Dr R. de Wijk, *Atlantisch Perspectief*, April 2005, no. 2, p. 8.

Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Information and Security have themselves been involved in planning and support terrorist attacks.<sup>23</sup> Rogue states such as Iran are especially not easily impressed by the velvet glove of diplomacy, as Europe learned last year. In contrast to many prosperous democracies, their defence spending is not subject to pressure.

But it is not just the rogue states that spend heavily on defence. While Europe has largely collected its peace dividend, there is a considerable increase in defence spending worldwide. Spending is expected to surpass the Cold War peak by the end of 2006, with a record amount of almost \$1060 billion.<sup>24</sup> This involves advanced weapons systems, on which the West no longer has an obvious monopoly. While the Netherlands grappled with the issue of whether it needed to purchase Tomahawks for its frigates, Pakistan announced a test launch of its own cruise missile.<sup>25</sup> Against a background of the development of emerging economies, our military strength continues to require attention. It continues to be conceivable that large-scale military conflicts will occur in which our interests will also be at stake.

## 2.7 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was considered one of the greatest security risks even before 9-11.<sup>26</sup> Ballistic missiles are especially suited as delivery systems for NBC weapons. The rapid dissemination of missile technology and systems is worrying, especially by rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. The desire of these types of countries to have weapons of mass destruction available has increased in the past decade. They believe these weapons are needed as a deterrent to prevent a military confrontation. The rapid fall of Saddam Hussein's regime made it clear to them once again that they will be thoroughly defeated with conventional means.

Iran has an active ballistic missile programme. With the development of the Shahab-3, among other things, the south-eastern portion of NATO territory

23 MIVD 2005 annual report, p. 26.

24 'Arms without borders', Control Arms Campaign, report by Amnesty/Iansa/Oxfam, October 2006, p. 6.

25 See Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 August 2005. Pakistan's Babur missile has striking similarities to the US Tomahawk. Pakistan maintains close relations with China, which is also working on cruise missiles and precision weapons.

26 For example, see the CDA Statement titled 'The armed forces, deployable for the 21<sup>st</sup> century' ('De Krijgsmacht inzetbaar voor de 21<sup>e</sup> eeuw'), November 1999, p. 9, and the 2000 Defence policy document, p. 23.

has come within range. In addition to the improved range and accuracy of the Shahab-3, the Iranian missile programme may be aimed at developing new missiles powered by liquid fuel and with an even longer range, and developing ballistic missiles powered by solid fuels.<sup>27</sup> Continual threats by Iran to 'wipe Israel off the map' are making the situation volatile. More so because Tehran, despite all the diplomatic pressure, is continuing its operations to enrich uranium, which would indicate a nuclear programme. If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, a highly dangerous situation will arise. It is doubtful whether it will risk self-destruction by deploying a nuclear weapon. But for terrorist organisations with which Iran maintains close ties, such a deterrent does not apply. In any event, there is a justified fear that with the protection of a nuclear umbrella, Iran will engage in an even more aggressive foreign policy, including its support for terrorism.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, there is a risk of an arms race in the region among countries seeking to offset this threat. A nuclear chain of dominos across the Middle East would then be conceivable. In response to the West's failure to keep Iran's ambitions in check, six Arab states have shown interest in developing nuclear technology for civilian purposes.<sup>29</sup>

North Korea is also very active in ballistic missiles.<sup>30</sup> On 5 July 2006, the Stalinist state caused concern in the region by launching a Taepodong 2 long-range missile and a number of smaller missiles. There was even more alarm when the country conducted a nuclear test, although it was probably not entirely successful. The actions of Kim Jong-il's unpredictable regime are very worrying, given its repeated threats to neighbouring countries as well. North Korea has also made it clear that as a sovereign state, it wants to be able to develop, use and export such missiles. Such exports have occurred many times in the past. Missile technology is exported from North Korea to countries with confirmed or suspected programmes aimed at obtaining weapons of mass destruction.<sup>31</sup>

27 MIVD 2005 annual report, p. 52.

28 Iran is held responsible for various terrorist attacks, such as on the Khobar Towers in 1996, in which 19 US soldiers were killed and 400 injured.

29 According to the Times, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have announced that they wish to set up programmes to develop nuclear energy; Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates have also demonstrated interest. Such technology for civilian purposes is not contrary to international law, but may also be used for military purposes. See [HYPERLINK http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2436948,00.html](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2436948,00.html)

30 Ballistic missiles are long range missiles which leave the atmosphere during flight.

31 Government's answer to written questions by members of the Lower Chamber Ormel and Brinkel about an American anti-missile shield for Europe, 2 August 2006.



With the rapid spread of ballistic missile technology and systems and the increasing number of countries with ballistic missile capacity, the threat to NATO territory has grown. The increasing range and modernisation of missile systems are also a contributing factor.<sup>32</sup> Therefore the need for adequate protection from them has grown. The United States has set up an ambitious programme for a missile shield against intercontinental missiles. Although the Ballistic Missile Defense System has until now been focused on defending US territory, the US now wishes to expand it to friendly countries and allies.<sup>33</sup> This is more far-reaching than NATO's plans, which are limited to defending NATO territory. A NATO study has demonstrated the technical feasibility of a missile shield for Europe, but it contains issues that are still open. As far as the committee is concerned, there should be no misunderstanding that NATO territory requires appropriate defence against ballistic missiles. The Netherlands would have to devote itself to a missile shield for Europe and make a concrete contribution to missile defence.<sup>34</sup>

## 2.8 Rising (regional) superpowers

The rise of China and India as new global powers means that the focus of the world economy is shifting towards Asia. This will have consequences for geostrategic relations and the balance of power in the world. The government has accordingly asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) to make recommendations on the consequences of China's emergence for security policy. The economies of Russia and Brazil will surpass those of individual European countries in size in the future. This is due primarily to their size but also these countries catching up to them economically. But demographic changes are at least equally important as a reason for Europe being overtaken. These will be addressed later.

32 Ibid.

33 The Americans have plans for a Global Missile Defense Third Interceptor Site in Europe, probably to be located in Poland and the Czech Republic. This goes further than the NATO study.

34 In terms of Theatre Missile Defence, the Netherlands is making a valuable contribution with Patriot PAC-3 systems. The Netherlands also supports the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme and has said it is prepared to provide a test facility. The committee also supports a missile shield on LC frigates.

## China

With 1.3 billion inhabitants, China is a rising economic power that will become the world's second-largest economy, according to US investment bank Goldman Sachs.<sup>35</sup> This economic growth is accompanied by increasing assertiveness in foreign policy, increased demand for raw materials and sharp increases in defence spending. China is expected to spend more on defence by 2025 than any European country.<sup>36</sup> It is rapidly modernising its armed forces. It is understandable for several reasons that China would like to end the weapons embargo announced against it by the EU. China is currently already one of the world's biggest arms importers. Russia in particular provides large quantities of weapons, including advanced systems.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the country is building its own defence industry that is developing advanced information technology, working on long-range precision strike power, ballistic missiles and aircraft.<sup>38</sup> China's history evokes an inward-looking and not especially imperialistic empire. The latest figures on the economy and defence, however, indicate a more outward attitude.

The Chinese leadership considers the US its most significant opponent. The level of ambition and modernisation of its armed forces should largely be seen from that perspective. For example, in 2010, there will be about 85 Chinese submarines in operation in the Pacific, which should currently still be considered a kind of American inland sea. By way of comparison, the Americans have only 35 there. The number of missiles and combat aircraft stationed along the coast of 'renegade province' Taiwan that can reach Taiwan is increasing every year. The consequences for stability in the region are predictable. The influential writer Robert Kaplan even predicts a struggle between the US and China, comparable to the Cold War in size.<sup>39</sup>

35 Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99: 'Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050'.

36 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 29800 X, no. 121, p. 6.

37 As the largest weapons supplier, Russia has delivered, among other things, modern Kilo-class submarines, Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft and S-300 SAM missiles. See 'China: peaceful rise or military threat?', C. Homan, *Atlantisch Perspectief*, April 2006.

38 Vision on the future surface fleet of the Royal Dutch Navy, CCSS report, April 2004, p. 15.

39 'We must prepare for a Cold War with China' ('We moeten ons voorbereiden op een Koude Oorlog tegen China'), R.D. Kaplan, NRC Handelsblad, 21 May 2005.

China is, after all, developing into one of the world's largest and also most irresponsible arms exporters.<sup>40</sup> It is the only major arms exporter not to have signed any agreement to prevent sales of weapons that could be used for serious violations of human rights. For example, it has supplied weapons to Iran, Myanmar and Sudan – countries where human rights are grossly violated. Estimates of the size of Chinese arms exports assume a figure of more than \$1 billion annually, with China frequently making barter deals: weapons are exchanged for raw materials such as oil or copper, which China urgently needs for its rapid economic growth.<sup>41</sup>

## *India*

India is also on the rise. The economy of the country, with nearly 1.1 billion inhabitants, grew by 7.5 per cent annually between 2002 and 2006, not much less than that of China. India wants to become a 'knowledge superpower' and hopes to pass over the industrial development phase on the road to the information age. By 2020, the Indian economy is expected to surpass that of Germany. India is therefore well on the way to becoming the world's third-largest economy, after the US and China.<sup>42</sup> As an atomic power, it has ballistic missiles, and with a rapidly growing fleet, it will have one of the world's largest navies.<sup>43</sup> Further modernisation of its armed forces is fulfilling India's aspirations to become a regional superpower. Increasing Indian military capacity is primarily aimed at neighbouring Pakistan but also at the threat posed by China.<sup>44</sup> The rise of new superpowers is occurring in regions that are not very stable, such as North Korea, the struggle for oil in the Caspian Sea, the rivalry between the two countries and frequent tensions between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir.

40 See 'People's Republic of China, Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses', report by Amnesty International, 11 June 2006.

41 *Ibid.*

42 Goldman Sachs, Global Economic Paper No. 99: 'Dreaming with BRIC's: The Path to 2050'.

43 The strength of the Indian navy will be expanded from 132 ships at present to 185 ships in 2017. Whereas Western navies are shifting from 'blue' to 'brown' water, India's navy staff is referring to a shift in focus to 'blue-water operations'. See 'Vision on the future surface fleet of the Royal Dutch Navy', CCSS report, April 2004, p. 15.

44 MIVD 2005 annual report, p. 44.

## 2.9 The 'instability belt'

As a highly developed industrialised trading nation, the Netherlands depends on the guaranteed supply of raw materials, safe trade routes and stable sales markets. If these are threatened, there can be far-reaching economic consequences. These can occur in many different ways: interstate or intrastate conflicts, or the absence of effective government authority, in which serious crime, piracy and terrorism are given free rein. Many of the world's most important conflict centres lie with the 'belt of instability' running from North Korea to the Caribbean. According to the Clingendael centre for strategic studies, this involves such issues as large-scale drug-related crime in the Caribbean, civil war in West Africa, the Gulf region and the disputed ownership of the oil-rich Spratly islands.<sup>45</sup> Many areas lying within this belt are rich in essential resources. Furthermore, the most important trade routes run through or past these areas. Transport capacity on maritime routes is limited at some crucial but narrow passages.<sup>46</sup> The supply routes for oil and gas are therefore a vulnerable element in the security of our energy supply.

Iran can be considered a potential threat to Europe's energy supply security and with it that of the Netherlands.<sup>47</sup> Terrorism and piracy also pose threats to the safety of shipping and facilities such as drilling platforms. In 2002, al-Qa'ida attacked the French tanker *Limburg*. The consequences of an attack on an oil pipeline or one of the vulnerable offshore oil platforms would be more far-reaching, both economically and environmentally. Such a scenario is not merely imaginary; maritime units of Operation Enduring Freedom have in fact prevented such an attack on an oil terminal.<sup>48</sup> Shipments of drugs, weapons and ammunitions associated with terrorist organisations, including al-Qa'ida, have also been intercepted several times.

45 Vision on the future surface fleet of the Royal Dutch Navy, CCSS report, April 2004, p. 15.

46 Every day, about 40% of the world's oil supply is transported through narrow sea straits such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-El-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca and the Bosphorus.

