

PHOENIXES FROM THE ASHES?

The recovery of the *Centrumpartij* '86 and the *Centrumdemocraten*, 1989-1991

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Introduction

The 1980s saw the revival of the extreme right across much of western Europe. In France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Austria and elsewhere extreme-right parties, mobilizing on xenophobia directed against immigrants in general and on hostility towards asylum-seekers in particular, were increasingly and persistently successful as the decade wore on. Yet, there were exceptions, sometimes surprising ones. In Great Britain there had been no serious extreme-right electoral force since the mid-1970s.¹ In the Federal Republic of Germany, despite some modest successes (such as the vote of the *Deutsche Volksunion - Liste D* (DVU - Liste D) in Bremerhaven in the September 1987 election to the Bremen regional parliament), only in January 1989 did the extreme right seriously take off, with the unexpected success of *Die Republikaner* (REP) in elections to the West Berlin House of Representatives.

The Netherlands has offered a more complex picture. At the beginning of the 1980s the political racism offered by the Dutch extreme right was apparently modestly successful. The *Centrumpartij* (CP), formally founded in early 1980,² had succeeded, albeit with only 0.8 per cent of the national vote, in electing a representative, Hans Janmaat, to the Second Chamber in the September 1982 general election. In September 1983 the same party won 9.1 per cent of votes cast and two seats in a municipal election in the newly incorporated Almere (in the province of Flevoland). Then, in the June 1984 European Parliament elections the CP won 2.5 per cent of votes cast nationally, insufficient to gain a seat in the European Parliament but an impressive performance none the less, since the party won 8.1 per cent of the vote in Rotterdam, 6.9 per cent in Amsterdam, and 6.4 per cent in The Hague. Then, as is well-known,³ the party's fortunes fell apart as a result of a vicious internal squabble that saw Janmaat expelled. However, he refused to surrender his parliamentary seat and in mid-November 1984 he riposted by forming a new party, the

Centrumdemocraten (CDs).

The two parties then fought each other for a while, almost as hostile brothers, both attempting to trade on the earlier successes of the CP in its halcyon days in the early and mid-1980s. In the March 1986 Municipal Council elections the CP, trading on its better-known name, managed to outpoll the CDs, winning seats in five municipalities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Almere and Lelystad. In the Second Chamber general election two months later the CP and CDs won 0.4 and 0.1 per cent respectively of the national vote, although the former had no candidatures in the Province of Drenthe and the latter had none in Limburg. Janmaat lost his Second Chamber seat and the cause of political racism in The Netherlands seemed to many commentators to be in terminal decline, contrary by the mid-1980s to the pattern elsewhere in much of western Europe.

The ensuing years were certainly difficult ones for the extreme right in The Netherlands. In 1986 the CP became bankrupt, which was the reason for its resurrection later in the same year with the name of the *Centrum-partij '86* (CP'86). However, it still fell into decline and ineffectiveness and in the March 1987 Provincial Council elections the CDs were the only real presence representing the extreme right. The CP'86 stood only in the province of Flevoland (where it won 1.2 per cent of votes cast) and in Amsterdam, whilst the CDs stood only in the provinces of South Holland, Utrecht and parts of North Holland. Calculated on votes cast nation-wide, the CDs won 0.3 percent; in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague they won 1.4, 1.6 and 1.3 percent respectively.

Janmaat had his own difficulties. After his exclusion from the Second Chamber, the state focussed more punitive attention on his activities and in 1987 he was accused of having made insulting remarks about Turks in a television broadcast in 1983, saying that amongst those who wanted to become naturalized there were delinquents, violent criminals, rapists, murderers and occasional terrorists. In August 1987 he was in fact acquitted of this charge by a court in The Hague, the presiding judge saying that his remarks were 'tasteless but not actionable', rather than receiving the fine of f. 10,000 demanded by the prosecution.⁴

1. The revival begins

Still, by 1989 Janmaat's party had gathered itself together and begun the process of re-emerging as a political force, accompanied to a lesser extent by the CP'86. By the end of the decade The Netherlands was also experiencing the recurrence of a nervousness about immigrants that was common to a number of west-European countries, although the specific focus of the discontent was now asylum-seekers rather than immigrants in general. As a foretaste of what was to come, the CDs won 0.8 per cent of

the national vote in the June 1989 European Parliament election, insufficient to win a seat but certainly better than would have been predicted only a few months earlier and by far their best election performance so far. The subsequent September 1989 Second Chamber elections had been precipitated ahead of the four-year cycle by a disagreement about transport and environment policy between the *Christen Democratisch Appel* (CDA) and the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), the previous coalition partners. With only minimal special effort Janmaat regained his Second Chamber seat, as the CDs collected 0.9 per cent of the national vote; his status as sole representative of the extreme right gave him a special personal prominence in the legislature. The CP'86 did not contest the September 1989 election.

However, the CP'86 was apparently inspired also to gather its forces and the two parties, the CDs and the CP'86, ran in the Municipal Council elections of March 1990. This was despite an attempt by Janmaat and the CDs to prevent the CP'86 from presenting itself as the former CP. Janmaat had appealed to the Council of State against a decision by the electoral authorities to allow the CP'86 to stand in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Almere as the successor of the CP.⁵

These elections produced the most successful set of results for the Dutch extreme right since the days of the *Boerenpartij* (BP), especially in the larger cities. The national figure of CDs' support was only 0.5 per cent, but the party had not stood in many places. Yet some of their local performances were even more impressive than the official percentaged results suggest, since they were based on an electorate that included some non-Dutch voters; excluding these from the base (since very few are likely to have chosen those parties), the percentage-level of support for the CP'86 and the CDs combined often rises significantly, as the local examples given later in this chapter make clear. Still, despite their modest breakthrough in the Municipal Council elections, neither the CP'86 nor the CDs was able to field candidates in the Local Council (*deelraad*) elections within the major cities. Also indicative of the limited organizational depth of the CP'86 is that twenty-two of twenty-four names on its list in Utrecht in fact lived in distant Dordrecht and many had apparently been tricked into having their names placed on this CP'86 list. The Hague's CP'86 list also contained names from Dordrecht.

However, the Municipal Council successes produced eleven Council members for the CDs and four (later three) for the CP'86. The CDs are represented now in Amsterdam (two seats), Dordrecht (one), The Hague (two), Haarlem (one), Purmerend (one), Rotterdam (one), Schiedam (two) and Utrecht (one), whilst the CP'86 has councillors in Amsterdam (one), The Hague (one) and Rotterdam (one). In Almere the CP'86 did also win a seat but there was no-one to take it up, since the sixty-one-year-old councillor, Wim Beaux, who had sat there for four years on

behalf of the CP'86, preferred to take up a position on the Amsterdam Council and there was no available replacement. There were protests by several hundred people in Amsterdam, The Hague, Dordrecht, Purmerend and elsewhere against the installation of the extreme-right councillors.

The fourteen councillors were an interesting mixture in terms of background and character. For example, Willem Bruyn, one of the CDs' councillors in Amsterdam, was a former planner with a doctorate and had in 1971 been suggested as chairman of the *Nederlandse Volksunie* (NVU) before Joop Glimmerveen became its leader. He had had various conflicts with Janmaat in the period when the CP was breaking up, claiming that he had paid the latter f 5,000 in order to be able to take over his Second Chamber seat after two years. He has a conviction for racial insult. A further controversial figure is Richard van der Plas, the CDs' councillor in Purmerend. In October 1990 he was acquitted on a technicality after being summoned for being a member of the forbidden neo-Nazi organization, *Actiefront Nationaal Socialisten* (ANS), and for illegal possession of firearms. Mrs. Wil Schuurman, one of the CDs' two councillors in The Hague, lost a leg in a bomb attack by anti-fascists some years ago at a meeting in Kedichem; divorced and now Janmaat's partner, she has achieved international recognition in extreme-right circles. Stuart Mordaunt, now twenty-nine, was elected as head of the CP'86 list in The Hague; he is English by birth and has a history of racist and neo-fascist activity. He has for some years been chairman of the *Jongeren Front Nederland* (JFN) and has been a regular visitor to the notorious widow of Meinoud Marinus Rost van Tonningen, a leading figure in the prewar national-socialist movement, the *Nationaal Socialistische Beweging* (NSB) and member of the Second Chamber after 1937, who was subsequently condemned to death for collaboration. Overall, of the fourteen municipal councillors initially elected, three had been found guilty in the past of racist behaviour, one of these on two occasions, and the case of a fourth was being investigated at the time of the elections.

A question of some interest, especially in the light of current attempts by the CDs to incorporate the CP'86, is the nature of the relationship between the two parties on those three Municipal Councils where both are represented. Certainly, although the public image of both is mutual disapproval, it has been suggested that private fraternizing is not unknown. Stuart Mordaunt, the CP'86's voice in The Hague, is said to be on reasonable personal terms with Mrs. Wil Schuurman, one of the CDs' two members. Still, uncompromising public cooperation between the two wings of the extreme right does not apparently occur.

The general reaction of the other parties to the extreme-right councillors

has been ostracism and exclusion. Amsterdam officials intended to keep their servicing of these councillors to an absolute minimum and in numerous cities, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Purmerend, other parties deliberately excluded CD and/or CP'86 councillors from committees, although in the context of national politics a VVD member called in May 1990 for a discontinuation of the Second Chamber's ostracism policy against Janmaat. In August 1990 Amsterdam decided against any attempt to prevent gatherings of the CP'86, basing its decision on the ground that the party was recognized by electoral law and not judicially proscribed.

2. Consolidation after the peak of support

In the Provincial Council elections in March 1991 the CP'86 stood only in the provinces of North Holland, South Holland and North Brabant (winning 0.3 percent of the national vote), while the CDs stood in the provinces of Flevoland, Friesland, Gelderland, North Brabant, North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht, winning 1.0 per cent of votes cast nationally. Both parties slipped back very slightly in comparison with the results of a year earlier but the CDs still performed well enough to take single seats in the North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht Provincial Councils, with 2.1, 2.1 and 1.6 per cent of votes cast respectively. Janmaat was elected to each of the first two councils, as head of both of his party's lists, but he withdrew from each in favour of an alternate in view of his parliamentary commitments. As in the past, both the North and South Holland councillors were the targets of anti-racist protests when they later took up their seats for the first time.