47 MIVD 2005 annual report, p. 51.

48 Government evaluation of deployment of OEF frigate, 3 October 2004 – 14 January 2005, p. 10.

Piracy is an ever increasing threat to shipping and is on the rise.<sup>49</sup> It occurs worldwide, particularly in the belt of instability, and is accompanied by the use of firearms, fatalities and kidnapping. The area in which pirates operate is becoming larger and their methods more advanced. For example, hijacking even occurs more than 200 miles from the coast of Somalia. Thanks to the deployment of maritime units of Enduring Freedom in the waters surrounding the Arabian peninsula, piracy in this region was reduced by 50% over the period before the operation began.<sup>50</sup>

Where physical protection of transport routes by military means is required, and there is an express international mandate to do so, the Netherlands should also be prepared to contribute, according to the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV).<sup>51</sup> This view deserves support: the deployment of the Royal Dutch Navy in Operation Enduring Freedom has in fact already attested to this. Furthermore, protecting the commercial fleet is also part of the tradition of the Netherlands as a seafaring nation. In addition to ships, the Dutch armed forces also have other resources that can be deployed to protect transport routes both on land and at sea. NATO is the most natural context for such deployment. At the request of some countries, the alliance could provide assistance in protecting infrastructure and transport routes. Secretary-General De Hoop Scheffer's arguments for placing energy security more prominently on NATO's agenda are therefore worthy of support.

## 2.10 Demographic changes

A provisional long-term strategy by the European Defence Agency outlines the developments and trends for the next twenty years that are important in terms of defence policy to be carried out. These are not particularly favourable for the political, economic and military importance of Europe in the future. While other countries experience spectacular growth, Europe will be dealing with the effects of a greying population. In 2025, Europeans


49 The number of reported incidents of piracy has risen sharply, from about 250 in 1999 to 445 incidents in 2003. The number of attacks in the first three quarters of 2006 has declined by 31 compared to 2005. (Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, [www.icc-ccs.org](http://www.icc-ccs.org)).

50 Evaluation of deployment of OEF frigate, 3 October 2004 – 14 January 2005, p. 10.

51 Sixth recommendation in 'Energetic foreign policy. Energy supply security as a new main goal' ('Energiek buitenlands beleid. Energievoorzieningszekerheid als nieuwe hoofddoelstelling'), General Energy Council (AER) and Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), December 2005, p. 58.

will be 45 years old on average and make up just 6% of the world's population. Because of lower birth rates in addition to an ageing population, more and more older people will need to be supported by fewer and fewer young people. The demand on European welfare states will therefore increase structurally. For a country like Germany, the cost associated with ageing will rise from 15% of GNP in 2000 to 26% in 2040. In Italy, the percentage will be as high as 33%. The following graph shows how the cost of ageing, such as pension plans and health care will rise in various Western countries if policy is not modified. Reforms of the welfare state may be able to weaken the trend but not reverse it. Only immigration on a large scale can still change this picture significantly. This will, however, have consequences for European cultural identity. The result will be downward pressure on other government spending, including defence.

#### Summary of cost of ageing in 2000 and in 2040 (estimated) in some Western countries



Demographic changes in other regions of the world are of an entirely different nature. It is expected that the population of Africa, despite AIDS, war and famine, will rise by 48% to 1.3 billion in 2025. The average age for Africans will be 22%. The professional population in the Middle East will increase by at least 50%.<sup>52</sup> The question in both Africa and the Middle East is very much whether the economy can keep up with this huge increase in the number of young people; probably not. High unemployment among large

52 An Initial Long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, European Defence Agency, p. 6.

groups of young people is a very real fear, with all the consequences it brings. Poverty, hopelessness and poor prospects can form a breeding ground for radicalisation and armed conflict and also lead to mass migration to Europe.

The increase in the world's population will result in a greater need for energy, expected to rise by 50%; oil consumption is expected to rise by 40%, gas consumption by 90%.<sup>53</sup> The growth of China and India in particular is driving up the demand for, and therefore the price of, raw materials, which, as indicated above, are primarily located in the instability belt. The interests of Europe, which in the future will be 90% dependent on foreign oil, and 80% dependent on foreign gas, may become involved in this race for resources. This is all the more reason to take energy supply security seriously. In any event, Europe will be older in 2025, less powerful economically and surrounded by unstable regions.

53 Ibid, p. 7.

# 3 International action



### 3.1 General

This chapter deals more closely with the international context of military action. Chapter 1 dealt with situations in which military action is justified. Our security interests are embedded in the North Atlantic treaty, of which one of the fundamental principles is article 5: the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance in the event of an armed attack on one or more allies. This principle gained a broader significance when it was invoked after the 9-11 attacks. In crisis management operations, the Netherlands will participate only if there is a coalition of multiple countries. Not only the mandate and its provider will be examined, or the equipment, armament and rules of engagement, but also the degree to which the Netherlands can exert an ongoing influence on the course of the mission. This requirement is based in part on the experience our country gained in previous missions, especially in the Balkans.

Furthermore, the conditions for transport (including air transport) will have to be met, both for displacement and for the exit strategy. The influence of the Netherlands should also be apparent from the placement of a red card holder at international headquarters. This is a Dutch national, who ensures that the duties assigned to the Netherlands remain within the mandate agreed on with us. This assures the Netherlands' full command of deployment of its military. This does not take away from the fact that many national caveats (restrictions imposed by countries on the deployment of their troops) lead to operational problems and restrictions in international missions. The Netherlands also exercises restraint in participation, and rightly so. In that sense, the frame of reference for future action remains no less current. The Netherlands can also exert influence by assuming leadership of a multinational troop force, as it now has for a six-month term with the ISAF regional command in southern Afghanistan.

The increasing number of international operations has provided many new insights into the opportunities and circumstances of intervention and assistance. The current starting point involves distributing risks over the participating countries. The fundamental principle for being prepared to share risks and for support for a mission is that the Netherlands must always be able to make its own deliberation on whether to participate. The Netherlands follows its own constitution and assesses the interests of the country and of international law above all else. Alliance interests may be seen here as being identical to those of the Netherlands. The interests of individual third parties, even if they are allies, are subordinate to the above interests.

An international division of duties, with the upper range of the spectrum of violence reserved for larger countries and smaller countries dedicated particularly to low-risk peacekeeping operations, must be explicitly rejected. First, experience has shown that it is scarcely possible to draw a firm boundary between the different types of action. Regions where foreign military forces are required are unstable by definition. Even a peacekeeping mission can degenerate into a combat mission and a participating country must be prepared accordingly. Second, all responsibility for military assistance or intervention must always be broadly supported. Smaller countries must also be able to share in the deliberations when greater force is applied. Encumbering only the larger countries with this would inevitably lead to an ethical double standard in which the smaller countries can raise the bar in ethical terms due to their moral exemption from difficult decisions. This results in gratuitous moralising: one becomes the moral critic of a world history that one lets others create. Conversely, becoming accustomed to more serious violence can lead the larger countries to a lower ethical threshold and hence to decay. Neither of these is a good thing. Third, such a distribution would in fact give the larger countries authority over where action is taken. They would be the police force and carry out the agenda together. This, too, is undesirable. This is the task of the UN Security Council. Through their permanent membership, the superpowers (or former superpowers) have already justified their size and the importance of their contribution, within the limits of the Charter.

An additional problem with an overly large international deployment by a single country is the risk of being overstretched, i.e., being attached to commitments while the reserves are too short of people and equipment to be able to fulfil each of those commitments fully and appropriately. Even the United States sees its abilities as finite in practice. The Netherlands must also be constantly judicious and ensure that all commitments are covered by sufficient relief reserves. This is no place to be miserly. The demand placed on troops in the field is considerable in itself, but they must also be properly prepared and trained in every respect. This is in the interests of the success of their mission, hence also in the interests of local civilians.

### 3.2 NATO

The security policy of the Netherlands is embedded in NATO's trans-Atlantic alliance. This is a very significant alliance, offering a continually available military command structure – the world's strongest. It also links the defence efforts of major democracies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This enables Europe to arrive at the same insights as the United States and

Canada, or to exert influence on each other to that end. The committee's preference is that international operations in which our country participates be carried out by or under the leadership of NATO, mandated by the Security Council where possible. Obviously, NATO's position has changed since the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the admission of many Eastern European countries to the alliance. But since then, the monster of internationally operating terrorism has also reared its head – an opponent against which civilian methods fall short and even the defensive potential of individual countries, even the United States, is insufficient. This is related not only to an individual country's strike power but equally to the platform offered by NATO for credible military coalitions. Military resistance against terror can thereby demonstrably be based on a broad international foundation. Partly for this reason, the alliance has a contemporary but also very important political function.

There is currently firm global criticism of the United States because of its unilateral stance on tensions and conflicts. There is, however, a significant nuance that should be stated. The selfwilledness the US can allow itself within the international community is counterbalanced by the weak and divided nature of Europe. This weakness all too often means its role lies on the periphery of global dynamics. This periphery, as stated above, can all too easily result in a country of continent shying away from significant dilemmas or taking them too lightly. This is the risk that Europe is running. At the same time, this can induce laziness in the partner, causing it to be self-centred and to overestimate itself. Reason enough to take the alliance very seriously, to invest in it and to maintain a reciprocally critical stance. The CDA's Foreign Affairs committee issued a discussion document in January 2004 on the role of NATO, the United States, the United Nations and the European Union in international security. In it, concern was expressed regarding US involvement in NATO, further to the country's 'Alleingang' in Iraq. The document rightly notes that '... lasting American involvement and interest in NATO' must go hand in hand with 'European consensus on and willingness to make a full contribution to resolving the international security issue'.<sup>54</sup> For this reason, Europe in a certain sense bears partial responsibility for the high-handed actions of what is in fact its most important ally.

As an operational military organisation, NATO has by now proved its worth with its actions in Bosnia and Afghanistan. The missions did justice to the various goals to which the Netherlands and others subscribe and which it

<sup>54</sup> Discussion document on international security, CDA Foreign Affairs Committee, 2004, p. 14-15.

considers its responsibility. On one hand, it involves the restoration of law and order and the reconstruction of areas that were centres of conflict with many civilian victims, but in Afghanistan, NATO also engages in military action against international terrorism. The Netherlands has rightly provided people and resources to all these actions, in proportion to its abilities. We note that even NATO still has insufficient transport capacity. It does not matter that military missions must hire transport capacity on site from external providers available at the time. Not only is such availability not always certain, it also does not sufficiently guarantee safe transport according to NATO specifications. We therefore welcome the NATO initiative for the joint purchase and management of C-17 transport aircraft and the participation of the Netherlands in it. This initiative offers guaranteed transport capacity as well as attractive economies of scale related to the multinational approach. The fact that Sweden, a non-member of NATO, supports this initiative further emphasises its relevance.

#### *NATO Response Force (NRF)*

To be able to act quickly in crisis situations, NATO set up the *NATO Response Force* (NRF) at the Prague summit in November 2002, an intervention force of 25,000 troops, deployable within five to thirty days. Many modern threats do in fact require a rapid response, whether as a result of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. The NRF also acts as a catalyst for the transformation of European armed forces. Parts of the NRF have already been deployed in combating the results of Hurricane Katrina and after the earthquake in Pakistan. Following problems with staffing, the NRF will be declared fully operational later this year.<sup>55</sup> At least as important as military capacity is the political will to deploy it in the upper range of the spectrum of violence, should it be necessary. The NRF still needs to undergo its baptism by fire. It may be assumed that the NRF will then achieve more than training exercises. It is a fact that the units provided by the member states must be able to count on each other. A process of improvement, training and certification precedes the time that units can be deployed for the NRF. Participation is not optional. The International Affairs Advisory Council in fact believes that member states maintaining their right to decide independently, at the last minute, which units they provide do not do justice to the concept of the NRF and perhaps should not participate.<sup>56</sup> The committee supports this view.

55 There are still considerable staffing problems for subsequent NRF batches.

56 Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) report on Military Cooperation in Europe, options and limitations, no. 31, April 2003, p. 32.