Despite this relative resurgence in support for the Dutch extreme right, it is not clear that there has been a commensurate take-off in terms of the numbers of activists. In 1990 it was estimated that the CDs had about 1,000 members, only about a hundred of them active; the CP'86's national membership was put at a mere seventy-five.⁶

3. Analysing the characteristics of extreme-right support in The Netherlands

There have been several studies of support for the two extreme-right parties, both during the CP's first phase of success and during the surge of votes for the two together from 1989. Some of these are based on individual-level data, either nationally or locally collected, whilst others are based on urban subarea data, usually in the three largest cities. However, only from the period in the early and mid-1980s when the CP was in the ascendant are there available significant studies that show some characteristics of individual extremeright sympathizers. These are

drawn upon generously by van Donselaar and van Praag in their round-up of relevant research, which also included aggregate-data studies then available.⁷ De Hond's large-sample analysis derived from 21,000 telephone interviews showed some particular, often predictable, distinctivenesses in CP supporters. They tended to be male and to have lower educational attainment, lower-than-average incomes and no religious affiliation, in comparison with the general Dutch population. They were more urban-based, stronger in the west of the country and (unsurprisingly) had little trust in government.⁸ Rath's study of voting for the Local Councils in Rotterdam in 1984 showed the usual pro-male disposition among CP voters; there were even occasional CP supporters in his sample of non-Dutch and Surinamese/Antillianese voters.⁹ Rather interestingly, Buijs and Rath's research on the Rotterdam Municipal Council elections in March 1986, which sampled in two predominantly working-class areas of the city, found no extra disposition among the unemployed to favour the CP,¹⁰ perhaps attenuating some of the emphasis placed upon this factor by numerous commentators offering hypotheses about the characteristics of individual supporters of the extreme right. Rath's study of the Rotterdam Municipal Council elections four years later presents little data on CP '86 and CD support, except that it is clear the pro-male disposition persists.¹¹ However, although at the individual level extreme-right support probably has a set of more general social characteristics that have remained relatively unchanged since the surge of the early 1980s, it must be said that analyses of recent support have been obliged to rely for the most part on aggregate data, usually for urban subareas. This chapter follows the same practice.

It is clearly important to recognize the weaknesses, as well as the strengths, of such aggregate-data analyses. They are well-suited to offering a descriptive summary of the social and economic character of neighbourhoods where the extreme right has performed well; however, they are less useful in enabling one to prioritize the causes of such support, either at the aggregate level or (even less so) at the individual level, since aggregate data cannot in general substitute for missing individual-level data. Thus, whilst it is tempting, as was done by Witte in 1991,¹² to use regression analyses to prioritize predictors of such voting at the subarea level, such methods are made problematic by the often very high levels of collinearity between the 'competing' independent variables. Thus, once one variable has explained its share of variation in the dependent variable, there is little further leverage available to others with which it correlates; also for the same reason, attempts to 'force' a number of 'competing' independent variables into a single analysis not infrequently produce partial coefficients with counter-intuitive signs under control conditions. Across seventy-eight *buurtcombinaties* of Amsterdam,

the percentage of foreigners in 1990 correlates 0.680 with the level of unemployment among the economically active population. The percentage of Turks and Moroccans in the population in 1990 correlates 0.739 with the percentage-point change in the presence of these ethnic groups between 1987 and 1990; thus, it is problematic with such data to discriminate between the hypotheses, on the one hand, that the native Dutch react to the presence of such groups and, on the other, that they react to the rate of increase of this presence. In Rotterdam the respective correlation coefficients are still higher, revealing even greater collinearity than among the Amsterdam subarea data. Across Rotterdam's twenty-five *wijken* (excluding the Hook of Holland), foreigners' presence in 1988 correlates 0.955 with the 1987 rate of unemployment; the presence of Turks and Moroccans in 1988 correlates 0.882 with the respective percentage-point change in their presence since 1984. To be sure, across thirty-three *wijken* in The Hague (for which up-to-date unemployment data could not be obtained) foreigners' presence in 1989 does correlate only 0.426 with the aggregate socio-economic status score; however, the presence of Turks and Moroccans in 1989 correlates 0.955 with the percentage-point change in their presence since 1980.

Nor are these aggregate electoral data particularly suited to making inferences about voters' origins and destinations. Various methods do exist that seek to accomplish this but their results are liable to instability in a multi-party situation where partisan support is in such flux. In the present case of the Dutch extreme right, there is curiosity, of course, about the source of its increased support in the March 1990 Municipal Council elections. Thus, in Amsterdam (taking this city as an example) the 18,800 votes on that occasion for the two extreme-right parties together compare with 11,182 received by the CDs in the September 1989 Second Chamber election, an increase of 7,618. However, it becomes a difficult matter to assess the degree of stability of the earlier vote or the origin of the extra support, when this increase - considered overall - is really rather trivial. Thus, the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) lost 80,563 votes in Amsterdam between the two elections. It might be thought that this decline offered plenty of scope for the extreme right to benefit. However, the CDA itself lost 23,308 votes and the VVD 9,558. True the *Democraten '66* (D'66) gained, but only 11,061. In short, it would be extremely precarious to correlate types of intra-party vote turnover across subareas in order to infer the source of the extreme right's vote. Two further major complications in this particular analysis would be differential turnout and the differently sized electorates. In September 1989 358,769 valid votes were cast in Amsterdam out of an electorate of 508,361 (70.6 per cent). In March 1990 the figure was 276,684 out of 545,970 (50.7 per cent). In the latter election certain non-Dutch were also

entitled to vote.

It may perhaps be instructive, if seeking some guidance about the origin of the extreme right's support, to refer back to individual-level data available about the sudden burst of support for the CP between 1981 and 1982; however, this practice can be followed only with significant caveats, since there is no reason to equate the overall political situations of the two occasions. However, Daudt has shown that over a fifth of CP voters in the September 1982 Second Chamber elections came from the May 1981 supporters of the PvdA, and about the same number were from the previous year's CP voters.¹³

4. Principal electoral results of the Dutch extreme right, 1989-1991

In Tables 1, 2 and 3 are presented aggregate-data analyses of the support won by the CP'86 and the CDs, where candidatures were offered, in the three cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague in the four sets of national elections since June 1989: the June 1989 European Parliament election; the September 1989 Second Chamber election; the March 1990 Municipal Council elections; and the March 1991 Provincial Council elections. Ever since the days of the NVU in the late 1970s, the support for the extreme right in The Netherlands has always been a particularly metropolitan phenomenon in the provinces of North Holland and South Holland, especially in these three cities - which considerably justifies the research attention being paid to them. This continuing concentration of support for these two parties is immediately apparent from the levels of their support shown in the three tables, as compared with corresponding nation-wide percentages. In fact, in these four elections the three cities contained only between 11 and 12 per cent of the total Dutch electorate, slightly higher in March 1990 because of the inclusion of the non-Dutch voters. In comparison, 29.6 per cent of the CDs' total national vote in the June 1989 Euro-election was cast in these three cities. In the September 1989 general election this figure rose to 35.4 per cent. In the March 1990 elections the analogous percentage was 72.2 per cent for the CDs; data on nation-wide support for the CP'86 alone were not given in the official publication of results from the Central Bureau for Statistics. In the March 1991 Provincial Council elections 49.6 per cent of the CP'86's vote was in these three cities; for the CDs it was slightly less, 37.8 per cent. Of course, these figures for the 1990 and 1991 elections are heightened by the failure of both parties, especially the CP'86, to offer candidatures in many locations; still, that fact alone demonstrates their particular concentration in the major cities of North and South Holland.

The analyses of the subarea-level distributions of CP'86 and CDs' support in the three cities thus seek only to provide general characterizations of

the locations where these parties attracted their best results. This is the practical limit of certainty with available data and is to be done by means of zero-order Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.

4.1 The city of Amsterdam

In Table 1 are given data and analyses for the performances of the CP'86 and the CDs in Amsterdam in the four elections from 1989 to 1991, based upon seventy-eight city *buurtcombinaties* (as formed after some necessary amalgamation of certain of the smallest such subareas whose election results are reported only aggregated with those of an adjacent larger subarea). Support for both parties, individually and together, rose from June 1989 to reach a maximum in the March 1990 Municipal Council elections, especially so after incorporating an adjustment in the base of support to exclude non-Dutch voters in these latter elections from the denominator of the percentage calculations. On that basis some of the percentages of support become truly substantial: thus, in the extreme case, about 24 per cent of Dutch voters in De Kolenkit (on the western side of the city in the Bos and Lommer area) voted CP'86 or CD in March 1990, with almost 20 per cent of such voters there favouring the CDs; the figures for both Dutch and non-Dutch voters were 14.2 and 11.5 per cent respectively. In Erasmuspark (also in the Bos and Lommer area and abutting on to De Kolenkit) the respective percentages were 23 and 16 per cent; among both Dutch and non-Dutch voters these percentages were 16.6 and 11.4 per cent. Turnout in both cases was a little under 50 percent of registered electors. Of course, concern about the strength of this support has to be tempered by the fact that the subareas concerned are quite small and local. Although overall support for the extreme right had somewhat declined by the Provincial Council elections a year later, the level of support of the two extreme-right parties in De Kolenkit was still 12.5 percent, with 10.1 per cent for the CDs. In Erasmuspark the figures were 14.1 and also 10.1 per cent.

It is also instructive to note that, despite the changed circumstances in the late-1980s - now with two extreme-right parties instead of one and the additional issue of asylum-seekers around which these parties could seek to mobilize support - all the subarea-level distributions from 1989 to 1991 correlate quite highly with the earlier performances of the CP, for example, in the September 1982 Second Chamber election. The mean correlation coefficient between this 1982 CP vote and the eight subarea-level vote-distributions presented in Table 1 is 0.69.