### *Political decision-making on deployment of Dutch troops in the NRF*

This raises the question of political guidance and decision-making in the event of actual deployment. If Dutch units are assigned to the NRF, a decision to deploy will by definition mean the military involvement of the Netherlands.<sup>57</sup> The Lower House NRF working group addressed the decision-making process in detail in its report, 'Deployment with consent – the role of the Lower House in dispatching troops'.<sup>58</sup> Our position in this is that providing troops to the NRF is not without obligation. The Netherlands is involved in political decision-making on deployment as one of the 26 NATO members in the North Atlantic Council. The government is therefore required to inform the Lower House as much as possible in advance of its deployment in NATO. This gives the House the option to enter into a debate with the government. There cannot be consent on the part of the House at that point yet; the 'article 100' procedure refers to decisions, not to *intentions* on the part of the government. The problem, however, is that after a decision is made by NATO, it is difficult for the House to reverse or modify Dutch participation. In the event of such independence on the part of the Netherlands, there will be great diplomatic damage. Furthermore, there may not be time for the House to deliberate carefully, given the speed at which the NRF can be developed. This is obviously important in the case of an unexpected terrorist attack.<sup>59</sup> A constitutional amendment comprising a right of assent for the House for *all* forms of deployment of Dutch troops provided to the NRF is contrary to this and must be rejected. The committee's position is therefore that the general assent of the States General to participation in the NRF comprises implicit approval of immediate deployment of Dutch troops that are part of the NRF if required according to NATO. It is quite conceivable that the Lower House will nonetheless arrive at a current statement as soon as possible regarding the Dutch military deployment that has already begun.

### *Challenges for NATO*

Whereas NATO's former *raison d'être* was collective self-defence, the alliance is now increasingly dedicated to projecting stability outside its own territory, by carrying out crisis management operations and entering into cooperation with other countries. The Riga summit on 28 and 29 November

57 In that case, the Netherlands cannot opt for an 'Iraq solution': providing political but not military support.

58 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30162, no. 2-5.

59 In that case, article 5 of the treaty will be invoked and action will be in collective self-defence. Article 100 of the constitution, which the frame of reference procedure is based on, will then not even be applicable formally.

2006 was characterised by the continued political and military transformation of the alliance. The Comprehensive Political Guidance assumed at the summit further elaborates on this. This document identifies a number of important concepts, such as the relationship between peace, security and development; bringing stability for the purposes of reconstruction; the importance of civilian-military relations in planning and carrying out missions; NATO's cooperation with partner countries and organisations; a proportional division of labour within the alliance and the importance of security sector reform. Dutch involvement is aimed at achieving consensus on the form and priorities of the new NATO in 2009 at the summit on the occasion of the alliance's sixtieth anniversary.

The first priority is the success of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, in which a total of 37 countries are participating with 31,000 troops led by NATO. NATO cannot allow itself to fail here. Therefore it is very important that member states present sufficient troops to compensate for existing shortfalls. NATO loses credibility and effectiveness if it does not provide and perform in concrete terms. NATO's adjusted level of ambition also indicates this. The focus is shifting from more smaller operations (six in total) in addition to two large ones. If maximum effort is devoted to this ambition, a total of 300,000 troops will be deployed in such a situation – one that we are far from experiencing at the moment. Experience in recent years has taught that cooperation frequently occurs with non-NATO countries such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. NATO's cooperation with other organisations such as the UN and EU also requires reinforcement. NATO needs these global partners. The ambitions, however, will first need to be achieved within the alliance. A fairer distribution of the burden is a contributing factor. At the moment, there is still a reverse lottery: if a country provides troops to the NRF, it can subsequently also pay the cost when it comes to deployment (which is often expensive). This can especially prevent less wealthy countries from contributing. Initiatives to finance activities such as in infrastructure are steps in the right direction towards more common funding. Serious efforts must be made in this direction.

### **3.3 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**

The foundation of European integration was laid at the time in part to end wars among nations on the European continent. Given Europe's extraordinarily violent history, the Union is, with all its faults, a phenomenal feat of progress. For Christian democracy, the European Union is more than a common market with the Euro as its currency. It is also a community of values and therefore a political union as well. A security policy is logically part of

such a union. With the acceptance of the Solana paper<sup>60</sup>, in December 2003, the Union developed a serious security strategy, making a good analysis of the threats and challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To a significant degree, these extend across borders: they extend farther than the European continent alone. The impetus for the ESDP was given in 2000 with the formulation of the Helsinki Headline Goal: the ambition to be able to deploy military forces with a maximum of 60,000 troops within no more than sixty days for the 'Petersberg objectives' for the duration of one year. This Rapid Reaction Force has now been supplemented with rapid-deployment initial entry units of about 1500 troops, known as Battle Groups. The Netherlands participates in these units periodically, as it did as of 1 January 2007 with Germany and Finland. The EU has since then carried out missions in Macedonia and the Congo and is engaged in the Althea mission in Bosnia, taking over the SFOR operation from NATO. This indicates that the EU's military role is growing.

The committee greatly regrets that the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, containing improvements to cooperation in the area of defence, cannot be implemented yet. This is unfortunately impossible for the time being, following the negative results of referendums in France and the Netherlands. Moreover, we do not support a European army fully subsuming national armed forces. This would indisputably lead to economies of scale and other advantages and perhaps considerable savings. Political guidance of such an army, however, requires a unanimous Community Foreign Policy and Security Policy. This is currently not the case to a sufficient degree. National governments cannot transfer their 'strong arm', which ultimately represents the sovereignty of their countries, nor do they wish to.

The need for more cooperation in a European context, however, is no less urgent. Section 2.10 indicates the potential consequences of demographic change on Europe's position on the world stage. European countries' defence spending is currently already below the NATO average of 2% of GNP; while the US spends about 3.4%, the Europeans did not spend more than 1.81% in 2005. Where the Americans spend 36% of their budget on equipment, development and technological research, the upper limit for Europe is an average of 18.4%, with lows below 10%. Europe spends just 1.14% of total defence expenditure on fundamental and applied technological research, according to figures from the European Defence Agency.<sup>61</sup> This percentage is far too low to maintain a healthy European defence industry.

60 J. Solana, 'A secure Europe in a Better World', European Security Strategy, December 2003.

61 'European Defence Expenditure Data', available on the European Defence Agency (EDA) website: <http://www.eda.europa.eu>.

Furthermore, the technological gap between the US and Europe is at risk of becoming wider, with every risk that carries for interoperability within NATO. In addition, the Union's ambitions are too small and this is reflected by the efforts of each of the European countries. The Netherlands cannot bridge the gap with the US by itself. Europe must seriously ask itself how long the US is prepared to protect Europe.

One very significant area in which Europe is dramatically behind the United States is in intelligence. Not only are there still different security agencies active in each country in Europe, the continent also lags far behind in terms of capacity in such areas as satellites. Sharing information in both the preventive and combat phase is a highly sensitive matter. Furthermore, Europe cannot expect the US to make significant efforts to conduct professional surveillance and then share it with third parties at no charge, even with allies. Europe is now years behind the US and cannot catch up; it would require European society to make a much greater budget contribution to defence than is now the case. Nonetheless, Europe's relevance and its claim in economic terms are such that it must arrive at a considerable intensification of policy and resources. This applies to all of Europe's defence efforts: noblesse oblige. The shortcomings are in fact not only in the high-tech area, such as command, reconnaissance and information. Low-tech resources such as transport and combat (service) support also show critical shortcomings. This means European armed forces are barely deployable in an expeditionary sense.<sup>62</sup> The great need for troop deployments in Lebanon and Afghanistan, for example, and the small response of European countries to it, made this once again painfully evident. The many initiatives such as the *Defence Capabilities Initiative* and the *Prague Capabilities Commitment* within NATO and the *European Capabilities Action Plan* have not been able to change this much. Completion of the Headline Goal is thus still very far away. The committee believes that ambitions should not be increased in the interim, as it is difficult enough to achieve the current ones. Reality would have to bring the EU to an insight into self-restriction. Large-scale out-of-area action such as in Afghanistan is not meant for the EU but for NATO, aside from the fact that the transport capacity to do so is simply absent. The ESDP must complement NATO; the committee therefore sees the EU's role for the time being as lying more in relatively small-scale missions with a lower risk profile than Afghanistan, for example.

Nevertheless, the ESDP must be strengthened, certainly to the extent that doing so also strengthens NATO. Europe can achieve more defence per Euro

62 Ibid.



in many ways. Task specialisation and pooling resources are among these, but they should not in turn form an alibi for further cutbacks and elimination of valuable capabilities. In particular, we see potential in the area of joint equipment purchasing. The current situation is that ships are being built on 21 wharves in Europe for 16 navies and in the next five to ten years, no fewer than 23 different armoured vehicles will be bought for the various European armies. Virtually all of these types have been developed on the basis of nationally determined needs and are supplied by national industries. There is scarcely any standardisation or interoperability involved. A better alignment of these countries' needs may promote both interoperability and efficient spending of tax funds. The European Defence Agency (EDA) can assist in this. To be able to play an effective catalyst role, the EDA must be expanded and, using a bigger budget, be enabled to manage equipment projects.

To date, the EDA has been involved in such issues as drawing up a code of conduct for equipment acquisition, which took effect on 1 July 2006. This code, which motivates member states to tender their equipment investments Europe-wide instead of just to their own industries, is a step forwards. The Netherlands must continue to endeavour to promote fair competition on the European defence market. Article 296 of the EU treaty is an obstacle in this sense.<sup>63</sup> It states that each member state can take measures that it considers necessary to protect the significant interests of its security and which refer to production of or trade in military equipment. Some European countries protect and subsidise their own national defence industry by limiting competition by invoking this article. The committee therefore advocates its complete elimination,<sup>64</sup> as over the long term, Dutch industry will also benefit more from free competition in a market that is as open as possible than from government protection. This may not, inciden-

63 The text of article 296 of the EU treaty is as follows:

The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:

- a) no member state shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
- b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.

64 This was also the approach used by the Netherlands at the intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 2000 on reforms of the institutions of the European Union, after the failure of a previous attempt in 1991. See the government's third Statement on IGC-2000, Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 26559, no. 2.

tally, result in a sort of 'company store' for European equipment. Successful participation in the JSF project clearly indicates that the Netherlands must be free to select the best product at the best price, with the best opportunities for industry. The Netherlands would in fact be shooting itself in the foot if it allowed itself to be led by such things as populist anti-American sentiment in its investment policy. Serious deliberation is required.

Avoiding duplication is also important in terms of carrying out crisis management operations. Precisely in order to use scarce resources as efficiently as possible, for example, the EU need not set up its own command structure with its own headquarters. It can use NATO capabilities, as arranged in the Berlin Plus agreement. The committee also advocates a reverse Berlin Plus structure: NATO using EU capabilities, such as the Gendarmerie Force. And just as with NATO, we advocate common funding within the ESDP for operations carried out by the EU.

### 3.4 United Nations (UN)

The United Nations also continues to play a crucial role. This role appeared to be virtually unlimited just after the Cold War. The 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace* exuded optimism about the UN's abilities in crisis management. The reality, however, turned out to be different. Although some missions, such as Cambodia, were successful, others (Rwanda, Yugoslavia) ended dramatically. These were learning experiences. The AIV, however, notes that there has been a growing realisation over the years that the UN is not the designated party to carry out crisis management operations in every case. This is certainly the case if the level of violence is or could be high. This is primarily the result of a limited ability to issue a good political mandate and the restrictions in carrying out operations, especially where command is concerned.<sup>65</sup>

In principle, military intervention is permitted only once the Security Council has given a mandate to do so. Decision-making can, however, be blocked by a veto by one of the permanent members, even if it is not related to the issue itself. Division and lack of vigour detract from the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN. Moreover, as a political organisation, the UN tends to give priority to diplomacy, even when military action is, or should be, already in progress, for example, as a consequence of an ultimatum. This is contrary to the credibility of the threat of violence. A shrewd opponent

65 'The Netherlands and crisis management: three contemporary aspects' ('Nederland en crisisbeheersing, drie actuele aspecten'), Advisory Council on International Affairs report no. 34, March 2004, p. 10.

can stretch infinitely and gain ground militarily or in terms of publicity in the meanwhile. Military involvement in actions that are relatively high on the spectrum of violence require the greatest possible professionalism in command structure and execution, in the interests of the safety of the civilian population in the crisis area and the safety of participating troops. It was therefore not without reason that former secretary-general Kofi Annan stated in his speech before the General Assembly in September 2003 that structural changes are required to be able to deal with old and new, 'hard' and 'soft' threats. To that end, he set up a *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (HLP), which in December 2004 issued a report titled '*A more secure world: our shared responsibility*'. This provides a clear analysis of the threats facing the world. The report makes a series of recommendations on how the international community can deal with them and how global multilateral institutions can be strengthened to that end, particularly the UN. A number of these recommendations were accepted at the UN summit on 14-16 September 2005, such as the 'responsibility to protect' stated in section 1.3. More generally, the Summit determined that peace and security, development and human rights are equal and interlinked UN fundamentals and form the basis for collective security; that an effective multilateral system is essential and that the UN plays a central role in it.<sup>66</sup> In any event, the committee obviously views the UN as the central forum of the world community and the Security Council as the world's most authoritative body in terms of sanctioning the use of military force, but it is less obviously the entity to carry out crisis management operations the more violence is involved.