In Table 1 have also been presented the zero-order correlates with a number of aggregate variables, measured at the *buurtcombinatie* level, with which it has been suggested, on the basis of various hypotheses about ethnic exclusionism, inter-ethnic competition and/or material

Table 1. Selected univariate statistics of percentaged support for the *Centrumpartij '86* and the *Centrumdemocraten* and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between these distributions and some aggregate characteristics in seventy-eight *buurtcombinaties* of Amsterdam, 1989-1991

Date and type of election	Party	Mean support	% foreigners, 1990	% Turks & Moroccans, 1990	Change in Turks & Moroccans, 1987-1990	% unemployed, 1990	Status score, 1990 ¹
15 June 1989 (European Parliament)	CD	2.3	0.357	0.526	0.206	- 0.020	0.049
6 September 1989 (Second Chamber)	CD	3.1	0.389	0.566	0.212	- 0.008	- 0.044
21 March 1990 (Municipal Councils) ²	CP'86	3.2	0.505	0.593	0.223	0.125	- 0.068
	CD	5.9	0.512	0.623	0.263	0.104	- 0.101
	Total	9.1	0.541	0.650	0.265	0.118	- 0.095
6 March 1991 (Provincial Councils)	CP'86	1.4	0.318	0.489	0.212	- 0.063	0.013
	CD	4.1	0.353	0.556	0.236	- 0.052	- 0.007
	Total	5.5	0.362	0.565	0.242	- 0.058	- 0.001

1. The status scores in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are derived directly or after categorization from subarea-level factor scores from the socio-economic dimension of a factor analysis of standard socio-economic variables. They have been calculated by the author from his own data-compilation in the case of Amsterdam in this table and have been taken from relevant official sources in the cases of Rotterdam and The Hague in Tables 2 and 3. Lower scores indicate lower socio-economic status.

2. For the March 1990 Municipal Council elections the levels of percentaged support used for the extreme-right parties in Tables 1, 2 and 3 have been adjusted by an estimate of the presence of foreigners in order to exclude them from the numerical base on which the percentaged support has been calculated.

deprivation that the distribution of extreme-right support might correlate.¹⁴ It will be seen that the pattern of this support in Amsterdam has certain specific features, in contrast with the forthcoming analyses for Rotterdam and The Hague. All the vote-distributions have modest to middling correlations in a positive direction with the presence of foreigners, but this latter variable is a rather poor operationalization of the salience of ethnic outgroups in the case of Amsterdam. As expected, there are higher correlations with the presence of Turks and Moroccans, who are among the most socially-distant ethnic outgroups in the Dutch context because of their Islamic culture;¹⁵ yet even these coefficients are not as high as complementary ones in the other cities to be examined. As mentioned above, the local presence of Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam in 1990 is quite strongly associated with the change in the level of their presence between 1987 and 1990, albeit less so than in Rotterdam and The Hague. Interestingly, the former was not correlated at all with conventional measures of aggregate socio-economic status (such as the unemployment rate); this non-existent relationship is a consequence of the idiosyncratic way in which the city of Amsterdam has developed throughout the twentieth century and then accommodated its Turk and Moroccan immigrant population since their settlement became established from the 1960s.¹⁶ The relationship between the extreme-right votes and the percentage-point change in Turks and Moroccans between 1987 and 1990 is fairly small in Amsterdam's case¹⁷ and with the socio-economic variables it is non-existent. As found also in Loef's study, subarea-level relationships between extreme-right support in Amsterdam and variables measuring the salience of those of Surinamese or Antillianese origin were for the most part non-existent and sometimes even negative.

4.2 The city of Rotterdam

In Table 2 are given data and analyses, complementary to those in Table 1, for the performances of the CP'86 and the CDs in Rotterdam, based upon twenty-five *wijken* (i.e., excluding the Hook of Holland), in the four elections from 1989 to 1991. As in Amsterdam, support for both parties, individually and together, rose from June 1989 to reach a maximum in the March 1990 Municipal Council elections. About 21 per cent of Dutch voters in Spangen and Witte Dorp (on the west of the city, towards Schiedam) voted CP'86 or CDs in March 1990, with 10 per cent of such voters there favouring the former and 11 per cent the latter; if we include non-Dutch voters, the figures drop to 6.0 and 6.9 per cent respectively. In Delfshaven, Bospolder and Tussendijken (immediately south and south-east of Spangen, between it and a major harbour-complex) the respective percentages for Dutch voters only were 18, 9 and 9 per cent;

Table 2. Selected univariate statistics of percentaged support for the *Centrumpartij '86* and the *Centrumdemocraten* and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between these distributions and some aggregate characteristics in twenty-five *wijken* of Rotterdam (excluding Hook of Holland), 1989-1991

Date and type of election	Party	Mean support	% foreigners, 1988	% Turks & Moroccans, 1988	Change in Turks & Moroccans, 1984-1988	% unemployed, 1987	Status score, 1986
15 June 1989 (European Parliament)	CD	2.7	0.733	0.758	0.738	0.815	- 0.756
6 September 1989 (Second Chamber)	CD	3.4	0.734	0.765	0.790	0.836	- 0.765
21 March 1990 (Municipal Councils)	CP'86	4.1	0.848	0.841	0.836	0.898	- 0.846
	CD	4.7	0.759	0.790	0.779	0.842	- 0.775
	Total	8.8	0.824	0.838	0.829	0.894	- 0.832
6 March 1991 (Provincial Councils)	CP'86	1.7	0.666	0.686	0.756	0.778	- 0.721
	CD	4.1	0.613	0.668	0.750	0.680	- 0.628
	Total	5.8	0.647	0.692	0.773	0.730	- 0.675

among both Dutch and non-Dutch voters these percentages were 12.9, 6.0 and 5.7 percent. Turnout in both *wijken* was less than 40 per cent in March 1990. In the Provincial Council elections a year later, the percentage support of the two extreme-right parties in Spangen and Witte Dorp was still 13.4 per cent, with 9.1 per cent for the CDs. In Delfshaven, Bospolder and Tussendijken these figures were 10.1 and 7.2 per cent.

Even more than in Amsterdam, the subarea-level vote-distributions from 1989 to 1991 correlate with the earlier performances of the CP, as in the September 1982 Second Chamber election. The mean correlation coefficient between the 1982 CP vote and the eight subarea-level vote-distributions presented in Table 2 is 0.79.

In Table 2 have also been presented zero-order correlates of the aggregate variables, measured at the *wijk* level, that were introduced in the case of Amsterdam. As will be seen, the pattern of correlation is much more straightforward. All variables in this analysis - the presence of foreigners in 1988, and of Turks and Moroccans, the percentage-point change in their presence between 1984 and 1988, the rate of unemployment in 1987 and the overall socio-economic status score in 1986 - correlate highly and positively with the various CP'86 and CD candidacies (separately and combined) from 1989 to 1991. Their mean correlation, with remarkably little variation between candidacies and variables, is 0.76. However, unlike Amsterdam, there was in Rotterdam a high correlation between extreme-right support and the local presence of Surinamese, a consequence of the fact that the pattern of their settlement resembles that of Rotterdam's Turks and Moroccans.

Thus, the extreme-right vote in Rotterdam can be described unambiguously as a phenomenon concentrated in poorer neighbourhoods that contain a disproportion of foreigners, especially Turks and Moroccans, and of Surinamese. In this respect it shows considerable continuity with support for earlier extreme-right phenomena in the early 1980s.

4.3 The city of The Hague

In Table 3 are given the data and analyses, analogous except in one respect to those in Tables 1 and 2, for the performances of the CP'86 and the CDs in The Hague, based upon thirty-three *wijken* (as formed after some necessary amalgamation of certain of the smallest such subareas whose election results are reported only aggregated with those of an adjacent larger subarea), in the four elections from 1989 to 1991. As in the two previous cases, support for both parties, individually and together, rose from June 1989 to reach a maximum in the March 1990 Municipal Council elections, although the fall in the March 1991

Table 3. Selected univariate statistics of percentaged support for the *Centrumpartij '86* and the *Centrumdemocraten* and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between these distributions and some aggregate characteristics in thirty-three *wijken* of The Hague, 1989-1991

Date and type of election	Party	Mean support	% foreigners, 1989	% Turks & Moroccans, 1989	Change in Turks & Moroccans, 1980-1989 ¹	% under Fl. 8,000 per annum, 1971	Status score, 1980
15 June 1989 (European Parliament)	CD	2.3	0.517	0.696	0.747	0.616	- 0.751
6 September 1989 (Second Chamber)	CD	3.2	0.533	0.678	0.740	0.570	- 0.682
21 March 1990 (Municipal Councils)	CP'86	2.3	0.551	0.715	0.725	0.640	- 0.791
	CD	4.7	0.466	0.663	0.744	0.549	- 0.718
	Total	7.0	0.506	0.696	0.755	0.593	- 0.760
6 March 1991 (Provincial Councils)	CP'86	1.5	0.520	0.670	0.686	0.377	- 0.583
	CD	4.5	0.531	0.709	0.760	0.669	- 0.790
	Total	6.0	0.553	0.732	0.775	0.615	- 0.768

The fact that The Hague's official data-book has not been republished for a number of years accounts for the age of some of the data used in the last three columns of Table 3.

Provincial Council elections was quite small. Still, even in 1990 the extreme right was slightly less successful with its performances in The Hague than with those in the other two cities considered. About 14 percent of Dutch voters in Transvaalkwartier (in the centre of the city) voted CP'86 or CDs in March 1990, with 5 per cent of such voters there favouring the former and 10 per cent the latter; the figures for both Dutch and non-Dutch voters were 3.2 and 6.7 per cent respectively. In Schildersbuurt (immediately east of Transvaalkwartier) the respective percentages were 13,4 and 9 per cent; among both Dutch and non-Dutch voters these percentages were 8,3, 2,9 and 5,4 per cent. The turnout was 35.1 per cent in Transvaalkwartier and 33.2 per cent in Schildersbuurt. Over a quarter of the former's population and a third of the latter's were Turkish or Moroccan at the end of 1989. In the Provincial Council elections a year later, the percentage support of the two extreme-right parties in Transvaalkwartier was 13.0 per cent, with 10.0 per cent for the CDs. In Schildersbuurt the figures were 13.0 and 9.6 per cent.

As in Rotterdam, the subarea-level vote-distributions from 1989 to 1991 correlate strongly with the earlier performances of the CP, such as in the September 1982 Second Chamber election. The mean correlation coefficient between the 1982 CP vote and the eight subarea-level vote-distributions presented in Table 3 is 0.84.