### **3.5 In conclusion: international action**

The security and defence policy of the Netherlands is primarily shaped within international institutions and organisations. The approach should therefore be aimed at strengthening them by being a reliable ally making a proportionate contribution, both in terms of burden sharing and risk sharing. The weight of the Dutch effort increases and becomes more relevant, more useable, if we invest in shortcomings within our most direct international boundaries: NATO and the EU. However, the Netherlands must not be oriented towards NATO and the EU alone. With the growth of both organisations, the possibility of division and indecision has increased commensurately, especially in crisis situations. The question of whether or not to act cannot always, as regrettable as it is, be seen as dependent on unanimity, as

66 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 26150, no. 34, p. 2.

indecision or opposition might then be the winner. Ad hoc coalitions may also arise in that case. Operation Enduring Freedom and the SFIR operation in Iraq, in which the Netherlands has made a considerable contribution, are examples of this. Such coalitions of the able and willing, usually with NATO and EU allies and led by the US, are not meant to replace NATO or the EU, but may sometimes be the only useful alternative for taking action. The Netherlands must be prepared for this. The UN itself has developed a useable, legitimate alternative for carrying out operations itself in situations in a higher spectrum of violence. It involves a large country together with an ad hoc coalition, mandated by the Security Council, carrying out the operation. Instead of an ad hoc coalition, it may also be a regional organisation, such as in Sierra Leone. NATO can also carry out or take over such an operation from an ad hoc coalition, as in Afghanistan. It appears that this trend is continuing. This emphasises the fact that the debate on, and the practical development of, the justified application of military force in the interests of peace and human rights is still undergoing development. The committee considers it highly important for the Netherlands to participate actively in this process, both in the relevant bodies and in providing feedback to its own parliament and society.

# 4 Dutch defence policy

In the context of the developments in the security situation indicated in chapter 3 and the international context outlined in chapter 3, Dutch defence policy must be evaluated and defined. This chapter deals in turn with the 'Prinsjesdag' Letter, the Netherlands' level of ambition, the relationship between Defence and Development Aid, operational insights and developments, as well as social and technological developments. Finally, the armed forces will be discussed.

#### 4.1 Prinsjesdag Letter, Operation 'New Equilibrium'

Under the first Balkenende government, Defence was faced with its greatest task in recent decades, after 11 September 2001, no less. The vision emerged later, in the letter on the 'Prinsjesdag' Letter in 2003, under the second Balkenende government, and resulted in the largest reorganisation in the history of the armed forces. It is to the credit of the members of the government that their actions this time did not consist exclusively of making cuts. Because there were even more cuts than was necessary according to the terms of reference – units and weapons systems were disposed of – space was created for investment elsewhere.

In some respects, Defence is now in better shape. Overhead and bureaucracy have been cut back. The armed forces are leaner and meaner than ever before. This does mean, however, that its organisational flexibility is very limited. This is cause for concern, especially when there is great pressure to deploy.

Defence now has more uniforms on the ground: the marine battalions have been strengthened, engineering and command have been expanded and a fourth armoured battalion has been set up. Deployability for crisis management operations has also been improved, in part by expanding air transport capacity with a third and fourth C-130 Hercules and a third DC-10.

In contrast to previously, the organisation is better staffed than ever and the armed forces will be fully staff in the foreseeable future.

The budget, with corresponding duties and resources, is more balanced and defence plays a large part in an integrated foreign policy (in part due to intensification of Security Sector Reform activity). The government's reconstruction statement<sup>67</sup> has created a good foundation for further expansion of these activities. The Netherlands is doing well internationally. The transformation process is further along in the Netherlands than in many

67 Government Statement on 'Reconstruction after armed conflict' ('Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict'), March 2005, Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30075, no. 1.

European countries. The Netherlands is clearly contributing to NATO in the form of the NATO Response Forces and to the EU in the form of EU Battle Groups. The armed forces have also been almost continuously involved in crisis management operations in recent years, with between 1500 and 2500 troops.

The importance of national operations and support from civilian authorities has increased further with the current threats. Defence has now grown into a structural security partner of the civilian authorities. Where Defence was a safety net in the past, the armed forces are now more than ever ready as the fourth column in addition to the police, fire brigade and emergency medical services. The Civilian-Military Cooperation Intensification (ICMS) has made additional capacity available and the required financing, in addition to existing agreements on military assistance and support. The number of troops available for national security has thereby risen from 3000 to 4600, primarily due to specialist capacity.<sup>68</sup> The capacity required for national duties, however, must not detract from availability for expeditionary operations.

#### **4.2 The Dutch level of ambition**

The committee believes that the Netherlands' foreign policy ambitions must correspond to our economic power and with a view to a safer, better world: noblesse oblige. Depending on one's perspective, the Netherlands is referred to as the smallest of the large countries or the largest of the small countries. We opt for the second description. Our country is a sub-superpower in economic terms, after all. It is the world's sixteenth-largest economy<sup>69</sup>, with the second-largest port; a country where foreign investors are happy to settle. Our economic position has consequences for security policy. On one hand, our open economic system makes us vulnerable to international stability. It is in our interest to combat this instability, here and abroad. On the other hand, a country with the size and influence that the Netherlands has bears a moral responsibility to let other nations share in the peace and security we experience and to help them on their way to more prosperity. Defence and development aid therefore serve the same agenda in this respect. Their reciprocal relationship will be discussed later.

68 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30300X, no. 106.

69 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 July 2005.

The role of the Netherlands is prominent in a political sense as well. Our country has traditionally been a leader in the area of foreign policy, originally primarily as an economic power. The Royal Dutch Navy, the oldest part of the armed forces, was founded to protect the mercantile interests of the world's first multinational, the United East India Company (VOC). In fact, the VOC was so important that it is the only company in history to have been given the right to put its name on the Dutch flag, in the manner of a modern sponsor. But the Netherlands also takes responsibility in its more modern role. It is one of the founders of the European Union, as a co-founder of its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, and as a stable partner in NATO. The Netherlands is also a leader in providing international aid. The Netherlands is the only country in the world whose constitution states that it wishes to promote peace and security<sup>70</sup>. The current level of ambition of the Dutch government is realistic and must be maintained. It should be noted, however, that the armed forces are indeed a professional organisation, but that developments in terms of security policy, as described above, do require further improvements. The trend in the defence budget in particular is cause for concern.

### 4.3 Defence and Development Cooperation

Security and stability are required for reconstruction and development, including sustainable development. If these elementary conditions do not exist, investments in development will have little result. This is most obvious in countries and regions where a violent conflict has recently ended. Without stabilisation with the deployment of the military and adequate aid, there is a good chance that violence will flare up again. Security and development are therefore closely linked. As early as February 1997, the Security and Defence working group of the CDA Foreign Affairs committee wrote that military operations in a country and its reconstruction should go hand in hand as much as possible.<sup>71</sup> In practice, in recent years, most crisis management operations have been accompanied by various elements of reconstruction. Civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) is very important to the acceptance of the presence of Dutch troops among the population of the operations area (force acceptance). Good relations with the local population

70 Article 97 (1): To defend and protect the interests of the Kingdom, as well as to enforce and promote international law and order, there are armed forces.

71 'Security knows no bounds. A view of the future for security and defence policy' ('Veiligheid kent geen grenzen. Toekomstverkenning voor een veiligheids- en defensiebeleid'), Security and Defence Working Group of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CDA. The Hague, February 1997, p. 22.



and authorities may also result in information that is important for the security of the military (force protection). One example of successful civilian-military cooperation is the Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities (IDEA), a collaboration between Defence and the Netherlands Confederation of Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW). In this project, reservists from the business world provide advice, through individual guidance and workshops, to local small and medium-sized businesses in order to contribute to economic development in the region. IDEA was first implemented in Bosnia and was followed up in Afghanistan.

Reconstruction projects can sometimes begin in the early stages of the presence of a stabilisation power. This does not mean that the work of reconstruction should be done primarily by the troops. The basic principle is: the military does what it must, civilians do what they can. The aim of CIMIC is to support the execution of the operation and so it differs principally from operations aimed at building or rebuilding the civilian environment. Specific operations may nonetheless overlap or be extensions of each other. Cooperation between civilian aid providers from non-governmental organisations and the military requires precision. Their professional orientation may differ significantly, but their work in situ is complementary. Violence committed against vulnerable civilian aid providers, intended to disrupt reconstruction, does sometimes occur, unfortunately. Sometimes the danger is such that it is impossible, or virtually impossible, for NGOs to be in the operations area.

Under both Balkenende governments, cooperation between Defence and Development Cooperation has been improved and intensified as part of an integrated foreign and security policy. For example, the Stability Fund was created to finance activities related to peace, security and development. Examples of activities financed by this fund, administered jointly by Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, are demobilisation and reintegration and clearing land mines and small arms in Afghanistan, support for the African Union mission in Darfur and reintegration of rebels in the Burundian armed forces.<sup>72</sup> The success of the Stability Fund lies in the fact that both ODA (Official Development Assistance) and non-ODA resources are available from a single fund and in increased cooperation between the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. The committee supports the government's intention to review the size of the fund if desired; further

<sup>72</sup> Government Statement on 'Reconstruction after armed conflict' ('Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict'), March 2005, p. 11 (Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30075, no. 1).

intensification seems obvious. Other cooperation between the ministries of Development Cooperation and Defence consists of the joint SSR (Security Sector Reform) team. In this respect, the ministry of Defence has set up an SSR pool, consisting of 90 members of the armed forces and civilians. The ministry of Foreign Affairs has a short mission file containing civilian experts on SSR matters. Both instruments are used to complement each other. The committee supports cooperation between the ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs and advocates continuing and intensifying it.

Finally, the government has argued during the recent cabinet term that a larger portion of the cost of peace operations in developing countries should be incorporated under the ODA definitions. Some operations that are or can be carried out by the military are in fact relevant to development. The aim is to broaden the ODA definition in the following three areas: reforming the security sector (i.e., including certain military aspects) in developing countries, supporting capacity reinforcement for developing countries to be able to run their own crisis management operations and all activity relevant to development performed by troops as part of crisis management operations in developing countries. Further to the discussion in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), six issues on the subject of peace and security have been added to the list of activities that may be financed using development funds, which is the most that is feasible for now.<sup>73</sup> The discussion will resume in 2007. There is every reason to do so. For example, there is a curious situation in which the creation of police units in Afghanistan may be financed using development funds, but restructuring military units may not. Yet as long as these 250,000 men led by various warlords are not converted into a nationally led army under civilian control, the instability in Afghanistan will persist.<sup>74</sup> It is no less remarkable that activities such as training police officers are covered by the criteria if carried out by UN blue helmets, but not, for example, by NATO troops. The criteria need to be expanded to put an end to this type of situation. Many activities regarding security and development currently do not occur because there is simply no financing for them. The committee therefore believes that the government must continue to allow discussion of ODA financing

73 This involves activities in the following areas: managing security funds; enlarging the role of the societal centre in the security sector; support to and development of legislation on recruiting child soldiers; reforming the security sector; creating peace and preventing conflicts; managing, preventing and reducing the spread of light arms and small arms.