In Table 3 have also been presented zero-order correlates of aggregate variables, measured at the *wijk* level, that (with one exception) were introduced in the cases of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The exception is that an aggregate measure of *wijk* income level has been substituted for the rate of unemployment, which was not available in published form. As will be seen, the pattern of correlations very much resembles that of Rotterdam. All variables in this analysis - the presence of foreigners in 1989, and of Turks and Moroccans, the percentage-point change in their presence between 1980 and 1980, the percentage of households earning less than fl. 8,000 in 1971 and the overall socio-economic status score in 1980 - correlate highly and positively with the various CP'86 and CDs candidacies (separately and combined) from 1989 to 1991. Their mean correlation is 0.65, with only slight variation between candidacies and variables; the column of coefficients with the percentage of foreigners (which, as in Amsterdam, is a poorer operationalization of the presence of ethnic outgroups) is slightly lower than in Rotterdam and the CP'86 support in March 1991 has somewhat lesser correlations than do the other candidacies with the socio-economic variables. The correlation between support for the extreme-right and the presence of Surinamese is moderate, averaging 0.50, in the case of The Hague - less than in Rotterdam but much more than in Amsterdam. Still, the Surinamese and the Turks and Moroccans do tend to live in the same neighbourhoods of The Hague.

It is worth observing in the light of the foregoing analyses that The Netherlands offers one specific model of what can happen to the electoral support of the extreme right when there is a party fission. In some cases, one new party attracts a reactionary bourgeois support, whilst the other culls the votes of working-class racists, as respectively in Switzerland's split in the 1970s between the *Schweizerische Republikanische Bewegung* (SRB) and the formerly named *Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat* (NA). However, in the Dutch case the two parties that emerged from the split apparently have types of support that in social and motivational terms have been rather similar, in both cases generally working-class voters opposed to the local presence of particular ethnic outgroups.

Thus, the pattern of support for the Dutch extreme right has remained stable throughout the 1980s in the areas of its special strength. Indeed, as documented elsewhere,¹⁸ there are subarea-level continuities in these cities with the earlier support of the NVU and even the performances of the BP towards the end of its career as a political party.

Conclusion: the current role of the extreme right

The Dutch extreme right in the early 1990s has clearly become a presence within the political system but its local basis and limited strength mean that it is far less a significant actor than are comparable groups in such other west-European countries as France and Belgium. It has hardly insinuated its way into local institutions, as has happened in (for example) France. True, it did slightly embarrass the CDA by awarding the latter its three Provincial Councillors' votes for their candidates for the First Chamber in May 1991.¹⁹

There have been several overtures from the CDs that the CP'86 should merge with them²⁰ but, despite the obvious relative weakness of the latter, these overtures have not been accepted, in part because many in the CP'86 could not readily work with Janmaat in the light of their complaints about his behaviour when he was expelled from the CP in 1984. Instead, CP'86 has in recent years been developing links with the Belgian *Vlaams Blok* (VB).²¹ Thus, on 7 August 1990 sixteen members of the VB and CP'86, including the former's leader, Karel Dillen, were arrested in Dordrecht, when they attempted to hold a forbidden press conference against an exhibition opposing the various extreme-right parties of several European countries.²²

In attempting to assess the future development of the extreme right in The Netherlands, it is important that an appropriate perspective be maintained. Although Dutch anti-fascists are prone to see dangers in the resurgence of the extreme right since 1989, this matter must be seen in a relative light. For in contemporary European terms The Netherlands

presents an interesting, but minor, example of the extreme-right phenomenon. Very differently from countries such as Belgium and France, Maoláin's compendium reports relatively few extreme-right groups there.²³ The European Parliament's report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia mentions the CDs and CP'86, plus only three small neo-Nazi groups, none of them particularly significant in profile.²⁴ Looking at the wider public, nation-wide opinion polls conducted by NIPO, the Dutch branch of Gallup International, were reporting support for the CDs at 0.5, 0.4 and 0.5 per cent, as cumulated from each week's omnibus results in the first, second and third quarters respectively of 1991.²⁵ Even if, as is likely, these data are substantially under-culling the true numbers of the CDs' supporters (say, by a half), the party would still secure only one seat in a nation-wide general election to the Second Chamber.

Thus, the Dutch extreme right, despite the assistance that it has received from the country's voting system in local and national elections and despite its occasional street presence in the major cities of the country, is comparable to that in Great Britain. Certainly, there is no sense in which the Dutch example has the importance of that in France or even Belgium, where Flemish nationalism has so stimulated the VB's support. Moreover, Eisinga, Lammers and Carton have shown with survey-based measures that there is a smaller attitudinal potential for the extreme right in The Netherlands than there is in Flanders.²⁶ In their study only 5 per cent of a sample of 1,185 Dutch adults gave racist explanations for inequalities between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in the country; the respective percentage among a sample of 444 Flemings was 21 per cent. More than 36 per cent of the Dutch respondents explained such inequality by social and cultural circumstances that could be improved; among the Flemings only 21 per cent took such a view. Of course, the Dutch extreme-right parties have to an extent agenda-set, as else where in western Europe, but the recent restrictive initiatives on immigration and asylum-seekers are likely to have been adopted in any case.

notes

1. See C. T. Husbands, 'Why has there been no extreme right in Great Britain?', *LSE Magazine*, Spring 1992, forthcoming.
2. For descriptions of the foundation and early history of the CP/CP'86 see: K. Brants and W. Hogendoorn, *Van vreemde smetten vrij: opkomst van de Centrumpartij*, Bussum: 1983, 18-20; J. van Donselaar, *Fout na de oorlog: fascistische en racistische organisaties in Nederland, 1950-1990*, Amsterdam: 1991, 172-184; A. P. M. Lucardie and G. Voerman, 'Extreem-rechts in Nederland: de Centrumdemocraten en hun radicale rivalen - I', *Namens*, 5 (1990), no. 5/6, 22-27; C. T. Husbands, 'The

- Netherlands: irritants on the body politic', in P.Hainsworth (ed.), *The extreme right in Europe and North America since 1945*, London: 1992, forthcoming.
3. See especially van Donselaar, *op. cit.*, 193-199.
 4. E.g., see *De Volkskrant*, 19 August 1987.
 5. See *De Volkskrant*, 20 February 1990.
 6. European Parliament, *Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia on the findings of the Committee of Inquiry*, European Parliament Document A3-195/90, 1990, 29.
 7. J. van Donselaar and C. van Praag, *Stemmen op de Centruumpartij: de opkomst van anti-vreemdelingen partijen in Nederland*, Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen (COMT), University of Leiden, Publication No. 13, 1983, 62-74.
 8. M. de Hond, *De opkomst van de Centruumpartij: een onderzoek onder de aanhang van de Centruumpartij in het najaar van 1983*, Amsterdam: 1983.
 9. J. Rath, *Migranten, de Centruumpartij en de deelraadsverkiezingen van 16 mei 1984 te Rotterdam*, Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen (COMT), University of Leiden, Publication No. 20, 1985, 187-189.
 10. F. Buijs and J. Rath, *De stem van migranten en werklozen: de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 19 maart te Rotterdam*, Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen (COMT), University of Leiden, Publication No. 25, 1986, 48.
 11. J. Rath, *Kenterend tij: migranten en de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 21 maart 1990 te Rotterdam*, Vakgroep Culturele Antropologie, University of Utrecht, 1990, 31.
 12. R. B. J. Witte, 'De onbegrepen verkiezingsuitslag voor extreem-rechts', *Acta Politica*, 26 (1991), no. 4, 449-470.
 13. H. Daudt, 'Wisselende kiezers', *Acta Politica*, 18 (1983), no. 2, 274-286.
 14. Rather puzzlingly, Witte, *op.cit.*, uses only data on the presence of non-Dutch ('allochtonen') rather than a more elaborate ethnic-group disaggregation; still, he does consider a number of other variables. The same cannot be said of a rather shoddy and over-simple study by Hoogendoorn and his colleagues, which merely used the non-Dutch measure alone in the country's four major cities, applying this to results for the CP in September 1982 and the CDs in September 1989. See J. Hoogendoorn, J. Kok, T. de Reuver and R. de Weijze, *Extreem-rechts en allochtonen in de vier grote steden: een problematische relatie*, Planologisch Demografisch Instituut, University of Amsterdam, Working Paper No. 122.
 15. L. Hagendoorn and J. Hraba, 'Foreign, different, deviant, seclusive and working class: anchors to an ethnic hierarchy in The Netherlands', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12 (1989), no. 4, 441-468.

16. H. van Amersfoort, 'Immigration and settlement in the Netherlands', *New Community*, 11 (1984), no. 3, 214-224.
17. However, using data on the *stadsdeel*-level, Loef showed a strong relationship between the CDs' support in September 1989 and the increase in Turks and Moroccans between 1982 and 1988. See K. Loef, *Centrumdemocraten in Amsterdam: een cijfermatige analyse in opdracht van het College van B en W*, Amsterdam: 1990, 4-5.
18. See Husbands, 'The Netherlands: irritants on the body politic', *op.cit.*
19. *Algemeen Dagblad*, 14 May 1991.
20. E.g., see the CDs' publication, *CD-info* 5, no. 2 (2 February 1992), col. 6.
21. See C. T. Husbands, 'Belgium: Flemish legions on the march', in P. Hainsworth (ed.), *The extreme right in Europe and North America since 1945*, London: 1992, forthcoming.
22. *NRC Handelsblad*, 7 August 1990, 1, 3.
23. C.O. Maoláin, (comp.), *The radical right: a world directory*, Harlow: 1987, 198-202.
24. European Parliament, *Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia on the findings of the Committee of Inquiry*, *op.cit.*, 1990, 29-30.
25. These figures have been calculated from print-outs of the results of NIPO's omnibus survey made available by the Steinmetz-archief in Amsterdam. The author is grateful for access to these data.
26. R. Eisinga, A. Carton en J. Lammers, 'Nederlanders en Vlamingen over de oorzaken van sociaal-economische ongelijkheid tussen allochtonen en autochtonen', *Sociologische Gids*, 39 (1992), no. 1, 4-27.