74 According to Agnes van Ardenne, Minister for Development Cooperation, in the article titled 'Shifting boundaries in Development Cooperation', *Internationale Spectator*, May 2004, p. 234.

for activities relevant to development, carried out by troops. Appendix 4 lists activities that are currently not covered by ODA definitions but which the committee believes are relevant to development. Formally expanding the criteria, however, requires assent in the OECD. The Netherlands may also be leader in this respect; a lack of consensus may not be an obstacle to an effective, integrated foreign policy for the Netherlands. The AIV therefore advocated that the Netherlands configure the ODA criteria in a flexible manner if necessary, within the norm of 0.8% of GNP for Development Cooperation.<sup>75</sup> The committee endorses this view.

#### 4.4 Operational insights and developments

Over the years, the focus of potential deployment of the Dutch military has shifted to areas outside Europe. Not only have the distance to the operations area and the geographical and climatological conditions changed, but also the type of action needed for the type of operation we are now carrying out with increasing frequency. Social, political and technological developments also influence the demands placed on military action.

##### *Not 'peacekeeping operations' but 'crisis management operations'*

Classic peacekeeping under chapter VI of the UN charter has not become irrelevant. But there is a good reason that the government has replaced the term 'peacekeeping operation' with 'crisis management operation'. This does more justice to circumstances in which deterrence by presence is no longer the case – a presence intended to keep conflicting parties from taking up arms again – but in which it must be possible to impose peace, sometimes in a compulsory and unexpected manner. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement can therefore overlap. Escalation dominance is required, in the event that sparks begin to fly. Sufficient self-protection is essential, such as armouring, but also firepower, and may also discourage any evildoers in advance. Also important are means of taking action at the lower end of the spectrum of violence. This may include units for crowd and riot control to be able to act against unarmed demonstrators, or non-lethal weapons. The reality of Afghanistan makes it clear in any event that troops may be confronted within a very short distance with simultaneously carrying out reconstruction, ensuring peace and carrying out focused combat actions known as a 'three-block war'.

<sup>75</sup> 'The Netherlands and crisis management: three contemporary aspects' ('Nederland en crisisbeheersing, drie actuele aspecten'), Advisory Council on International Affairs report no. 34, March 2004, p. 45.

*'Every soldier a rifleman'*

The reality of the three-block war knows no fronts or safe hinterland and a peaceful situation can suddenly turn into combat contact. This is why every member of the military must be first and foremost a fighter, and then a specialist: 'every soldier a rifleman'. After all, a logistician must also be able to act appropriately in an ambush situation. Troops in a deployment area must be able to switch between different roles very quickly: humanitarian aid providers, enforcers of public order and warriors, between a best friend and a worst enemy. In such situations, every soldier must be able to make decisions within seconds and carry out actions with far-reaching consequences. Good preparation, education and training, basic military skills as well as mission-oriented training are therefore very important. The demands placed on the professional deployment of troops have never been so high. It is equally important for a soldier to have a good ethical frame of reference. For this reason, it is important for training to devote lasting attention to the education of our soldiers. The committee believes that training time has come under pressure due to earlier cuts. The recent observations of the Undesirable Conduct Committee must also result in an adjustment (improvement) to the training of individual soldiers. This does not mean that military disciplinary law must be reintroduced. For less serious offences, the ministry of defence applies its own legal system, while the Public Prosecutor is brought in for more serious offences. The committee attaches a great deal of value to an excellent pattern of values and standards among Dutch troops: the military ethos. Although it believes that levels are generally good, lasting attention is called for and perhaps an additional impetus as well. The great diversity of deployment areas and the often extreme and risky circumstances place great demands on the physical and mental toughness of our soldiers. They are expected to be able to operate in virtually all climate zones and regions. Realistic training using the train-as-you-fight principle is therefore required.

*Risky operations*

The type of operation that the Netherlands currently primarily carries out is accompanied by considerable risk. It is now virtually normal for troops to have to deal with missile attacks or bombings during deployment, even in regions that are supposedly relatively calm. Protecting against these risks involves additional expense. For example, the measures to protect the Dutch Task Force in Uruzgan cost at least € 100 million.<sup>76</sup> Whereas in the past an operation could be considered successful if no shots needed to be fired, com-

<sup>76</sup> According to Minister Kamp of Defence during the first Nassau lecture in Breda on 30 October 2006. About € 50 million was spent on armoured containers alone, required to protect against mortar and rocket attacks.

bat actions are unfortunately unavoidable in Afghanistan, even with a restrained attitude. Ammunition and related expenses are correspondingly higher. Furthermore, peace and combat losses must increasingly be taken into account. Within the current budgetary limits, there are insufficient resources to fully compensate for this problem.

The experiences of high-visibility, high-risk operations emphasise the importance of adequate protection (force protection) and the survivability of our own units and capacities. An example of necessary investment is the Soldier Modernisation Programme, intended to increase the effectiveness and self-protection of troops on the ground. In the spirit of ‘every soldier a rifleman’, all ground troops would need to be equipped with this in the future. The fact that potential opponents have weapons that can cause great damage renders the importance of protection and armour obvious. A terrorist organisation like Hezbollah proved to have advanced Russian-made anti-tank rockets during the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006, causing the Israeli army to suffer losses in southern Lebanon. A heavy weapons system such as a main battle tank, seen by some as a relic of the Cold War, is proving to be relevant after all. In Iraq, main battle tanks provide US troops with essential protection against improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Although the Canadians initially planned to get rid of their Leopard tanks, these are now being deployed in Afghanistan, and with good reason. The same is true of the PzH-2000 heavy armoured howitzer that the Dutch army has had for some time. It may have been designed for combat against conventional mechanised units, but in Uruzgan it offers round-the-clock, effective, high-precision firepower support for Dutch and other NATO troops.

#### *Asymmetrical warfare, terrorism*

The combat methods of opponents and potential opponents present an additional complicating factor. Now that they realise they cannot defeat the West by conventional means, they often resort to asymmetrical warfare. In contrast to Dutch troops, terrorists do not comply with any conventions. They can dress as civilians, and then commit attacks to cause as many civilian casualties as possible. By stationing themselves or their weapons in densely populated areas, they can attempt to cause as many civilian casualties as possible or even use human shields. Groups like the Taliban are also highly willing to die and have a continuous supply of new warriors. Furthermore, terrorists appear to learn for each other’s ‘successes’; the suicide attacks that plague Iraq now also occur in Afghanistan. The same is true of attacks using improvised explosive devices at the roadside, which pose a major threat. Protecting against this is a major challenge and requires

efforts in research and development.<sup>77</sup> The Netherlands has already purchased armoured patrol cars to be able to implement the 'Dutch approach' optimally.

### *Intelligence*

Dutch experiences in the Balkans have emphasised the importance of a strong intelligence position,<sup>78</sup> if only because one must be able to gather intelligence first before sharing it with others. The importance of up-to-date intelligence, as well as the demands placed on the information supply, has also increased considerably in recent years.<sup>79</sup> Among other things, the increasing complexity of operations, the unpredictability and asymmetrical actions of opponents and the importance of preventing collateral damage are contributing factors. Defence has accordingly announced an expansion of staff in the areas of intelligence, information operations and civilian-military cooperation. Intelligence gathering also requires operational capacities such as ground-based observation and reconnaissance units and unmanned aircraft. Despite very advanced technological developments in intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT) almost always proves invaluable.

### *Operations at a great distance*

As stated, operations usually take place far beyond our national borders. To enable deployment over great distances, transport capacity is required: by sea and by air. This is one of the greatest shortcomings of the European armed forces, which have traditionally been strongly oriented towards classic land defence. It can be hired from the civilian sphere, but this is expensive, not always guaranteed to be available and often cannot be deployed directly towards the operations area. For this reason, it is essential for us to have our own transport ships and aircraft – something the Netherlands has to an insufficient degree.<sup>80</sup> In any case, we must assume structural growth in transport expenses from, to and in operations areas.

77 On 13 November 2006, the Governing Council of the European Defence Agency decided on a trial programme on force protection that will last three years and cost € 54 million. In addition to 17 other countries, the Netherlands is participating at a cost of € 4 million.

78 C. Wiebes, *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995, the role of intelligence and security services*, p. 161-162, Boom, Amsterdam 2002.

79 2007 Defence budget, p. 15 (Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30300X, no. 107).

80 The Force Proposals by NATO to the Netherlands in terms of air transport amount to a fleet of 10 Hercules C-130 aircraft, one C-17 strategic transport aircraft (or equivalents) and one aircraft with a capacity of 200 passengers). The Netherlands has only four C-130 Hercules and two KDC-10 tanker aircraft, which are also suitable for freight.

### *Extreme geographical and climatological conditions*

In addition to the long distances to be covered, the operations of the Dutch armed forces are increasingly occurring under difficult, often extreme conditions. There are very tough geographical and climatological conditions in Afghanistan (mountainous terrain, heat, dust, sand) and deficient infrastructure. What few roads there are, are often poor. There are scarcely any airfields and those that exist are of poor quality. These conditions pose a huge logistical challenge, and not just in Afghanistan. This is also the case in Africa, for example. The importance of combat support and combat service support has increased further. Without these critical capacities, combat units have little or no deployability.

### *Greater demands on equipment and operational losses*

The demands placed on equipment are also increasing. New generations of vehicles must be able to operate under extreme conditions. Frequent deployment in such conditions requires more maintenance, results in more rapid wear and so costs more. A shorter life cycle for equipment requires more rapid replacement. If the required investments are not made, the operating costs will increase even more. As stated above, we must also increasingly take peace and combat losses into account. So far, two Chinook helicopters, an Apache and an F-16 have crashed during operations in Afghanistan. Most wheeled vehicles were purchased for use in the European theatre. Deployment in other parts of the world makes early replacement more likely. Defence has insufficient reserve capacity to compensate for these losses and for increased wear.

This has led the government to make arrangements for the problem of operational losses. As of 2009, € 25 million will be available annually to create reserves<sup>81</sup>. This is very important, as equipment lost in operations or wearing out sooner can be replaced immediately. This arrangement, however, is entirely insufficient to deal with the full extent of the problem.<sup>82</sup>

### *Increased importance of transport helicopters*

Bad roads and difficult terrain make transport helicopters ever more important. These are the ultimate joint resource because they increase the capacities of armed land forces, not only the Air Mobile Brigade, but also the

81 Government letter on structural solution to operation losses (Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 27925, no. 219).

82 One Chinook helicopter alone costs double the amount provided. It will therefore be some time before the needs in that area have been fulfilled, assuming that there will be no new losses in Uruzgan. Moreover, the reserve problem extends to more than just transport helicopters.

armoured infantry and the Marine Corps. There is demand for them in virtually all crisis management operations carried out by the Netherlands. They are very valuable transport resources, providing mobility, reconnaissance capacity and medical evacuation options. They are also very valuable to operations by special units, such as in Afghanistan. The need for transport helicopters is greater than the budget allows.<sup>83</sup> Helicopters are often essential not only for the actual deployment of units but sufficient capacity must remain in the Netherlands for maintaining air mobile units' air manoeuvre training and potential national deployment.

#### *Stabilisation operations and continuation capacity*

Because of the huge technological advantage of the United States in particular, it appears that the war can be won in an increasingly shorter time. Winning the peace, however, appears equally difficult, as not only Iraq and Afghanistan but also countries racked by wars and conflicts prove, such as the Congo. Instability can persist for a long time in most post-conflict situations. It is estimated that 30% of countries emerging from a conflict experience conflict again within ten years. In Africa, this percentage is as high as 50%.<sup>84</sup> This is often related to the fact that the causes of the conflict still exist in the post-conflict phase. Stabilisation operations are often long-term affairs, lasting an average of seven years.<sup>85</sup> In Afghanistan, the international community will need to be active for another ten years at least, to prevent the country from ending up in chaos, anarchy and terror again. Military deployment itself does not lead to successful reconstruction, but creating security and stability is a necessary prerequisite for it. It must therefore be possible to sustain the deployment of enough 'boots on the ground' by the international community for a longer period. The ability to continue is also important for the Netherlands; circumstances may render a premature withdrawal from a stabilisation operation irresponsible. The ability to sustain an operation for a longer period as required obviously makes demands on the capabilities of the armed forces.

83 Despite the acquisition of additional transport helicopters, there is a remaining need for three more Chinook helicopters and two more NH90 helicopters in the transport version. See update letter, Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30300X, no. 107, p. 10).

84 Government Statement on 'Reconstruction after armed conflict' ('Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict'), March 2005, Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30075, no. 1.

85 Prof. Dr R. de Wijk, 'Dilemmas for future national action' *Atlantisch Perspectief*, April 2005, no. 2, p. 7.



## 4.5. Societal developments

### *The CNN factor*

Every bomb is a political bomb, as an American general recently said. What were previously tactical events, in the sense that the effects of an attack were almost always of a local and temporary nature, can now immediately have disproportionate political implications under the magnifying glass of the media.<sup>86</sup> The media are now a fixture of the combat theatre; their role has continually increased. The 'CNN factor' of 24-hour reporting and live television is no longer limited to CNN and the BBC, but has been emulated by broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia. Constant images of such things as American action in Iraq are certainly not received more positively by viewers of these channels than by CNN viewers in Europe or the US. The battle for images is no longer about public opinion in the West but also in other parts of the world. Even autocratic or dictatorial governments of countries with a pro-Western stance, such as Jordan, can come under pressure from their own population as a result of media reporting. For example, this was the case with scandals such as the Abu Ghraib prison, which greatly undermined support for the military presence of the West in Iraq. Such offences must certainly be addressed publicly. Here again, the principle of noblesse oblige applies. But they can also easily be used to feed anti-Western sentiment. They can be and are being used for propaganda purposes against the West. The possibilities of modern media extend beyond traditional reporting by journalists. The Internet offers terrorists space to undermine and demoralise public opinion in the West with gruesome images of hostages. Al-Qa'ida states that 50% of its war against the West is waged through the media.<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, making news in a conflict area no longer requires a journalist. Everyone with a mobile phone equipped with a video camera can record combat action. Video of attacks in Iraq can be on the Internet within 30 minutes<sup>88</sup>.

While events can find their way via the media to the outside, incidents thousands of kilometres away can conversely have direct consequences for the troops' operations area. Reporting in Newsweek on the alleged dishonouring of the Koran at Guantánamo Bay, or the Danish cartoon issue, led to riots in Afghanistan, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of inju-

86 F. Osinga, 'An overview of military and security policy trends in relation to air power', Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, March 2005, p. 108.

87 Speech by Eliza Manningham-Buller, director of Britain's MI5 security services, 11 November 2006.

88 Ibid.

ries, with the offices of the government and international organisations being ransacked and burned. Partly because of the intrusive manner in which images enter the home, the public's acceptance of unintended collateral damage by military action has been further reduced. There is less and less acceptance of civilian victims, missed targets, accidents and damage to civilian infrastructure and the environment. The same applies to victims on our side. War must be clean – this is the virtually impossible task of the military. This has consequences for the modus operandi, weaponry, equipment and security of deployed units.

This is the same public opinion that often wants to see results quickly, even in difficult circumstances in Afghanistan. These are conditions in which combat action occurs, where stability must be established and where reconstruction must also be made possible. This is an area where there is barely a functioning government, where there is widespread corruption and where officials and authority figures are often illiterate. Furthermore, the Taliban is doing everything in its power to disrupt the process. Harrowing images of human rights violations and floods of refugees can undermine support for military deployment, but can equally rouse public opinion that intervention is necessary. In the 1990s, the Netherlands was driven by a 'humanitarian imperative' in the deployment of troops in the Balkans. The most striking example was Kosovo. There were loud calls to act against Milosevic's ethnic cleansing and broad support when it occurred, but due to the same public opinion, ground troops could not be deployed; the risk of large numbers of victims on both sides would have been too great. When Operation Allied Force remained limited to the deployment of airborne weapons and there was no rapid success, support by the public opinion that had called for intervention gradually crumbled. Such formation and changing of opinion is a typical example of what decision-makers must currently deal with.

*'Lawfare' – juridification of military action*

Now that the legitimacy of military action can be undermined in front of the camera, the importance of strict compliance with humanitarian martial law is also increasing in that perspective. Rules of engagement have been drawn up containing the instructions for Dutch troops on the use of force. Self-imposed restrictions on the use of force are necessary and clearly show soldiers how to act. But they have also led to the juridification of military conduct. Military jurists accompany deployment as standard procedure to determine, for example, whether attacks on certain targets are justified. The significance of this must not be underestimated. The Eric O. case has shown what the consequences of juridification can be. In addition to national application of military criminal law, an International Criminal Court has

been set up that can prosecute members of the military. The committee assumes good faith in the case of a soldier who becomes involved in a shooting incident in carrying out his duties. The rules of engagement are there not only to impose restrictions but also to protect soldiers. The committee welcomes the recommendations of the Commission to evaluate the application of military criminal procedural law to deployments (Borghouts Commission)<sup>89</sup> and has a positive view of proposals for a specific legal provision, tailored to current and future forms of Dutch military deployment and legitimising the use of force in accordance with instructions on the use of violence.

#### **4.6. Technological developments**

##### *Network-Centric Warfare*

Technological developments in defence can certainly be called revolutionary. From them has emerged the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This refers to joint action by components of the armed forces in an Internet-like structure. Sensors, weapons platforms and units are part of single network and can be linked to each other almost at will in the future. By integrating the information from many sensors into a single sea, land and air view, commanders at all levels can be given a timely and accurate shared view of the environment. Action by units in networks clearly offers great advantages. Their strike power, accuracy and mobility are considerably increased. NCW can rightly be called a force multiplier. Units not having these capabilities are 'deaf and blind' by comparison.

The NCW concept has been successfully applied by the American in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Although the current situation in Iraq suggests otherwise, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an unprecedented achievement in military terms; in just 26 days, Saddam Hussein's regime, which had considerable troop strength, was dismantled. The successes of recent operations, marked by rapid victory, little collateral damage and small losses on our side, have created a standard for future Western action. NCW is at the core of the transformation of modern armed forces and is required to ensure interoperability with allies.

89 The report of the Borghouts Commission was received by the minister of Defence on 31 August 2006. The Commission was appointed following a motion by Van Baalen and Eijksink, accepted by the Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 29800 X, no 57.

Defence is therefore right to invest in Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) such as the Battlefield Management System for the army, which is intended to improve the operational information supply and with it, command to the battalion level, particularly by improving situational awareness. But with the financial resources currently available, it will take more than years to get all required capacities to the required level across the armed forces. The financial resources to increase interoperability more rapidly and to improve the network and information infrastructure are lacking.<sup>90</sup> Technological developments will require more from personnel in the future. This will include more stringent requirements for instructors, and personnel spending more time in training, thereby not being available for deployment.<sup>91</sup>

#### *Consequences of technological developments*

As stated, technological developments have set a standard for military action by Western countries, hence for the weapons systems and command by which it occurs as well. This standard is again reinforced as a result of the influence of the media. Since Dutch deployment is in the context of a coalition, it is very important for us to be able to keep up with larger allies. Armed forces resources that are not interoperable or are insufficiently effective, or too vulnerable, are greatly at risk of no longer being deployed and thereby becoming superfluous. Capacities that can only be deployed either at the low or high end of the spectrum of violence, or only under certain conditions, are not flexible and are therefore less useable in the current political/military operations context. It is preferable to be able to take action against as many different types of targets as possible, in as many different types of conditions as possible: throughout the spectrum of violence, in all weather conditions, 24 hours a day.

New technology will contribute to the development of new weapons, both lethal and non-lethal, improvements in the accuracy of weapons systems and improvements to the protection and mobility of personnel and resources. The improvements in precision munitions have been spectacular. As stated before, collateral damage during military action must be prevented as much as possible, regardless of its nature, type of target, tactic or munitions. Damage to targets must be dosed as accurately as possible and related to the desired effect. The use of precision ammunition allows such requirements to be met; its share of the Dutch armed forces' munitions must therefore be as large as possible. Obviously, there is a price attached to this, but it is necessary nonetheless.

90 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30300X, no. 119, p. 20.

91 Ibid.

### *Technological progress does not escape our opponents*

Technological developments offer huge opportunities, but the downside is that potential opponents can use them as well. This may involve civilian technology such as mobile telephony, used by terrorists to detonate roadside explosive devices. Another example is the dissemination of nuclear technology, a potential danger exposed by the dismantled international network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. More generally, non-Western countries increasingly have their own defence industries. Countries such as Russia and China are selling more and more advanced weapons systems to the most obscure regimes. The proliferation of improved radar technology alone may make the current generation of fighter jets vulnerable, such as the air force's F-16s. The fact that potential opponents are not idle is all the more reason for our armed forces to be at the forefront of technology.

## **4.7 The armed forces**

### *Royal Dutch Navy*

The 2003 'Prinsjesdag' was incomplete as far as the navy was concerned. An additional correction in the form of the Navy Study changed this situation appropriately. The navy is increasingly oriented towards supporting operations on land, as shown by close cooperation between the fleet and the marines, among other things. Measures as part of the study needed to be taken in a budget-neutral manner. This means that investments are financed by the elimination of existing capacities and the proceeds of their sale. The committee believes that the outcome is satisfactory: a shift from the ocean to supporting land actions, a second Landing Platform Dock, stronger marine battalions, four modern patrol ships that can take over duties in coastal waters from overqualified frigates, a modern joint support ship equipped for new tasks, modernisation of minesweepers and submarines. Furthermore, the navy is expected to receive the first NH 90 helicopters in the course of 2008. The majority of them are intended for operations from frigates and patrol ships, the others for operations over land and to a limited degree from an LPD. This version is primarily intended for transporting marines or army units. The NH 90s will, like other defence helicopters, be under Defence Helicopter Command. This will enable the full helicopter capacity to be used maximally across the defence forces, which may include deployment for National Tasks (such as the Special Intervention Service). Closer cooperation between the fleet and the marines is a good development. A forces-wide approach to capacities is also important. Cooperation between marines, air mobile brigade and commands is encouraged by the committee.

### *Royal Dutch Army*

In the future as well, conflicts will ultimately be decided on land. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it clear that peace cannot be won by technology alone, such as Network-Centric Warfare and precision-guided munitions. It is always about the presence (usually long-term) of troops among the population and being able to win their hearts and minds. Sharing risks with allies is particularly evident in the willingness to deploy Dutch troops with 'boots on the ground' throughout the spectrum of violence. The developments outlined above in terms of the 'three-block war' and the current presence of army units in southern Afghanistan emphasise the fact that the Netherlands is willing in this sense. The committee approves of this and supports the equipment programmes that make it possible, such as the new infantry combat vehicle, the soldier modernisation programme across the forces and the battlefield management system. The willingness to share risks is also visible when leadership is taken over operations. The rapidly deployable headquarters of the German/Dutch Corps and the brigade staffs that can form the nucleus of a multinational headquarters have already demonstrated this in practice, in Afghanistan, Macedonia and elsewhere.

The committee supports this development in which the role of the brigades is expanded further as part of national tasks. The brigades integrate the various capacities needed for a military operation. This applies both for a national operation and for expeditionary deployment. All capacities with their own specialisation, varying from manoeuvre resources to disaster relief capacities and National Reserve, are joined at the brigade level. The deployment of units involves their actual deployability. This requires combat support and logistics, such as firepower support, connection units, engineering and transport. These units are deployable as long as their capacities allow. The importance of these capacities has increased, now that operations usually occur outside the European continent. By dealing sensibly with ambitions that are high in themselves, excessively high deployment pressure on these units should be prevented.

### *Royal Dutch Air Force*

The importance of air power to support the actions of forces on land is undisputed. In the fight against terrorism and during asymmetrical warfare, fighter planes and combat helicopters are crucial. The Dutch armed forces' first F-16s will be reaching the end of their life cycle in 2010, after some thirty years of faithful service. Their purchase in the 1970s aroused a great deal of emotion. The same is true in 2007 with its intended successor, the Lightning II, better known as the F-35 or Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). A decision

to purchase these, to be made by the new cabinet, will form the basis for the future of one of the most important main weapons systems of the Dutch air force in the coming decades. The cost of this will be very great. Because of its strategic importance to Defence and especially the great expense, the JSF is a strategic decision for the Netherlands. In addition to manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly being implemented. One example is the US Predator, which can be fitted with missiles and can eliminate targets on the ground in addition to performing aerial reconnaissance. The Dutch armed forces will also acquire UAVs. A final decision on the purchase of the JSF will need to be placed in the context of an optimal mix of manned and unmanned aircraft. The preliminary conclusion in 2002, i.e., that the JSF is the best aircraft at the best price, is still valid. Despite cost overruns and delays, the JSF is still better and more affordable than competitors.<sup>92</sup> The committee therefore believes that aside from unusual developments in the project, the discussion should not be about *whether* the JSF should be purchased but in what quantity. For the replacement of the F-16, the committee is assuming the current level of ambition at Defence, both at the upper and lower ends of the spectrum of violence, but realises that specific figures cannot be determined at present. Issues such as the number of aircraft per squadron and the crew ratio have not yet been finalised, nor have the ultimate price per unit and life cycle costs. A decision to buy will require deliberations across the armed forces and within the budget available at that time. The importance of investment in unmanned aircraft, air transport and air defence and in maritime and land forces must then be included. After all, every Euro can only be spent once.

Strategic and tactical air transport capacity is essential the expeditionary capability of the entire armed forces. Although the KDC-10 and C-130 have developed into the workhorses of Defence transport capacity, demand far outstrips supply in both quality and quantity. This problem is partially solved by expanding air transport capacity. For example, an additional DC-10 has been purchased and a decision has been made to buy two additional C-130s. Nonetheless, national air transport capacity is structurally unable to fulfil the need and all additional measures provide only a partial solution. Expansion of strategic air transport capacity is thus at issue, in the committee's view. The government has also decided to strengthen the personal and material capacity of transport helicopters considerably. This ensures

92 In December 2004, the expected price of a JSF was \$44.5 million, while a Rafale cost more than ? 53 million (2002 price level) and a Eurofighter approximately ? 62 million (probably 2004 price level). This applies to versions of the Rafale and Eurofighter that do not yet meet the Netherlands' minimum requirements.

Chinook capacity over time, but in a broad sense there will still be insufficient redundancy in Defence helicopter capacity. Personal and material helicopter capacity must therefore be reinforced further, partly through more helicopters and partly by adjusting the crew ratio, for example, and expanding support personnel. Deployment pressure on these vulnerable personnel categories is currently too high.

#### *Royal Dutch Military Constabulary*

Security problems in national and international contexts increasingly require a combination of police expertise and military training. This combination has traditionally been found in the military constabulary. Demand for this unique combination is increasing both nationally and internationally. In addition to performing police duties in deployed units, the military constabulary is deployed internationally to enforce public order and reform the security sector in post-conflict regions, partly in the context of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

The military constabulary is able to meet national and international demand because its personnel are flexibly deployable and has a military background. To be able to continue to guarantee this flexibility and military background and because of the relationship between internal and external security, it is essential for the military constabulary to continue to be part of Defence.



# 5 Positions and conclusions

## 5.1 Level of ambition

The Netherlands is the world's sixteenth-largest economy and the ninth-largest export nation. Given our position in the world, the Netherlands has a large responsibility for, and a great interest in, stable, peaceful and fair international relations. The Netherlands is one of the largest donors in development aid. But the country's influence and reputation depend on more than soft power alone. Hard power in the form of relevant, high-quality armed forces also puts the Netherlands on the map. In view of its position and interests in the world, the Netherlands should contribute as a reliable ally to enforcing international peace and security. The level of ambition of our armed forces is rightly at both ends of the spectrum of violence and also encompasses participation in NATO, EU and ad hoc coalitions. In the first Balkenende government's Strategic Agreement, the level of ambition was lowered from four to three operations, and later reduced for the higher end of the spectrum of violence with air and maritime forces. It was recalibrated when the letter on the day of the Queen's speech was updated in June of this year. The committee fully supports the current process, but realises that there are considerable challenges. The same update contained an indication by the government that there are obstacles and shortcomings in Defence. These must be resolved to continue to be able to achieve the level of ambition in the future.<sup>93</sup>

The forces-wide formulation of the level of ambition does not allow minimum numbers of units or systems to be defined for each element of the armed forces. Deployment is virtually always in a joint setting with the participation of all parts of the armed forces. It also involves the issue of the number of different, geographically separate locations where deployment occurs and at what distance, and what support (especially logistical support) is required as a result. The difference between supporting units in Bosnia or Afghanistan is self-evident. There is also no fixed composition for a fleet context, squadron, brigade or battalion. In practice, a contribution will almost always have a tailor-made composition. The basic principle at work is the capacity of the supporting (logistical) resource, taking other commitments into account. To be able to have a useable yardstick for the required defence budget, the committee considers the Dutch contribution to crisis management operations in recent years a sensible starting point, given the Netherlands' position and capability.

93 Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30300 X, no. 119, p. 2.

## 5.2 Organisation

The defence organisation has been changed drastically in recent years. The loss of 11,700 positions has meant that barracks and bases have closed and many staffs and organisational units have been merged. The volume and efficiency targets imposed by the first Balkenende government's Strategic Agreement on the total organisation's personnel, including operational units<sup>94</sup>, have had a very drastic effect on Defence as a specific 'executive ministry'. After many years of cuts affecting staffs and units time and time again, the latest functional tasking has resulted in very little organisational flexibility. This is cause for concern, especially as operational commands have virtually no 'tail'. Each member of personnel is deployable and executive members of higher staffs are also frequently deployed, either to reinforce deployed units or as part of the many smaller missions. The consequences for deployment pressure speak for themselves. Further cuts to bureaucracy should involve a thorough inspection of where bureaucracy is actually found. Defence produces virtually no legislation and creates no administrative burden. Moreover, in recent years, Defence has made an unusually large contribution to the reduction of bureaucracy in the national government.

The new organisational structure physically places operational commanders at a remove, in Den Helder, Utrecht and Breda. Without wishing to detract from the important and visible role of the Commander of the Armed Forces, the committee believes that operational commanders continue to play a significant role in being directly responsible for operational readiness. They continue to be the crucial link between policy and implementation, between the political units in The Hague and the operational units. It is important to use their expertise as the ultimate authorities in the area of maritime, air and land operations. Their input remains essential to the checks and balances that every healthy organisation must have. The operational commanders' 'figurehead' function for their organisation must also be maintained. Maintaining the identity of individual components of the armed forces does not hinder the interests of collectivity across the armed forces. On the contrary: it is crucial for the elements of the armed forces to be recognisable, both in terms of recruitment and esprit de corps, which is highly important.

The armed forces and within them the various components have in the past been primarily oriented towards their own actions and therefore towards supporting (logistically) their own actions only. Those days are over. There

94 The military constabulary was an exception to these targets.

are no more land operations that do not involve other parts of the armed forces. There are no more air operations without the involvement of army engineering units, for example. This does not mean, however, that all capacities should therefore simply merge. It is precisely the elements of the armed forces that are ultimately suited to performing combat support and logistical tasks for a forces-wide unit. It is precisely there that the knowledge and experience is found to deploy and lead a forces-wide capacity, for example, in a single service management structure. Pool formation is good, but need not always result in centralisation.

The committee considers the armed forces' current structure complete: a navy with an increased focus on supporting operations on land, an army with flexibly deployable brigades and supporting units and an air force with a balanced combination of fighter aircraft, transporters and helicopters. Current deployment in Afghanistan illustrates this perfectly. The committee emphatically supports the new role of the armed forces as a structural security partner in this country. Being firmly anchored nationally also increases the visibility of the armed forces and thereby contributes to support in society.

### 5.3 Personnel

People are always at the core of military deployment, now and in the future. Military action is complex, demanding and never risk-free. It demands the utmost of people, mentally and physically: there is danger, fear, fatigue and uncertainty. Wanting to win and being able to win under all circumstances; the ability to endure; being able to act independently and authoritatively; knowing when violence is not appropriate, when the population needs help and a respectful approach: it is hard to imagine more difficult work. The armed forces must be deployable for all tasks across the entire spectrum of violence. Combat readiness of personnel is therefore an essential element of the deployability of units. To increase combat readiness, training will have to be more realistic than ever. Live firing exercises are an example of this. But mental stamina and good physical condition are also important prerequisites, as is leadership under difficult conditions and in the event of sleep deprivation. This aspect of military power is perhaps one of the most important force multipliers. The importance of proper training for all troops cannot be emphasised enough. The attention devoted to training, especially in terms of standards and values, is essential: the military ethos. The risk that incidents will detract from this is very great and may have major consequences for popular support for the armed forces. The Undesired Conduct Committee recently made recommendations to focus more attention on

standards and values within Defence. Implementing this means that personnel will be in training for longer, which will bring considerable financial consequences<sup>95</sup> for which no allowance has been made as yet. The committee wholeheartedly endorses the recommendations, as well as the need for the required financing.

The military profession entails a number of special requirements and restrictions for military officials and obligations that occur in other employment organisations only to a lesser degree, or not in combination with each other. In the first place, this involves the duty to carry out the tasks assigned to the armed forces. Military personnel can also be ordered to perform duties under life-threatening circumstances, often being required to use violence themselves and to use weapons. Military personnel can be deployed anywhere in the world and must be available and deployable for that purpose. They must acquire a variety of knowledge and skills and remain ready. Ensuring the availability of the armed forces is also related to the obligation for military personnel to continue to be part of personnel for a certain period after hiring, during which time a request for discharge may be rejected. Military personnel must also comply with restrictions imposed on their personal liberties. These include the fact that specific requirements apply in terms of health.

Under the new personnel system as well, some of the personnel will have a complete career in the armed forces. These members in particular will be subject to physical and often mental wear during demanding deployment and many intensive periods of training. This means it is emphatically necessary to account for 'operational age', which indicates the limit of deployability. In many cases, this age limit will be significantly below the age of 60. Deployment pressure requires special attention. It is so great in some units that many soldiers leave the organisation, especially in vulnerable personnel categories such as maintenance personnel and crews for helicopters and transport aircraft. Given an attractive job market, it is particularly important to retain qualified personnel in which significant investments have already been made. Both the special position of military personnel and the recruiting power of the armed forces must be reflected in the employment terms for this group. The committee therefore believes that future negotiations on employment terms must accommodate these issues.

95 According to a preliminary indication by Defence, this will involve an amount of approximately ? 80 million (Tweede Kamer (Lower House), house document 30800 X, no 54).

The often tough and risky circumstances of operational deployment sometimes have negative effects on the physical or mental health of soldiers or veterans. These effects must be limited as much as possible by appropriate aftercare and professional help. The Veterans' Care policy document has created a sound basis for veterans' care. The committee believes that care for veterans requires continual attention. It is on the right track but must be expanded and reinforced.

#### 5.4 Compulsory social service

The suspension of compulsory military service in the Netherlands was part of the restructuring of the armed forces after the end of the Cold War. When as rapid an adjustment to new circumstances as possible was required due to more active participation by Dutch soldiers in crisis management operations than expected, working with conscripts brought major limitations. The actual deployment of conscripted soldiers was subject to strict conditions imposed by the Lower House. The debate on suspending military service, however, was not backed up by more careful deliberation. Germany shows a combination of general social service with an option for military fulfilment. So that conscription is not eliminated from the constitution, the decision was made to suspend compulsory enlistment so that compulsory national service still existed in legal terms. There are now more and more calls to introduce compulsory social service. The CDA makes reference to social internships and as early as July 2005, the party advocated the option of allowing these to be fulfilled in Defence.<sup>96</sup> The purpose is compulsory involvement of the younger generation in a number of tasks to be performed for society, for example, for the environment, care and security. There are also fairly frequent calls for compulsory re-education of problematic youths. In October 2006, Prime Minister Balkenende suggested reactivating compulsory national service as a legal basis. Reactivating it in the form of compulsory social service could contribute to preventing problematic behaviour and crime among young people, as Defence can instil team spirit, perseverance, discipline and awareness of values in them. Furthermore, such compulsory national service could contribute to better integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, since the armed forces are a symbol of national unity and represent, as an organisation, the protection of important rights and freedoms.

96 Statement on 'The armed forces at the centre of society, for the benefit of all' ('De krijgsmacht midden in de samenleving, ten voordele van eenieder'), CDA Lower House section, July 2005.

The ambition to continue to deploy Dutch military personnel in crisis management operations is not compatible with uncertainties regarding sufficient staffing of the armed forces. Especially in a prosperous economic situation, demand by business for workers will rise rapidly and the recruitment challenge for the armed forces will increase. For many years, the CDA Research Institute has pointed to this fact and the threat to collectively financed sectors.<sup>97</sup> Aside from the fact that Defence must in any case be competitive with business, familiarity with the armed forces among young people is very important. Social service will increase this familiarity, contribute to societal support and increase the recruiting power of Defence for professional personnel. The committee realises that the strength of today's armed forces lies primarily in professionalism: we are successful in Afghanistan and elsewhere because we have professional soldiers who have chosen the job voluntarily and often have considerable deployment experience. Proper, often long-term training has never been so important. Those who choose the military option as part of social service will be deployable in a much more limited sense. This refers primarily to deployment for national tasks (including security), not the deployable armed forces. We also realise that successful fulfilment of the military option requires that various personal, infrastructural and material prerequisites be met. For example, excellent executive members are needed to train less motivated conscripts. In part because of the current shortages of non-commissioned officers in particular, introducing compulsory (social) service would have to occur in a responsible manner, without overtaxing executive members, who are already under strain.

In all, the committee believes a serious social and parliamentary debate must be initiated quickly on the introduction of compulsory social service, paying particular attention to different models in use among our allies. All young people would then have to be available for one year of their lives to perform tasks for society, with involvement in the military as one of the options. Because it will take years to actually introduce such a system, it is important for the introduction of this debate to be rapid and well organised.

97 For example, see Research Institute for the CDA, 'Restoring the ability to bear' ('Herstel van draagkracht'), The Hague 2000, 'Investing in solidarity' ('Investeren in solidariteit'), The Hague 2002, and 'Tailor-made security' ('Zekerheid op maat'), The Hague 2004.

## 5.5 Investments and operations

The 1993 'Prioriteitennota' (Priorities Statement) indicated that a modern, high-quality military requires an investment percentage of 28 to 30%. When the first Balkenende government took office, the level of investment in the armed forces had sunk to a post-war low. The level for the army was as low as 11 to 12%. The 'New Equilibrium' programme substantially raised this percentage across the armed forces to approximately 20%. Although this is a significant achievement, the committee believes that this level is still insufficient to make highly necessary investments as outlined in the 'Actualiseringsbrief' (Update Letter) and elsewhere. Furthermore, virtually every equipment project involves rising expenses. Therefore, task assignment budgets must cope with smaller numbers of systems than is desirable from an operational point of view. There are often unforeseen needs involved that are not included in long-range plans but which are indicated by the current reality in the deployment area. Soldiers in the field rightly expect from a professional stance that the Defence organisation is able to fulfil urgent operational needs quickly, even if an unorthodox approach is required. The budget will need to allow for these investments as well. Only then can continual postponement of highly necessary equipment replacements be avoided. After all, action in extreme geographical and climatological conditions means that considerable wear occurs and systems quickly become technically outdated. In short, replacement investment will rise accordingly.

Room for investment cannot be increased at the expense of the operating budget. As noted previously, deployable armed forces will be operated on an increasingly frequent basis. For example, use of munitions was high during deployment in Afghanistan and major maintenance efforts must be made to keep equipment deployable. Defence will also need to remain competitive in the coming years in terms of employment terms in a tight job market, resulting in upward pressure on personnel costs. Quality, training and personnel retention will require additional resources. These developments put pressure on the investment percentage. Therefore, the question is whether the current level of ambition can be sustained within the current budgetary boundaries. In addition, many investments in recent years have been financed using the proceeds from sales of equipment, much of it valuable. In view of recent equipment purchases in recent years that were needed to accommodate cuts, this source of financing will decline. Additional investments are needed in the current long-range plans for Defence. The intensification mentioned in the Update Letter alone requires approximately € 1.2 billion in investments and € 170 million annually for operations.



The Lower House has already accepted a motion asking for the Defence budget to be expanded for the purposes of these investments.<sup>98</sup>

## 5.6 Defence budget

The level of political ambition for the armed forces can only be achieved by means of an organisation with high technological value, excellent personnel training and firm support from society. Adequate long-term budgetary guarantees of the defence budget are an essential prerequisite for achieving this. The Netherlands is proportionally one of the top five countries supplying troops to NATO. The transformation policy initiated in the 1990s with the 1993 Priorities Statement has clearly borne fruit. In fact, the Netherlands has set a benchmark for countries in a comparable position, such as Canada and Australia. This can be considered quite an achievement, especially as it occurred during a period of sharp declines in defence spending. Whereas the Netherlands still spent 2.8% of its gross domestic product on defence in 1989, this percentage has fallen to 1.4% in 2007 (see appendix 2).

We may play with the argument that it is not the percentage of GDP but the output that determines evaluation within NATO. Other European countries such as Germany, however, are also undergoing a transformation process and are therefore catching up. The 'white book' recently presented by the German government focuses on a further shift from classic land defence to more expeditionary deployability for missions abroad.<sup>99</sup> Without additional expenditures and with the effect of lagging cutbacks, Dutch defence spending will continue to decrease in the coming years: to € 7.7 billion in 2011, which will be equivalent to 1.21% of GDP (taking into account the economic growth forecast by the Central Planning Office – see appendix 2).<sup>100</sup>

If these developments are not reversed, the Netherlands will drop to the bottom of the NATO rankings, with the corresponding consequences for our international reputation. Only Luxembourg and Spain will then spend even less on Defence (see appendix 3). Furthermore, Spain's socialist government

98 The CDA section in the Lower House supported the Szabó motion (Lower House, house document 30800 X, no. 39).

99 The *Weissbuch* sets the level of ambition for the German armed forces at deployment of 14,000 troops in a maximum of five different crisis management operations. See <http://www.weissbuch.de>.

100 The Coalition Agreement of February 7<sup>th</sup> provide with 500 million euro additional budget for defence and peace missions in the period 2008-2011. These extra investments are incidental, and do not turn the trend of – as a percentage of the GDP – diminishing defence expenditures.

recently announced a sharp increase in defence spending, causing the Netherlands to lag even further. If we are to expect countries like Poland to meet NATO standards, we must not set the wrong example. Being a member of the alliance and wanting to contribute to international peace means jointly assuming risks and burdens. This is why we advocate a growth trend for Dutch defence spending that exceeds GDP growth. This means that the Netherlands will be able to contribute to strengthening the capacity of NATO and the ESDP and make a greater contribution to international units such as the NRF, which is struggling with staffing problems.

Defence policy is less measurable than other policy areas. The main goals of Defence are more general in nature. Protecting the integrity of our territory, promoting international law and order and supporting civilian authorities are goals that are difficult to quantify. The same is true in some sense for Development Cooperation.

The Development Cooperation budget has been set at 0.8% of GDP (the UN norm is 0.7%). This promotes policy continuity. Development Cooperation therefore does not need to fight for additional funds in periods of economic growth; the budget will grow with the economy. Defence has to fight for every penny. This is an almost impossible task, because priority is almost always given to other policy areas that can count on more popular support, such as education, health care and improving purchasing power. Even if there is additional funding, as in the 2006 'Voorjaarsnota' (Spring policy) document, the downward trend cannot be reversed: from 1.55 to 1.52% in 2006 to 1.43% in 2007. Without a set percentage, Development Cooperation would face the same problems as Defence. Further efficiency cuts will also be almost entirely at the expense of operational units and therefore result in clearcutting without vision. There will then be a significant danger that the Netherlands will need to eliminate important military resources that are essential in view of the international security situation.

As stated in section 6.5 above, significant investments are needed to resolve the obstacles and shortcomings encountered by Defence. If the required investments are not made, the level of ambition for the future can no longer be fully guaranteed. This involves measures aimed at strengthening the deployability of the armed forces for crisis management operations, and further development of the role of Defence in national security. These refer to missing or incomplete capacity in the following areas (in no particular order):

- Unmanned aircraft
- Combat and transport aircraft
- Strategic transport
- Protective measures
- Network-enabled capabilities
- The ability of units in high demand to continue operating
- Broadening education and training
- Intelligence

The committee endorses the usefulness and necessity of these investments, which should have priority in the event of intensification. Additional funds are also needed for measures to combat undesirable conduct and to assure the position of Defence as an attractive employer in a tightening job market.

The committee therefore advocates an increase in the Defence budget. The aim should be to meet the NATO norm of 2% of GNP, over time. The security situation in the Netherlands and the rest of the world, geopolitical and security developments, military trends and technological developments are all reasons to do so.

# Appendix 1

*The level of ambition of Defence, as recalibrated in the Update to the letter on the day of the Queen's speech*



The armed forces guarantee:

- protecting the integrity of our own territory and that of our allies, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, with all available means if necessary;
- an active contribution to our country's integrated foreign policy. This involves high-quality, high-technology military contributions to international operations in all parts of the spectrum of violence, including the beginning stage of an operation. This refers to:
  - a contribution to NATO's level of ambition. In this context, the armed forces will also make a continuous contribution of varying sizes to the NATO Response Force;
  - a contribution to the European Union's level of ambition. In this context, the armed forces will also make a periodic contribution to the Union's rapid response capacities, the EU Battle Groups;
  - a contribution to the United Nations' Standby High Readiness Brigade (Shirbig);
  - participation for a maximum of one year in an operation in the upper end of the spectrum of violence with a brigade of armies, two squadrons of fighter aircraft or a maritime task force;
  - simultaneous participation for longer periods in a maximum of three operations at the lower end of the spectrum of violence with task forces that are battalion-sized or, for air and maritime operations, their equivalents;
  - action in land operations as the lead nation at the brigade level and, together with other countries, at the army corps level, in maritime operations at the task force level and in air operations with contributions at levels equivalent to brigades;
  - carrying out special operations, including evacuation and counter-terrorism operations;
  - participation in police missions, including those of the European Gendarmerie unit, with officials and units of the military constabulary command and small-scale missions of a civilian/military nature;
  - availability of military experts for training and advising security organisations in other countries;
  - providing international emergency assistance at the request of civilian authorities;

- contributions within the borders of the Netherlands to the security of our society, under civilian authority. These contributions are both structural and incidental in nature. In total, about 25 per cent of the military portion of the armed forces is guaranteed to be available, on a rotating basis, to perform national tasks. This particularly involves:
  - performing national tasks, such as border patrol by the military constabulary command and the coast guard;
  - military assistance in enforcing law and order under criminal law as well as enforcing public order and security, as with special assistance units and explosives disposal;
  - military assistance in the event of disasters and serious accidents.

# Appendix 2

Trends in the Dutch defence budget: from 2.8% in 1989 to 1.4% now and 1.2% in 2011.





# Appendix 3

*Activities that could be included in ODA definitions:*

- overseas support in downsizing and restructuring the (military) security sector;
- destroying superfluous and illegal weapons from the security sector (i.e., not only destroying the weapons of former conflicting factions, which is currently attributable to ODA);
- educating and training DAC-I troops<sup>101</sup> in peace tasks;
- military support and training for public order tasks and other civilian tasks of defence in society;
- training soldiers in DAC-I countries with the aim of having them work according to international standards and values (such as respect for human rights, the Geneva convention), enabling them to guarantee the security needed for development and setting up the security sector so that it helps create the conditions for development;
- setting up and maintaining medical facilities (hospital function, first-line care) for the local population and also military personnel involved in the operation in question;
- arranging transport by non-DAC-I countries of soldiers from DAC-I countries to and from the operations area;
- use of resources to transport injured members of the local population and also military personnel involved in the operation in question;
- deploying military monitors in DAC-I countries to observe elections, demarcation lines, implementation of peace accords, etc.;
- protecting international observers;
- detecting or collecting, clearing and removing explosives and weapons, regardless of context, i.e., not just 'humanitarian'; operation-oriented demining also benefits the local population, for example;
- instructing security services and (local) soldiers;
- spending to hire local workers for the peace operation (job creation, on-the-job training);
- use of military resources to instruct and assist local services for crowd and riot control.

101 DAC countries are those eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA).